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

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The Myth of the 'New History': The Techniques and Tactics of the New Mythologists of American History

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To Rousas J. Rushdoony, an intrepid defender of our American heritage.

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THE MYTH OF THE 'NEW HISTORY'

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INTRODUCTION

One of the eight major crises dealt with in the following *Study Guide* is American participation in World War II. There are many lessons to be learned by America from that conflict. Let us consider, as an example, the lessons to be learned from the defeat of Germany. The use of the German example in this introductory essay is in no sense prompted by any special solicitude about the role of Germany in the modern world. My major field of study in the Harvard Graduate School, so far as the area of European history is concerned, was not Germany but Russia. The only foreign system which I have praised in any of my writings as being especially well suited to meet the problems with which it was confronted was the French Third Republic, 1870-1940. The motive behind the employment of the German example in the present context is that it meets the requirements of what Spengler would have called the effective historical analogy. The failure to adapt her economic policies to meet a specific challenge spelled doom for Germany in World War II, and a corresponding failure on our part in facing the Soviet challenge of today could steal from our own country its promising future. It would not matter whether the failure was prompted by a distorted interpretation of devotion to principle or by the underestimation of a challenge; the latter was the decisive factor in the case of Germany. Paradoxical it may seem, but a country such as ours must strengthen its understanding of and trust in its own valid basic principles, in order, if necessary, to pursue emergency policies successfully for the moment, as in the case of our temporary monetary inflation during the American Revolution, in the interest of a better future. The specifically American system consists of a Christian constitutional system of limitations in politics and a free market along scriptural lines in economics. These values alone are conducive to the fulfillment of the American genius, and they are well worth

defending. But situations arise in the history of this world when one must be prepared to risk all in order to gain all. Such times of challenge can be surmounted successfully when enough people in the society realize the nature of the heritage to be preserved and are willing to employ the necessary means to preserve it.

The German National Socialist government made many cardinal mistakes during World War II, but undoubtedly the most important one was in the field of conservative economics. Scores of writers have pointed out that Germany's wartime position might have been less desperate had she pursued a different Eastern policy. Her Eastern policy tended to exclude the great Russian people from the family of Indo-European nations. This was no doubt a product of the Spenglerian influence. The National Socialists opposed Spengler's cultural pessimism, but they were nevertheless seduced by some of his cultural theories. For instance, Spengler claimed that Russia had joined Asia with the success of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. A dearth of competent advisers at the top level prompted the National Socialist leaders to accept this thesis.

Let us suppose, however, that the Germans had employed a different Eastern policy. They might have accompanied their preventive war against the homeland of world revolution in June, 1941, with the proclamation of a White Russian regime and an appeal for White Russian military support in terminating the hated Bolshevik oppression. Such a policy, paradoxical as it may sound, would scarcely have affected the outcome of the war to a major extent due to the nature of Germany's prevailing conservative economic policies. Germany simply would not have been in a position to equip adequate large numbers of White Russian volunteers. Eight hundred thousand White Russians who did in fact serve under German leadership during World War II never had adequate military equipment. The Rumanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Finnish satellite armies allied to Germany were constantly short of minimum requirements in the field of army ordnance.

The Anglo-American bloc, on the other hand, employed radically different economic policies from those of Germany during World War II, and especially during the crucial first

three years of that conflict. The Anglo-American bloc, unlike Germany, was not greatly worried by the possible consequences of massive deficit spending and creeping inflation. This wartime complacency in the vital economic sphere is reflected today in the huge public debt of the 160,000 units of government here in these United States. But, in terms of the immediate issue, there can be no doubt that the Anglo-American bloc with their Keynesian economic theories greatly outproduced Germany with their more conservative economic policies, although German-occupied Europe in 1940 had a greater immediate industrial potential than Great Britain and the United States combined.

Burton Klein, in his *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Harvard University Press, 1959), has explained the discrepancies between the economic policies of Germany and the Anglo-American bloc. The German leadership with its conservative economic advisers did not wish to subject the German people to the hazards of inflation and excessive deficit spending. They rejected John Maynard Keynes. The final result was that the entire German people ended up in slavery in 1945 under indescribably barbaric measures inflicted from West and East alike. Germany had ignored the fundamental lesson of high politics to the effect that the measures of rivals have to be countered one way or another. France introduced the standing army in the fifteenth century. This was no doubt a bad thing, but her neighbors on land found no alternative other than to duplicate her procedure. This state of affairs was clearly recognized by Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist,* no. 26, 1788. God's gift to America of a favorable geographical position enabled her to adopt milder military defense policies than was true for the mighty European nations crowded closely one upon another. The fact that England did not follow the example of France's neighbors on land in adopting large standing armies reflected no special English virtue, but rather a different geographical position, symbolized by the English Channel. The same process appeared in relation to the system of military conscription devised for revolutionary France by Lazarus Carnot in 1793. The land neighbors of France had to follow the French

example because they failed to devise any suitable alternatives. England and America did not have to follow the French example because different geographical conditions provided an alternative for them.

Ray Stannard Baker suggests that President Wilson in 1915 considered that a democracy ceases to be a democracy when peacetime military conscription is introduced.[1] Whether or not this independent American republic has in fact ever been a political democracy in any meaningful sense of that term will not be argued here. Wilson evidently thought that the United States was a democracy. What must be emphasized here is the widely shared view of President Wilson that the nature of a national defense policy can be relevant to defining the ideological affiliation of a nation. This assumption might not have been made had President Wilson, whose specialty was domestic politics, fully realized that the national defense policies of the modern states are dictated by special physical circumstances, and that ideological questions are irrelevant to the hard necessities of such facts in the cases of any nations which have a real will to survive.

Germany, in 1939, may have detested Keynes' inflationary economics at the top leadership level. Very good, but her national existence was at stake. As demonstrated in my book, *When Peaceful Revision Failed,* (Devin-Adair, New York, 1964), Germany, whatever her faults in her own domestic system and foreign policy, was the victim of an English Tory conspiracy in September, 1939. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had secretly seized control of British foreign policy from peace-loving Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in October, 1938. Halifax was enabled to do this by threatening to resign from Chamberlain's Cabinet in the midst of a torrent of Tory criticism of the Munich Agreement in both houses of the British Parliament during October, 1938 (opposition from Labour and the Liberals was taken for granted, but defection in the Tory ranks jeopardized Chamberlain's position; he surrendered to Halifax rather than resign). During more than ten months which followed, Halifax conducted a single-minded campaign to plunge Germany into war, and in such a way as to make Germany appear to be the guilty party.

His ingenious scheme was carried out against the wishes of the majority of the top English experts on Germany, as well as against the peace efforts of Pope Pius XII; (these Papal efforts in 1939 were in themselves quite a contrast to 1914, when the Holy See encouraged Catholic Austria to undertake reprisals against the terrorist policies of Greek Orthodox Serbia). Halifax's scheme was carried out in the face of similar efforts to maintain the peace on the part of the French, Italian, and German leaders. Poland was the pawn in the game, and by September 3, 1939, a new general European war was a fact. Halifax was not prompted by considerations of personal wealth, prestige or glory; all of these he possessed in full measure prior to 1939. His campaign was prompted by considerations arising from the antique English balance of power, which Oliver Cromwell had vigorously condemned as decadent as early as the seventeenth century. Halifax was prompted by the conviction that the power and prestige of Hitler's Germany must on no account be allowed to overshadow the traditionally predominant position of Great Britain in Western Europe. It was for this British prestige, and not because of any military threat to Britain, that millions were destined to die in Europe and throughout the world. The documentary record has long since revealed that in 1939 it was Hitler's utmost desire to enjoy peaceful and friendly relations, and if possible even alliances, with both Great Britain and Poland.

September 3, 1939, was the latest date when Hitler, in terms of the political necessity of considerations outlined above, should have employed a Keynesian economic policy in the absence of any suitable alternative. Great Britain, as well as the United States, did pursue such a policy. During the first year of the conflict, Great Britain produced as many aircraft, and more tanks than did Germany. This was a truly amazing situation when one considers the legendary German efficiency, the German authoritarian regime, and the fact that the industrial production of Germany proper was more than double that of Great Britain. Conservative state finance was the nemesis of Germany during World War II. Hubert Cole has claimed as recently as 1963 that Germany lost twice the

number of aircraft that Great Britain did during the 1940 air battle of Great Britain.[2] Thus Cole seeks to maintain the Churchill myth of Germany armed to the teeth in 1940 in the face of all the statistical evidence which has been offered by his brilliant compatriot and leading military historian, Asher Lee.[3]

It was Germany's lesser number of fighter aircraft, and total lack of long-distance bombers, of which the British possessed a large number, which decided the air battle of Great Britain. The British and German losses in aircraft were approximately equal, but the paucity of trained air crews and the lack of aircraft rendered the German bid for air mastery over Great Britain unattainable. It is truly astonishing that the German pilots, through sheer grit and courage, came as close as they did to defeating the Royal Air Force in 1940. Had the German aerial defense effort been in proportion to Great Britain's in 1939 and 1940, Germany would have had twice the number of aircraft that the British did, and the military defeat of Great Britain in 1940 would have been virtually inevitable.

German conservative financial policies would certainly have been superior to British Keynesian deficit spending under normal peacetime conditions. The economic fallacies of the Keynesian system have been thoroughly exposed by Henry Hazlitt and other competent economists.[4] The Keynesian system inevitably imposes its ruinous legacy of moral and economic bankruptcy on the future. There is no hocus-pocus magic, no illusions by Galbraith and others about an affluent society based upon permanent creeping inflation, which can serve effectively to avoid the inevitable result. But no doubt it is far more sensible to survive while temporarily flying the unwelcome banner of Keynes and his disciples than to go down to irrevocable defeat and lasting national humiliation (there are only fragments of Germany today) under the banner of Hjalmer Horace Greeley Schacht or his disciples. The latter was the fate of Germany in 1945. Inadequate economic policy was only one of a host of German blunders during World War II, but it was undoubtedly the decisive one so far as Germany and her future were concerned.

There is, however, a dangerous illusion here in America to the effect that the Keynesian inflationary economics are also superior in terms of military defense to the monolithic monopoly structure of Soviet statist economics. The rival presidential candidates in the United States in 1960, John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, agreed with the estimate that total American production as of that time was roughly double that of the Soviet Union. No allowances were made for the percentages of this production devoted to fixed capital, plant and equipment, or to the respective military defence efforts of the two countries.

Let us consider for a moment the American picture of the military history of World War II. No competent authority would deny that the United States played the leading role in the defeat of Japan, a country the size of California, with the national resources of Mississippi. It is in Europe where we encounter some of the big prevailing American illusions about World War II events. George Jordan, our leading authority on American aid to Russia during World War II, has revealed that we shipped eleven billion dollars worth of lend-lease contraband goods during World War II to the U.S.S.R., as compared to fifty billion dollars worth of American lend-lease materials shipped to Great Britain.[5] This American lend-lease has been assumed by many writers and commentators not only to have stopped the German advance in Russia, but also to have enabled the Soviet Union to capture Berlin. No doubt eleven billion dollars worth of lend-lease material could and did decide the outcome of three or four major battles. But to assume that it could decide the outcome of a war on the Eastern front where never less than four hundred combat divisions were engaged uninterruptedly for forty-seven months, is a little short of fantastic.

To paraphrase the late President Herbert Hoover, let's cite a powerful statistic. On the second front in France during the six weeks after D-Day on June 6, 1944, total German battle casualties, including killed, badly wounded, slightly wounded and missing, were 140,000 men. During the single week from June 22 to June 29, 1944, in the single Vitebsk

Sector of the Byelorussian front, German battle casualties were 480,000.

Harry Hopkins was interested to learn, when he visited with Josef Stalin at Moscow in July, 1941, that the Soviet Union recognized no pressing need to import tanks and artillery from abroad, including the United States; their own were better than ours, and they had a vast supply. Other items were more important on Stalin's list of requested supplies from America, and no doubt he hoped to obtain much more than the eleven billion dollars of our material which he eventually received. What was this eleven billion dollars from America compared to the estimated seven hundred billion dollars worth of Soviet expenditure on their own military defense from 1930 to 1945? Throughout this period the Soviet Union had far and away the largest military establishment in the entire world; Asher Lee, in 1962, revealed that the Soviet air arm in World War II has been grossly underestimated by Western writers. Unlike the British and American Air Forces, but much like the German 1939 air force, the Soviet air arm was geared for strategic front line bombing rather than for illegal terror bombing of civilians far behind the front, as first initiated by Great Britain against Germany on May 11, 1940. The strategic front line bombing tactics of the Soviet Union were more effective than the British methods during World War II in strict military terms, as Britain's leading military historian, General J. F. C. Fuller, has told us. His viewpoint has been thoroughly confirmed by America's own strategic bombing survey. Much has been written about the desperate German air lift to Stalingrad during the crucial winter operations of 1942-1943. But this German effort was picayune compared to the Soviet air lift to Stalingrad about which so little has been written except by the Soviet military historians.[6]

Contrary to our prevailing American myth, Soviet military production in terms of quality and volume led the entire world, including America, throughout World War II. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union might have defeated Germany in Europe during World War II even if the United States had remained strictly neutral under a Herbert

Hoover or a Robert Taft, rather than becoming passionately interventionist under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

These past realities are penetrating the consciousness of Americans ever more widely today as the Soviet Union leads in the space and rocket competition, and as she carefully and thoroughly disperses her huge heavy industry throughout the eight million square miles of the U.S.S.R., possibly in preparation for World War III. Soviet strategy, as revealed in *Krasnaya Svesda (Red Star)* and other military journals is disconcertingly simple: seek to capture the Americans and the other capitalists from within by subversive methods, but in case that fails, be prepared to hit all of them over the head.

The United States, under the Kennedy administration, lacked a comprehensive foreign policy. This is ironical in light of the fact that no nation on earth had a more meaningful and consistent foreign policy during the nineteenth century than the United States. It can clearly be said in our own day that there has been no coherent American foreign policy since the outbreak of the Cold War in March, 1947. Several leading works on the history of the Cold War are cited in the latter part of the present study, but none of these go deeply into the genesis of the Cold War itself. The picture of relations among the three principal allied powers during World War II, and especially during the last two years of that struggle, is a familiar one. The friction within the alliance centered on disagreements between Churchill and Stalin. Roosevelt played the role of moderator between the aims and aspirations of British Imperialism and the goals of Soviet World Communism. The British leadership was not pleased by the spectacle of the United States occupying the central position on the diplomatic teeter-totter. This position they considered to be traditionally and rightfully their own. With the advent of the present so-called Cold War in March, 1947, Great Britain and the United States exchanged positions in the diplomatic scheme of things.

Winston Churchill, leader of His Majesty's opposition since the Labour Party victory at the polls in 1945, toured the United States in 1946 in an effort to arouse the American people against World Communism. The high point of this campaign was Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, under

President Truman's auspices. But Truman was careful to distance himself from Churchill's message, which he described as a personal opinion of the former British Prime Minister. Secretary of State James Byrnes, in a public address to American civilian and military occupation personnel at Stuttgart, Germany, in September, 1946, denied that the United States had any obligation to regard the Oder-Neisse zonal occupation border between the Soviet Russian and Polish occupation zones of Germany as the final German-Polish frontier. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Commissar, replied in scorn ten days later that the United States at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 had approved the expulsion of millions of Germans from the Polish zone of occupation. Molotov argued that it was a betrayal of Germans and Poles alike to hold out hopes of territorial revision to the West Germans. President Truman agreed with Molotov, and distanced himself from his own Secretary of State. The United States continued to occupy the central position on the diplomatic teeter-totter at that time.

It took a policy move of great subtlety and skill on the part of the permanent British Foreign Office to dislodge the United States from their favored diplomatic position. The Soviet Union, in early 1947, was backing Communist insurrection in Greece, and publicly demanding the return of the Northeastern Turkish Kars-Ardahan district to Russia. The British government, despite extensive loans from the United States after World War II, suddenly announced that their foreign commitments were too extensive and that they intended to withdraw from Turkey and Greece, a traditional sphere of British interest for many years. This was bluff on a gigantic scale. Truman responded by going before Congress on March 12, 1947 and requesting direct American aid for Greece and Turkey with the additional pledge of a specific American determination to combat Communism in those countries. Three months later, George Catlin Marshall, having succeeded Byrnes as Secretary of State, declared in a commencement address at Harvard University that the United States ought to conduct a program of economic rehabilitation throughout Europe. This proposal followed closely on the

termination of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The American program of economic rehabilitation in Europe quickly became an economic policy to combat Communism in those areas of Europe where the Communist trends have not yet consolidated. Emphasis on Europe was accompanied by a radical reduction of American economic aid to Nationalist China. When the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung triumphed over mainland China in 1949, Great Britain proceeded to accord diplomatic recognition to the new Red Chinese regime. The United States continued to support Chiang Kai-shek and to deny recognition to the Red Chinese who have been diplomatically accepted by the Soviet Union and by Great Britain. The United States and Great Britain had exchanged their respective diplomatic positions in world affairs, without the British having given this country much advice on how to operate from the former British position. By assuming our former position, Britain had actually returned to her old and trusted position within the context of the balance of power. But the strange new diplomatic position assumed by the United States was without any precedent at all in the course of American history.

The containment policy of Truman and the liberation policy of Dulles and Eisenhower, which in any case were never much more than slogans, have been abandoned. Whether or not the "new frontier" will ultimately mean the frontier of Karl Marx or of John Stuart Mill after the latter became a socialist, or of something else (no one seems to know what it means now), the present absence of anything more than a day-to-day pragmatic operational policy has become an obvious fact. This is in great contrast to the succinct Soviet policy outlined above. In foreign affairs, our country today offers the picture of a veritable Tower of Babel, with everyone advocating something different. In the meantime, we are lagging behind the Soviet Union not only in national defense and the formulation of foreign policy, but also in terms of the defense of our American heritage at home. Despite the examples of France in 1789, Russia in 1917, Germany in 1918, this country still lacks an adequate preventive organization to

deal with a possible subversive *coup d'état* at some moment of national crisis.

Materialism, whether utilitarian or collectivist, could not very well solve these tremendous problems facing our country without destroying the principles upon which America has been built. One possible answer for the United States during these difficult times would certainly be the most obvious one: a return to the spiritual heritage of America's founding fathers under the auspices of a strong modern leadership proud of that heritage. With such a program, a rejuvenation of America would still be possible, and it might surpass any similar national rejuvenation ever seen anywhere. A program of this kind, *ab initio,* would be closer in accord with the wishes of most Americans than the present A.D.A. foreign and domestic policies of the Johnson administration. Such a program would advance America's legitimate interests, and at the same time would be of service to the entire world. We may be certain that a genuinely rejuvenated America would cause the masters of the Kremlin to tremble. The positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War could rapidly be reversed. Soviet leaders do not even trust their own Russian people when we are weak. If we were strong, they would soon be fearing revolution at home, instead of our fearing subversion here.

All of this could be achieved without in any way treating Russia in an aggressive manner. The example could turn the tide with its own strength. A rejuvenated America would soon devise the means of competing successfully with Soviet defense efforts, and it could do so without any permanent abandonment of basic American principles. Paper money issues did not have any lastingly corrupt effect during our Revolutionary War, because, although these inflationary money issues were dictated by momentary expediency, they did not produce any abandonment of basic principles and values. Under such a program, we could justly stand with a slogan of our faith engraved upon our banner: If God is with us, who then can be against us?

Unfortunately, the dominant trend in our American academic life is considered by many observers to be moving

in the opposite direction, toward further moral relativism. It has often been asked why so many outstanding American intellectuals embraced Communism when the great economic depression struck our country in 1929. The depression was a severe blow, but earlier economic depressions such as those of 1873 had been relatively more severe. There were grass-roots American progressive and reform traditions in times of economic crises and stress which might have been appealed to by these intellectuals instead of importing the alien and godless ideology of the Soviet Union. One thing is certain: the answer to this perplexing question about the defection of so many of our intellectual leaders in a time of crisis can only be found in a study of the history of American education, particularly American public education, and of the forces which made these men and women what they were. This has been amply demonstrated, as Ivan Bierly points out in his introduction, in the outstanding book of R. J. Rushdoony, *The Messianic Character of American Education.*[7]

The following study guide is exclusively concerned with some developments in American historical thought and their relation to the major crises in foreign affairs. It is hoped that the introduction to this study has brought home the fact that there are some important lessons which ought to be learned quickly and that such lessons can best be learned from a bird's-eye perspective of detachment rather than from a frog's-eye perspective of too close contact with our present blinding public communications media. The purpose of the following study guide is to raise pertinent questions, to throw light on one important aspect of the American academic scene, and to reveal some existing strengths and weaknesses. It is hoped that each reader will feel completely free at all times to adopt whatever perspective he or she chooses in reviewing the following material. One must then decide the basic grounds of meaning and relevance. As in all cases, when material concerning ideas is presented: a few will agree with much, many with something, and some with none. The world of ideas, as well as the world of hard facts, presents the pageant of a continuing struggle to control the future destiny of our great nation.

The history of history itself traditionally offers one of the best indications available of the cultural values of the intellectual elite of any particular region, nation or civilization, depending upon the scope of the study which has been undertaken. In the present context, the method followed has been to analyze eight principal American national crises in the light of historical scholarship, during the past century. All of these crises center upon the outbreak of military altercations of one sort or another. For the purpose of simplication, the investigation deals with what American historians have written about the questions of war guilt in the crises concerned. The eight crises, in terms of history itself, as opposed to historicism or the history of history, are included in the following years: 1775, 1812, 1846, 1861, 1898, 1917, 1941, 1950. The first part of the study introduces what some representative American historians have written about these vital issues during the past century. This first part is largely development in method. The second part constitutes an attempt to deepen understanding of the underlying trends of historical interpretation in America during the past century by dealing with some of the vital concepts of the philosophy of history as they have been understood here in these United States.

There has evidently been a dominant trend during the period considered which seems to run through the treatment of these topics like the proverbial red thread in the rope employed by the British Navy. The purpose of the conclusion at the end of Part II is to summarize what appear to be the predominant manifestations of this trend and their implications. All of the sources used in the preparation of this study are cited in the footnotes. An annotated bibliography of suggested additional reading follows the conclusion. This in itself is an indication that this study, like the others in the same series, is designed to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, and its purpose has necessarily been more closely connected with raising the vital questions than with answering them.

PART I: THE CRISES

Chapter I: The American Revolution

The American Revolution, which began in 1775, was actually a civil war within the British Empire. Beginning with Spain in 1492, seven European nations had founded permanent colonies in the hitherto unknown western hemisphere (Spain, Portugal, England, France, Holland, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden-Finland). Montesquieu, the French political philosopher who had restored to political theory the Aristotelian conception of an ideal government combining the aristocratic, monarchical and democratic elements, predicted forty-five years before the battle of Lexington that "England would be the first nation abandoned by her colonies."[1]

The American Revolution was a supreme struggle for the colonists of many nationalities in English America. They began to resist English tyranny by armed force in 1775. Upon the outcome of this military struggle depended the question of whether or not America under God would have an independent and self-respecting future. Although the issues involved in America had some relation to the outcome of parent political party struggles within England, the military struggle itself was a mere incident in the long history of English imperialism. William M. Sloane, the leading historian of the American political party system during the years before World War I, observed in 1895, ". . . it can be asserted without fear of contradiction that more men of Anglo-Saxon blood have perished in battle for a principle in the single county of Spottsylvania, in Virginia (during the American Civil War) than England has lost up to this moment in all the conflicts of her foreign wars."[2]

It is difficult for Americans of the present age to envisage the world military superiority of England in 1775. Warfare in those days was confined to lithosphere and hydro-

sphere. English naval supremacy and geographic insularity of fered an impregnable defense. Naval power was also an incomparable aggressive weapon. Using a so-called Athenian military strategy, England was able to strike, and to strike hard, along the coastlines of the entire world. The very name of England was a household word of terror in many foreign lands. The English could operate on a vast scale by committing at widely separated points small but deadly armies, safely conveyed by preponderant sea power. These armies were able to strike fast and hard where they were least expected. The Anglo-Norman aristocracy of England maintained the ruthless reputation of Norsemen, who had been the terror of Europe in the age of Charlemagne. England was also the most advanced nation of the world, industrially, in 1775. The French surpassed the English in some theoretical fields of modern science, but the English led the world in the application of practical inventions on a large scale. The England of the fifteenth century had been a poor country, economically one of the most backward countries of Europe, with her foreign trade largely in the hands of foreigners. Then Richard Chancellor opened the maritime route to Russia through the White Sea. Holland's traditional ally, Denmark-Norway, was no longer able to hold up to ransom the English trade with Russia, as the Trojans had done centuries earlier with the Achaean Greek trade through the Black Sea. This Russian trade produced the profits which enabled England to extend her commercial interests in many directions, including America. The industrial growth which followed enabled England to accelerate her accumulation of wealth. The percentages of English population growth were the highest in Europe throughout the eighteenth century, and the enclosure movement of those years, which dwarfed the earlier sixteenth century enclosures limited largely to southeastern England, drove the hardy English yeomanry away from the land and into the teeming new cities with their mushrooming factories. This England, paramount in the Mediterranean area and in India, as well as in America and northern Europe, could scarcely regard an insurrection of her scattered American Atlantic seaboard colonies as a threat to her existence. Even when the

Americans were joined later in the war by France, Spain and Holland, and when other countries, such as Prussia, Russia, Denmark-Norway, and Sweden-Finland, adopted policies favorable to the American cause, the English homeland was never in serious danger. Militarily speaking, the life-and-death struggle of America was a mere incident in the annals of England.

There is an old saying that the greatest revolution in English letters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the French Revolution. It was most certainly not the American Revolution. One of the first American professors to teach regular American History courses at Oxford University, tells the following anecdote:

> At an English banquet of scholars where the Napoleonic Wars were being discussed, an American colleague, who happened to be present, referred to the Anglo-American War of 1812, an integral phase of the so-called world war of the fourth coalition (1812-1814). "Oh, were you in that one too?" one of his hosts inquired. And the answer: "Yes, that was the war in which you burned Washington." "Great heavens!" exclaimed the astonished host, "I knew we had burned Joan d'Arc, but I did not realize we had burned George Washington!"[3]

Michael Kraus, the only twentieth century historian who has attempted to survey the entire field of American historiography, has made the following comment about the American preoccupation with the events of 1775 and 1776 during the generations which follow: "The War of Independence pervaded much of American historical writing in the last quarter of the 18th century and the first six decades of the nineteenth century."[4]

The general consensus among historians is that historical writing in America on the American Revolution during the period outlined above was usually pro-American and anti-English. George Washington was almost universally accepted as the William Tell of the western hemisphere. He had ventured to lead the cause against overwhelming odds. He had dared to believe that God would give the victory to freedom and deny it to tyranny.

Then, in 1861, came the American Civil War, a conflict much more closely resembling a revolution in the comprehen-

sive sense of that term as employed in the twentieth century than was the so-called American Revolution, the American conservative defense against the new and unprecedented encroachments of English mercantilism after 1763. The American Revolution soon surrendered its first place in the minds of our historians to the American Civil War. One of our greatest living American authorities on the American Civil War has summed up this situation as follows in our own day:

> Repeatedly, for almost a century, Americans have been reviewing the background of the war, sometimes in scholarship, and sometimes in controversy, in an attempt to resolve the problem, and to offer an explanation.
>
> More books are written about it than about any other event in America.[5]

Nor was a shift in relative emphasis the only impact of the Civil War on the American historians. The Civil War, whether rightly or wrongly, prompted both the triumphant North and the defeated South to feel a new affinity toward England, especially in the American Atlantic seaboard region which looks out toward Europe, and where interest in the frontier, and in the progressive Yankee subjugation of the American Continent, were less pronounced than in the Mississippi Valley. The reasons for this development are sufficiently obvious. Most of the official English leadership throughout the Civil War period favored the South against the North. Efforts were made to embarrass and humiliate the North, as in the notorious *Trent* affair, named after an English private vessel; the British adopted a threatening attitude toward the North, even allowing matters to drift to the verge of war, when the Yankees attempted to impede the C.S.A. diplomatic missions to Europe of Mason and Slidell. The British fitted out raiders for the C.S.A. at Liverpool and these were manned by British crews. These craft took a heavy toll of Yankee shipping and prompted Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts to charge that the British had prolonged the American Civil War by at least two years. In the British Parliament, during 1862 and 1863, the advisability of recognizing the independence of the South was publicly

debated. Although individual English politicians, such as Cobden and Bright, expressed their sympathy with the plight of the North during the Civil War, they were not in a position at that time to direct the course of English policy. There was no doubt in either England or America that the sympathies of official England were with the South. Hence, Southern gratitude and a more friendly Southern attitude toward England followed as a matter of course. This development was enhanced by the fact that the South favored free trade in order to have access to the cheaper European markets, and to escape from the financial stranglehold which the North had established over the South by means of the protective tariff. Free trade was the nineteenth century English international economic system *par excellence.* This was only natural in view of the world industrial preponderance of England at that time, just as imperial preferences and protective tariffs are typical of the weak England of today.

Equally compelling reasons prompted many people in the North to revise previous attitudes toward England in favor of Anglophilia, or, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, in favor of Anglomania. The excessively restrictive tariff policies effectively promoted by the North revealed a marked similitude to earlier English mercantile policies directed against the American colonies. The parallel between the Southern revolt against Northern economic tyranny in 1861, and the revolt of English colonies against English economic tyranny and other repressive measures in 1775 was painfully obvious. Frank L. Kluckhohn, *What's Wrong with U. S. Foreign Policy?* (Monarch Books, Derby, Conn., 1963, p. 77) reminds us of the position taken in 1861 by the Leader *Times:* "The contest is really for empire on the side of the North, and for independence on that of the South, and in this respect we recognize an exact analogy between the North and the government of George III and the South and the revolted provinces."

Trite slogans about this parallel rapidly circulated. It was said that Lord North had employed the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes against America in 1775, and that Lincoln had employed the same political philosophy against the South in 1861. Hobbes had contended in the seventeenth century that

a genuine social contract in national politics could only be made between the hereditary monarch and his or her Heavenly Creator; the subjects of the sovereign had no implicit right to determine whether or not the rule of the sovereign was just. Only God had that right, and an attempt to usurp it on the part of subjects was always a cardinal sin, and an invitation to God to consign such rebels to eternal damnation.

The opposite side of the picture completed the inversion. The colonists were said to have relied on the theory of John Locke in 1775 when opposing the British claims. No doubt some of them did, although none of the American leaders relied exclusively on Locke in building his case, particularly since Locke in the 1690's abandoned Christianity. Locke's political theory held that there was a social contract between the sovereign and the people. This theory was perfectly consistent with the tradition of European feudalism which provided that everyone in authority, no matter how high his station, had duties toward other men as well as rights over them, and where everyone subject to authority, no matter how modest his station, had rights as well as duties. Although Locke had been an absolutist during the years immediately after the Stuart restoration in 1660, his unwillingness to accept the doctrine of religious toleration toward the Roman Catholics in England ultimately prompted him to overcome his antipathy against constitutionalism in any form, and to emerge as the principal apologist for the anti-Catholic so-called English Glorious Revolution in 1688. As such, he came to be regarded as the leading apologist for revolutions in general. It was said in America that the South invoked Locke against Hobbes in 1861 while defying President Abraham Lincoln and his "Black Republicans."[6]

The idea began to spread in the North that Yankee economic policies and political theories in 1861 were really not far different from those of the ruling English Tories in 1775. More than that, there was also an impressive military parallel. The American colonies had been the so-called underdogs against England in 1775. But in 1861, the South was the underdog to a much greater extent. The South had to fight harder for independence in the Civil War than had been

true of the American colonies in the American Revolution. And the South lost. There was no continental European intervention for the South comparable to the French declaration of war against England in 1778, although there probably would have been, had not England and France temporarily slaked some of their thirst for meddling in foreign quarrels by supporting Turkey against Russia in the foolish and unnecessary Crimean War of 1853-1856. The Crimean War had been produced by some misunderstandings following upon a whole series of incredible English deceptions of Russia. Indeed, after strenuous efforts, the English leaders very nearly succeeded in converting the Crimean War into a general European war. Their efforts were finally frustrated, thanks to the stubborn refusal of Hohenzollern Prussia to play their game.[7]

The employment of sea power in the Civil War strengthened the comparison between the North in 1861 and Tory England in 1775. French Admiral De Grasse posed a major threat to English naval supremacy for eleven months during the closing phase of the American Revolutionary War, but the conflict finally ended in 1783 with England still the undisputed naval champion of the world. The *Merrimac,* primary secret weapon of the South during the Civil War, posed a brief threat to the naval supremacy of the North over the South in 1862, but the conflict opened and ended with an effective Northern blockade of the South. The English leaders derived amusement from the fact that the Yankees repeated many of the gross violations of international maritime law which had been traditional British usage. For instance, Yankee Secretary of State, William H. Seward, flatly refused to follow the rules on the crucial doctrine of continuous voyage (despite Seward, ultimate destination of contraband goods was not legally acceptable as a basis for contraband seizure). These rules had been painstakingly clarified by the concert of powers at the Paris International Maritime Conference as recently as 1856.

The multitude of considerations briefly outlined above prompted many thinking Americans to conclude that Cousin Jonathan had been unfairly critical of good old John Bull

during the past seventy-five years. It is not really surprising that many of America's most enterprising historians began to be tempted by the challenge of reversing the verdict in America on the rights and wrongs of the American Revolution. There would be a real challenge in seeking to rehabilitate the despised American Loyalist of 1776. Many considered that it would be gratifying to extend the olive branch to the mighty British Empire now that the discrepancy in strength between the United States and the British Empire had become less crass than in the past. (The English Navy was still twelve times the size of the American Navy at the time of the Venezuelan crisis between the two countries in 1895, but the land position of America was incomparably stronger at that time than it had been in 1775. In the event of a conflict in 1895, the Americans would probably have succeeded at last in conquering Canada after failing in their earlier efforts to do so in 1775 and 1812.)

Moses Coit Tyler, a leading American cultural historian at Cornell University, declared in 1895: "At any rate, the American Revolution affords no exemption from the general law of historical investigation, — that the truth is to be found only by him who searches for it with an unbiased mind."[8]

American historians were expected to be "neutral in thought" so far as the American Revolution was concerned. This implied a radical departure from the pre-Civil War American historical tradition. There had to be leaders for such a departure, and they were not slow to appear after Tyler's clarion call. As Evarts B. Greene, one of the leading authorities on the American Revolution, put it in 1922: "For the past three decades, such scholars as Channing, Turner, Andrews, Beer, and Osgood, have exploited new materials suggested new points of view, and often made necessary the abandonment, or at least the reconsideration, of time-honored traditions."[9]

Since 1895, the American book market has been flooded by pro-English accounts of the American Revolution, written by American historians. The pro-English account is taken for granted today. Edmund S. Morgan, *The American Revolu-*

tion: a Review of Changing Interpretations (Service Center for Teachers of History, Washington, D. C., 1958) complains that the only really major history of the American Revolution was written by George Bancroft, an American nationalist, and that "no one has yet rewritten the history of the Revolution on the grand scale" (*ibid.*, p. 2). But the same Tyler who in 1895 had spoken in lofty tones of the pursuit of history "with an unbiased mind" had expressed his views with greater candor eight years earlier: ". . .I believe in history with a tendency. My interest in our own past is chiefly derived from my interests in our own present and future: and I teach American history, not so much to make historians as to make citizens and good leaders for the state and nation."[10]

Evidently Tyler considered that earlier American patriotism was too superficial. He conducted a campaign in support of the rehabilitation of the American Loyalist reputation in the fashion of a crusade. For instance, with real pathos he declared that Loyalist literature, by which he meant propaganda pamphlets and speeches, was in the position in 1895 in America of "now having almost a pathetic insignificance as it slumbers under a hundred years of dust and contempt."[11] Tyler recalled that there had been no real motive for a so-called Loyalist party prior to 1774.

The best people throughout America seemed to regard an eventual settlement of difficulties with the authorities in London as probable. But with the convening of the First Continental Congress in 1774, the depth of disagreement between the Americans presenting their grievances, and the English enforcing their claims, became increasingly evident. Those who wished to maintain the imperial tie with London at almost any cost became alarmed, and they produced an extensive amount of argumentative literature in favor of their position. The peak period of this literary activity was limited to the two years from the convening of the First Continental Congress to the later congressional approval of the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Some of these Loyalist spokesmen were truly able writers; outstanding examples would be Daniel Leonard, Joseph Galloway, Samuel Seabury, and Jonathan Odell.

These controversies of the American Nationalists with the Loyalists dated back more than a century, and Tyler complained that his compatriots were still finding difficulty in achieving the degree of detachment which he considered the facts warranted. Tyler stated the issue as follows: "Hardly have we known, seldom have we been reminded, that the side of the Loyalists, as they called themselves, of the Tories, as they were scornfully nicknamed by their opponents, was even in argument not a weak one, and in motive and sentiment not a base one, and in devotion and self-sacrifice not an unheroic one."

This was fine, as far as it went, but Tyler's ultimate position was a great deal more advanced in presenting the Loyalist complaint: "It is an error to regard the Tories of our Revolution as composed of Americans lacking in love for their native country, or in zeal for its liberty or unwilling to labor, or fight, or even to die, for what they conceive to be its interest."

Tyler denied that the Tories ". . . who would have given us political reform and political safety, but without civil war and without an angry disruption of the English speaking race (were) an unpatriotic party."

Tyler was perfectly well aware that by definition the Loyalists were unwilling to accept a permanent political breach with England, despite the fact that many of them were convinced that some important reforms in the English imperial system were both desirable and possible. An identification on the part of a historian with a Loyalist position of 1776 and after would be tantamount to condemning the Revolutionary War as such as an unnecessary war from the American standpoint — a war which had been brought about by blunders on both sides, with the American Loyalists more or less the heroes of a conciliatory policy. As cited above from Kraus, the traditional view of American historians was that the American Revolutionary War was a just and necessary conflict on behalf of a sacred cause. On one point, of course, there is universal agreement; namely, that an independent American government would not have been recognized by Great Britain as early as 1783 had there been no recourse to armed force.

Consider the contrast between Tyler and John Fiske, one of the most important Harvard historians, whose first volume on the American Revolution was published in 1891:[12]

"So while George III lost the fairest portion of the British Empire, it was the sturdy Americans who, fighting the battle at once for the Old World and for the New, ended by overwhelming his paltry schemes for personal aggrandizement in hopeless ruin, leaving him for posterity to contemplate as one of the most instructive examples of short-sighted folly that modern history affords."[13]

Tyler delighted in maintaining that the majority of the American people during the Revolutionary War were opposed to George Washington and the National Independence party. Sometimes he hinted the disaffection of the absolute majority of all the people and at other times "merely a majority of the people of quality." Tyler states:

> Surely an idea—a cause—that was cherished and clung to, amid almost every form of obloquy and disaster, by so vast a section of American society, can hardly deserve any longer to be turned out of court in so summary and contemptuous a fashion as that with which it has been commonly disposed of by American writers.
>
> Still another class of Loyalists was made up of people of professional training and occupation,— clergymen, physicians, lawyers, teachers,—a clear majority of whom seem to have been set against the ultimate measures of the Revolution.
>
> The word independence was merely a euphemism for national disunion, for a disruption of the British Empire.

Tyler drew the obvious parallel between the rebellious American colonies in 1775 and the seceding Southern states in 1860 and 1861. Tyler contended that it "seemed to the American Tories of that time precisely the same political crime as, to the people of the Northern states, seemed the measure undertaken by certain Southern leaders in the latter part of 1860 under the name Secession."

Tyler sought to make his charge of fickle faithlessness against George Washington and his cohorts stick by citing a petition to the English crown from the First Continental Congress, on October 26, 1774: "Your royal authority over

us, and our connection with Great Britain we shall always carefully and zealously endeavor to support and maintain."[14]

Tyler's vehement attacks against the supporters of George Washington in 1776 outraged some critics. The first volume of Tyler's *Literary History of the American Revolution* was published by Putnam in New York City in 1897. In this book, Tyler concentrated much of his fire on Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. Tyler claimed that Jefferson was lying when he recorded that he was also the principal author of the *Declaration of the Causes for Taking up Arms*. This was too much for Paul Leicester Ford, the distinguished novelist and Jefferson scholar: "Dr. Moore (a contemporary of Jefferson's) proved to his own satisfaction that Jefferson in his words 'lied' in claiming a material share in the authorship of this paper, but his pamphlet was written before Jefferson's drafts were discovered. They have since been printed, with such corrections as Dickinson wrote upon them, and they show that the major part of the famous paper was drafted by Jefferson."[15]

James Davie Butler, an associate of Tyler in the revision of traditional viewpoints about the American Revolution, cited the following familiar statement made by England's cynical philosopher-journalist, Samuel Johnson, about the American subjects of the Union Jack in 1769: "Sir, they are a race of convicts and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging."

Avoiding the usual indignant comment, Butler seriously proposed to investigate whether or not there was any objective justification for Dr. Johnson's extravagant statement. Johnson's Boswell evidently felt somewhat apologetic about recording this statement from the man whose intellect he so greatly revered. Boswell offered an explanatory note which contended that convicts had been sent from England in large numbers to no less than nine of the thirteen colonies, sometimes as many as two thousand per annum, with a grand total of perhaps fifty thousand.

The total American colonial population in 1763, at the outbreak of the major controversy between the colonies and

England, was well under three million. The fact that Australia was originally settled exclusively as a penal colony is widely known, and Butler cited the Encyclopaedia Britannica's article "Botany Bay" to the effect that the penal settlements "down under" from 1780 on resulted from the successful American Revolution and the loss to the English of the American dumping ground. Butler also cites with evident relish from the autobiography of Francis Lieber that in nineteenth century England the view was prevalent that most American women were descended from prostitutes. Butler went so far as to claim that George Bancroft, far and away the most widely respected American author on the Revolutionary War prior to this period, did not sufficiently emphasize the convict issue merely because he was afraid to do so for social reasons. Butler admitted that some of these convicts shipped to America were "political offenders," but he insisted that the great majority were common criminals. Butler stated disingenuously that his "research has filled him with surprise that our colonial convict element was so large," and he concluded his investigation with the following remarkable statement: "It now seems more natural that he (Dr. Johnson) should speak as he did, and declare he could love everybody except an American, than the writer could at first believe."[16]

Butler made no mention of the fact that eighteenth century British criminal law was harsh to an almost unbelievable extent. There were no less than seventy-five crimes, most of them involving property, for which the death penalty was inflicted. As suggested above, England had relatively the highest birth rate in Europe, and probably in the entire world, at that time. Certainly none of the Asiatic countries in the twentieth century, including India, China and Japan, had a rate of population growth comparable to eighteenth century England. The workhouses and debtor prisons of England in the eighteenth century were teeming institutions. For Butler to imagine that the victims of this situation, the so-called common criminals, resembled the toughs and hoodlums of the Bowery in the 1890's is incredibly naive. They were more often than not good Christian men and women who had not been defeated by adversity in the old country.

It had become fashionable in American historical circles by the end of the nineteenth century to look at the American Revolution through English spectacles. Tyler was scheduled to assume the presidency of the American Historical Association in 1900, and he would have done so had it not been for his untimely death that same year.

Frederick Jackson Turner, the world famous expert on the historical significance of the American western frontier, was by no means excessively critical of eighteenth century England; nevertheless, the tidal wave of Anglomania in American historical circles was repugnant to him. He derived amusement from the fact that the leading English historian, George Trevelyan, whose *American Revolution*, Vol. I, was published by Longmans, Green at London in 1899, frankly conceded that the English mercantilist's case against the American colonies during the period from 1763-1766 was a very weak one and a very difficult one to defend. Turner proclaimed that Trevelyan's book was "an important reaction from the recent American tendency to state the English side of the case, in this momentous struggle between mother country and colonial dependency." Turner noted that Trevelyan was as critical of British imperial policy "as any of the earlier radical American historians of repute, who have dealt with the subject. The general reader will find no stronger statement of the justness of the cause of the colonists than is embraced in this volume. Indeed, at times the author's party predilections and his admiration for things American seem to have led him to neglect some of the strong points in the government's side of the case."[17]

One of the manifestations of the revised approach to the American Revolution consisted in deprecating the motives of European nations friendly toward or allied with the American cause after 1775. For instance, Paul L. Haworth's "Frederick the Great and the American Revolution" (*American Historical Review*, April, 1904), readily agreed with the prevailing view that the Prussian sovereign had performed yeoman service for the American cause during its darkest days. He had first expressed his sympathy for the colonists at the time of the Continental Congress in 1774, he had exerted his influence

with Catherine II of Russia to defeat the English Tory plan of obtaining Cossacks to fight against the colonists, and he had opposed English recruitment of German mercenary soldiers wherever he could. But Haworth maintained that this attitude arose from Frederick's hatred of England, rather than from any actual sympathy toward the colonies. As Haworth put it: ". . .Frederick entertained an intense hatred for England, and was consequently glad to see her humiliated. . .his interests were such that he was unwilling openly to become her enemy."

A similar approach, this time applied to France, was taken by Claude Halstead Van Tyne, one of the most remarkable of American historians. Harry Elmer Barnes, generally recognized as the leading American expert in the history of history, declared as recently as 1962: "Van Tyne has produced the best (one volume) history of the American Revolution." Barnes, who is widely known for his revisionist views relating to the origins of World War I, had no special reason to be partial toward Van Tyne. He recalled Van Tyne's "leadership in preparing fierce invectives against the Germans," during and after World War I. In paying tribute to Van Tyne's 1905 volume on the American Revolution, he was merely extending an honest recognition of Van Tyne's ability, regardless of the fact that there was more often disagreement than agreement between Barnes and Van Tyne, so far as historical matters are concerned.[19]

Van Tyne was born in Michigan in 1869, and he received his A.B. at the University of Michigan in 1896. He carried out graduate research in Europe for several years at Paris, Leipzig and Heidelberg, before returning to America and receiving his doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania in 1900. Pennsylvania hoped to retain him as a faculty member, but he ultimately returned to the University of Michigan. From 1911 until his death in 1930, Van Tyne was chairman of the History Department; during that period his department took the lead in the Middle West, and was able to compete successfully with Harvard, Yale and Princeton. The range of Van Tyne's interest in both teaching and writing was a broad one, he managed to produce four major works on the American Revolution (*The Loyalists in the American*

Revolution, 1902; *The American Revolution,* 1905; *Causes of the War of Independence,* 1921; *England and America, Rivals in the American Revolution,* 1927). Van Tyne's competence and prestige made the matter of his attitude toward the American Revolution a vital one. His major effort in this field began in 1900, the year that Tyler died. Van Tyne elected to sustain Tyler's campaign to rewrite the history of the American Revolution from a standpoint more sympathetic toward England and the Loyalists than toward George Washington and his group.

Van Tyne dealt with French policy toward America in his article "Influences which Determined the French Government to Make a Treaty with America, 1778," (*American Historical Review,* April 1916). Van Tyne pointed to the personal Anglophobia of Choiseul and Vergennes, the Foreign Ministers of France during the two decades following the Peace of Paris in 1763. After the overthrow of the elder Pitt, Lord Bute deserted the continental alliance with Frederick of Prussia, leaving the Prussian monarch to fight out his own destiny, and concentrated upon persuading a vanquished France to deed most of the French colonies throughout the world to the English crown. Van Tyne cites Vergennes to illustrate that the French Foreign Minister at the time of the American Revolution was somewhat less than objective in his attitude toward England: "She is a restless and greedy nation, more jealous of the prosperity of her neighbors than concerned for her own happiness."[20] Van Tyne argues in this article that basic English attitudes had a great deal to do with the favorable terms of peace obtained by the United States in 1783. He cites a communication from Vergennes to Louis XVI (1782), to the effect that the surrender of Burgoyne to the Americans at Saratoga had already produced in England a strong demand for a separate peace with America in the interest of prosecuting the new war against France more vigorously. British agents in Paris were saying to the American diplomatic mission that England would recognize American independence if the Americans would side with England against France. Van Tyne correctly notes that both English and American historians had failed previously to emphasize

this vital point. As Van Tyne saw it, the English and Americans had more in common when they were fighting against each other than did the Americans and the French when they were allied.

Van Tyne carries the argument on behalf of the American Loyalists a great deal further than Tyler had ever dreamed of doing. For instance, in "Sovereignty in the American Revolution: A Historical Study," (*American Historical Review*, 1907), Van Tyne asked the question how the American Loyalists could possibly have been traitors to the American national cause, when, according to Van Tyne, there was no American national cause. As Van Tyne explained at the outset of his article:

> I wish to examine again the much-mooted question as to whether there was an American national state in the Revolution, and whether Congress or the state governments exercised the sovereign power.

Van Tyne recalls that Joseph Story (*Commentaries*, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 140) claimed that an American national state had existed, at least *de facto*, since 1774, when the First Continental Congress convened. Van Tyne denied Story's contention:

> The delegates came together unauthorized by the people to act as a national government. They were to keep the councils of the colonies united while the English government was being forced to yield what men thought their rights.

Van Tyne did not believe that the Declaration of Independence in 1776 changed this fundamental picture. The action of twelve of the colonies in approving the Declaration of Independence did not bind New York until her own convention approved it. Van Tyne saw in the Articles of Confederation a system similar to that adopted for the German states at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The German confederation had existed until 1866 when Prussia's Bismarck took action to smash it and to create a German national state. No one had seriously contended that a German national state had existed during the period after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Van Tyne denied that one could find a common will for national independence as such until the close of the Confederation period in 1789, and the adoption of our

present Constitution. Van Tyne denounced the charges of treason which had been levelled against the American Loyalists as an unfair *ex post facto* argument. How could there be treason against the national state when there was no national state? It was much easier for Van Tyne to argue the case for the Loyalists on this basis than it had been for Tyler, with his dogmatic assertion that the Loyalists were usually good American patriots.

One of the most brilliant statements of Van Tyne's fundamental position is his article "The Influence of the Clergy, and of Religious and Sectarian Forces, on the American Revolution" (*American Historical Review*, October, 1913). Van Tyne was quite correct in asserting that the religious factor had never received sufficient emphasis, even in Bancroft, in discussing the causes of the American Revolution. Van Tyne's assertion received brilliant confirmation ten years later in the pioneering book by Edward Frank Humphrey, *Nationalism and Religion in America, 1774-1789*, (Chipman Law Boston, 1924, 536 pp.). Humphrey remarks that A. M. Schlesinger, Sr. (*The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1918), had "analyzed with minute care the economic elements which produced the Revolution," and he had done this in the fashion of economic determinism as popularized by Charles Austin Beard in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*. Schlesinger does not take into account that "at that time the preacher was the leading politician." Humphrey analyzes the attitudes and policies of the Congregationalists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Dutch Reformed, and Lutherans. Humphrey has little difficulty in sustaining the thesis he announced at the outset: "Religion was one of the more potent factors in the making of the United States of America."[21]

Van Tyne's insight and command of the sources was such that he could easily have written Humphrey's book himself ten years earlier. But there was a vital and important difference between the approaches of Humphrey and Van Tyne. The former, who somehow never achieved the reputation of a major historian, sympathized with the zeal and independence which predominated among the American clergy during the

Revolution. Van Tyne's attitude was basically unsympathetic, as the following excerpts from his article clearly show:

> . . .in the whole colonial period, controversies of a religious character kept the colonists suspicious of encroachment by the Anglican Church. Again and again, the dissenting sects in America took alarm as they noted the influence of the Bishop of London in getting American political plums for those who gave promise of being useful allies of the Anglican Church in America.
>
> . . .the Episcopalians (north of the Mason-Dixon Line) became in a great majority Loyalists, while the Dissenters became Patriots.
>
> Of these influences, the first and most important to study is that of the Calvinistic preachers.
>
> The Boston Massacre was piously magnified by New England divines, Reverend John Lothrop preaching upon the 'Innocent Blood Crying to God from the streets of Boston.'
>
> Samuel Adams, and others taking their cue from him, so aroused the latent Puritan bigotry that pre-Revolutionary literature is filled with denunciations of the wise act of the British government recognizing the Roman Catholic religion in the Province of Quebec.

Van Tyne concluded, after twelve years of concentrated study, that excessive stress had been placed on the economic causes of the Revolution: "Among the many causes, I rate religious bigotry, sectarian antipathy and the influence of the Calvinist clergy, which we have reviewed as among the most important."

Van Tyne concluded his article on an ironical note: "This spirit the dissenting clergy communicated to a people far more influenced by what they heard in the House of God than we in these degenerate days can comprehend."

Van Tyne's antipathy toward the dissenting clergy was equaled by his dislike of Sam Adams, the New England leader who decided as early as 1768 that American Independence could and should be attained. Sam Adams, previously recognized as a hero of the American Revolution, became the object of a campaign of defamation which has continued until the present day. A good instance of this may be encountered in the work of Carl Lotus Becker, who was greatly influenced by Van Tyne. Becker, like Van Tyne, has rightly been regarded as one of the more brilliant American historians. For

instance, in his *Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers*, he has given us the best analysis of the illusions of the French enlightenment on the attainment of scientific objectivity. In his book, *The Eve of the Revolution, a Chronicle of the Breach with England,* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1918), Becker presented with gusto the English and American Loyalist cases, and concentrated scornful criticism on Sam Adams:

> No one, in the year 1770, was better fitted than Samuel Adams either by talent and temperament or the circumstances of his position, to push the continent into a rebellion. Unlike most of his patriot friends, he had neither private business nor private profession to fall back upon when public affairs grew tame, his only business being, as one might say, the public business, his only profession a definition and defense of popular rights.

Becker hints that practical opportunism was a powerful motive in Adams the Patriot. He notes that Adams was "well known as a 'poor provider,' an improvident man who had lost a fair estate, had failed in business, and was barely able, and sometimes not able, to support a small family." Becker continued that Adams had "the innate slant of mind that properly belongs to a moderator of mass meetings called to aggravate a crisis. With the soul of a Jacobin he was most at home in clubs, secret clubs, of which everyone had heard and few were members."

To strike out at Sam Adams or Patrick Henry is to strike at the heart of the American patriots' cause of 1775. Kenneth R. Rossman, *Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1952), has demonstrated how a humble associate of Sam Adams owed much of his rapid promotion during the American Revolutionary War to his earlier association with the Massachusetts patriot leader. Of course, Sam Adams was the principal author of the Boston Tea Party, but in those days this was a badge of honor rather than a brand of shame. As Rossman puts it:

> The colonies seemed to vie with each other for leadership against Great Britain. This rivalry, one of the forces bringing on the Revolution, led to the Boston Tea Party, a masterpiece of Samuel Adams.[23]

It was the record of Mifflin's association with Adams which prompted Washington to appoint him Quartermaster General of the entire Patriot forces on August 14, 1775. Mifflin also served as President of Congress under the Articles of Confederation, and as a delegate to the Federal Convention which drafted our present Constitution.

From the American patriot side it was Thomas Paine, not Sam Adams, who embraced the alien cause of Jacobinism. As all historians know, Paine's espousal of the radical revolutionaires' cause deeply disturbed George Washington. John C. Miller, *Sam Adams, Pioneer in Propaganda* (Stanford University Press, 1936; 2nd ed., 1960) a biography by no means friendly to Adams, contrasted the position between Sam Adams, the American conservative patriot, and Thomas Paine:

> . . .during the French Revolution Tom Paine's irreligion became so brazen that Adams felt obliged to rebuke his old friend of Revolutionary days for contributing to the depravity of the younger generation.[24]

Miller states elsewhere that "Sam Adams was well aware that by serving the British government a dish of tea brewed with salt water, Boston was certain to be punished."[25]

Becker's attempt to associate Sam Adams with Jacobinism reflects a treatment far different from his tender concern about Thomas Hutchinson and his reputation in history. Hutchinson, a stalwart defender of the repressive British mercantile policies in America, was the implacable foe of Sam Adams. Becker writes about Hutchinson as follows:

> Mr. Hutchinson did not, at any time in his life, regard himself as an Enemy of the Human Race, or of America, or even of liberty rightly considered.

Becker recalls that Hutchinson went to England after the Tea Party:

> He never returned, but died in England on June 3, 1780, an unhappy and a homesick exile from the country which he loved.[26]

A more realistic approach to Hutchinson is in Bernhord Knollenberg, *Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1960). Knollenberg cites Hutchinson informing Whately, a member of Parliament, that since some

"abridgement of what are called English liberties" was inherent in the colonial relationship, he wished for his colony's own good, to "see some further restraint of liberty" imposed upon it by the mother country (Hutchinson to Whately, Jan. 20, 1769).

The tone of Becker's book is consistently pro-English throughout, so far as the issues dividing England and her American colonies are concerned. His first chapter is entitled "A Patriot of 1763." Becker means 'British Patriot,' and the British Patriot he has in mind is Benjamin Franklin. Franklin was once a British Patriot, and Martin Luther was once a Roman Catholic; Becker's purpose is to persuade his reader that Franklin was at ease and happy in this position. The second chapter is entitled "The Burden of Empire," and it endeavors to present the British side of the controversy over mercantilist policies. Becker is much concerned with the enormous English public debt following the successful expropriation of the French colonial empire in 1763. There was the British argument that the American colonists had been less patriotic, despite their large troop levies, than they ought to have been during the Seven Years War. For instance, there were many proven cases where individual American merchants had traded with the French in the West Indies during the war. This, no doubt, sounds very shocking when presented out of context, but the fact remains that American trade with the enemy was insignificant when compared to the gigantic illicit contraband trade between England and France across the English Channel throughout the war. The English imperial debt at the end of the war was also a fact, but it is equally true that English assets at hand were enormous. Hard money was rare in the colonies, but it was plentiful in England, thanks to the skillful policies of the Bank of England which had been founded in 1696. Becker creates a somewhat deceptive picture of American prosperity after 1763:

"In every colony the 'starving time,' even if it had ever existed, was now no more than an ancient tradition."[27]

Becker notes that by 1758, annual English exports to the American continental colonies were 2,000,000 and to the English West Indies colonies, 877,571. The percentage of

English exports to the mainland was increasing more rapidly than to the island. The fact remains, however, that the population of European descent in the islands was but a small fraction of the mainland's. No doubt American quibbling over the economic consequences of the Stamp Act of 1765, including the draining away of what little currency was left in America, would have been picayune had there been an American prosperity of the dimensions suggested by Becker. In Chapter III, entitled "The Rights of a Nation," Becker takes a deprecatory view of Patrick Henry. Rather than heap abuse on both Henry and Adams, he seeks to make the former look ridiculous. In Chapter IV, "Defining the Issue," Becker presents King George III as a misguided monarch being fought with equal ardor in both England and America:

> The idea of a Patriot King conceived by Lord Bolingbroke (one-time Jacobite exile), and instilled into the mind of the young Hanoverian monarch by an ambitious mother had little to do with liberty, either British or Colonial, but had much to do with authority.

The reader is supposed to conclude that the policies of George III, who reigned in England until 1820, were equally alien to England and America. Becker's sarcasm becomes a bit ponderous in his treatment of the Boston Massacre:

> The Boston Massacre was not as serious as the Massacre of St. Bartholomew or the Sicilian Vespers; but it seemed to raise passion to a white heat in the little provincial town.

Becker is somewhat concerned in his description of the engagements at Lexington and Concord lest the reader fail to appreciate the justice and rectitude of the British punitive expedition.

> To destroy stores of ammunition seemed to General Gage quite the most obvious of his duties; and Colonel Smith was accordingly ordered to proceed to the little village of Concord, some eighteen miles Northwest of Boston, and destroy the magazines which were known to be collected there.

Even the Declaration of Independence is interpreted by Becker to be implicitly an international doctrine applicable to the entire western world, rather than as a specific statement of America's national will and purpose.[29]

The presidential address of Professor Andrew C. McLaughlin to the American Historical Association Convention at Chicago on December 29, 1914, reflected the new cosmopolitan pro-English approach to the events of 1775:

> In the interpretation of American history and especially, I think, Constitutional history, writers have plainly been influenced by their own environments.
>
> Bancroft's great epic, with its paean of exultant escape from bondage was a very natural expression of the buoyant self-confident democracy of the Jacksonian era.
>
> If today Bancroft's attitude toward his subject seems provincial . . . he was permeated by the atmosphere of his generation.[30]

The following year H. Morse Stephens delivered the annual American Historical Association presidential address on the subject of "Nationality and History." Stephens evidently regarded modern nationalism, whether American or some other variety, as an evil which should be overcome:

> The belief in nationality has been in the 19th century as fundamental a doctrine as the belief in Christianity or in monarchy or democracy or aristocracy, in previous ages.
>
> Martin Luther, it is true, made his 'Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation' (actually a book) in 1520, but even in his time the ruling idea was rather the unity of western European civilization rather than its diversity among different nations.

It is unfortunate that Stephens was not in Europe in those days to deliver this inspiring message to King Francis I, his subjects, and their Turkish allies.

Stephens believed that the nationalist historians were to blame for present misfortunes:

> To them the fundamental righteousness of the national idea was as clear as the truth of the Christian religion was to the chroniclers of the middle ages.
>
> National patriotism became the national creed. It filtered through the entire educational system of modern states.
>
> The idea of a common Christianity binding all Christian peoples together in one religion has disappeared; the belief in the brotherhood of man has had no chance.

> Americans are taught from childhood to hate Britishers by the study of American history and not only the descendants of the men who made the Revolution, but every newly arrived immigrant child imbibes the hatred of the Great Britain of today from the patriotic ceremonies of the public schools.
>
> Woe unto us! Professional historians, professional historical students, professional teachers of history, if we cannot see, written in blood, in the dying civilization of Europe, the dreadful result of exaggerated nationalism as set forth in the patriotic histories of some of the most eloquent historians in the 19th century.

It would be difficult to quarrel with Stephens if his criticism of nationalism was restricted to excessive nationalism or chauvinism. Every quality and every cause become vices if they are distorted or practiced to excess. Unfortunately, Stephens made no allowance for a healthy and moderate nationalism promoting the best interests of a particular nation. His thought was in terms of glib slogans about internationalism which had become the order of the day. To judge from his argument about the pernicious influence of the American nationalist historians of the nineteenth century, one would imagine that we were about to go to war against England again as we had done in 1812. Fortunately, there was not the slightest danger of this in 1915 or 1916. But there was another danger of the sort which had been guarded against by Washington, Jefferson, John Adams, and John Quincy Adams; namely, that the United States would become involved in foreign quarrels which were not her concern either directly or indirectly. Stephens spoke more than six months after the *Lusitania* tragedy. It was obvious by that time that neutral America, under the leadership of President Wilson, was holding Germany to strict accountability on matters of international law while permitting the reckless British violations, including the torpedoing of neutral commerce by British submarines in the Baltic Sea, to pass unheeded. The danger in 1915 was not an unnecessary war of America against England, but an unnecessary war by America on behalf of alien interests. The problems which concerned Stephens in his address were not the real ones.

The issue at the time Stephens spoke was not so much nationalism versus internationalism, as a fluctuating attitude

on the part of American scholars toward competing foreign nationalisms. There was, to be sure, a simultaneous attempt to denigrate the American nationalist tradition as such. As Eugene Curtis put it: "The place occupied by England in the American emotional complex was radically different in 1759, 1776 and 1917."

The British Empire in 1759, the year that Wolfe attacked Quebec, was regarded as a symbol of safety against the French imperialism of Louis XV. In 1776, most Americans regarded England much as the gentle judge regarded Shylock in Shakespeare's famous play. The belief was widespread that an omnipotent England was seeking to exploit mercilessly her weaker American colonies. This factor of English power has become increasingly diminished in recent years. Americans of the present day, who see the balanced polarity, and hence futility, of the approximately equal division of military power in the world between the United States and the Soviet Union, find it difficult to conceive of one preponderant military power in the style of England in 1775. By 1917, most Americans regarded England's war against Germany as an intrinsically moral one, on behalf of the heritage of our Western civilization.

These fluctuations in American sympathies toward foreign nations are proverbial. America was incensed against England in 1870 because of England's reluctance to settle the Alabama Claims controversy, but in the preponderant American North, enthusiastic sympathy for the German cause in Europe was almost universal. As Curtis recalls: "When war broke out between France and Prussia, American sympathy in the North was naturally on the side of Prussia, in the South, on the side of France."[32]

The most influential New England historian in the campaign to rewrite the history of the American Revolution in favor of England was no doubt Charles McLain Andrews, who was born in Connecticut in 1863, and died in Vermont in 1943. Andrews came to Yale to complete his university teaching career in 1910, after having taught previously at Bryn Mawr and Johns Hopkins. He had made a reputation as an outstanding author of American textbooks in European history

before the turn of the century; the appearance of his major work. *The Colonial Period of American History* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, 1912) established his reputation as a leading expert in the field of early American history. Andrews was more than satisfied with the prevailing trends in the writing of American history during the first quarter of the twentieth century, and well he might be. He reviewed the scene in his presidential address to the American Historical Association at Richmond, Virginia, on December 27, 1924. Wherever Andrews looked, he saw progress in the interpretation and writing of modern history. He declared to his audience that "men have passed out of an age of intellectual and scientific adolescence into one of wider and more certain knowledge . . . the great majority of historians of the period before the middle of the nineteenth century wrote works that are of but little value today." Of course, this statement is not quite as dangerous as it seems at first glance. One could safely say that many of the operas written in the days of Bizet and Verdi have very little value. This does not change the fact that this was the great age of opera composition.

Andrews suggested that "the student of today . . . is born into a historical world already mature." Above all, Andrews was satisfied that American scholars had thoroughly revised their opinions of earlier English policies and he was confident that on this basis there could be fruitful Anglo-American collaboration in matters of historical scholarship; he noted that "a very promising beginning is now being made of Anglo-American cooperation in conferences of professors of history from the two countries and in the effort made to expound the part that Great Britain has played in the events of our colonial period and the connection which her history has had with our national affairs."[33]

Let us turn to the concrete approach of Andrews to the events of 1775. In his article "The American Revolution: An Interpretation" (*American Historical Review*, January, 1926), he explains:

> There is the conviction, which I hold very strongly, that no matter how familiar a subject may be, it can always be re-examined with profit and viewed not infrequently from such points of vantage

> as to set the scene in quite a new light. As with natural phenomena in the pre-Copernican days of celestial mechanics, when the world believed that the sun moved and the earth was flat, so it has been at all times with historical phenomena that what to the superficial observer has appeared to be true has been accepted far too often as containing the whole truth. Among these pre-Copernican convictions, for example, widely held in America today, is the belief that the American Revolution was brought about by British Tyranny.
>
> We sometimes hear that revolutions are not made but happen. In their immediate causes this is not true—for revolutions do not happen, they are made in that they are the creations of propaganda and manipulation. But, in reality, revolutions are not made, they are the detonations of explosive matters long accumulating and often lying dormant. They are the resultants of a vast complex of economic, political, social, and legal forces, which taken collectively are the masters, not the servants of statesmen and political agitators.

Andrews noted that "It was not until after 1750 when a favorable balance of trade was reached with the colonies themselves (i.e., favorable to England) that the mercantilist deemed the situation entirely satisfactory; and from that time on for twenty years—epochal years in the history of England's relations with America—the mercantilist idea of the place that a colony should occupy in the British scheme of things became fixed and unalterable."

The approach of Andrews is basically one of economic determinism. For instance, numerous writers have observed that Whitney's cotton gin fastened the waning slave system more securely to the institutions of the old South. It is certainly essential to stress the economic factors whenever they are applicable. Andrews is saying that the application of mercantilist policy to the continental colonies before the Seven Years War was not taken very seriously in London because the profits from the colonies were relatively meager and the expenses of imperial administration were relatively great. In those days, the American sugar islands were the source of great profit and hence the object of most careful attention. The picture changed when the profits from British mercantilism, whether those gathered by the Scottish 'factors' (business agents) or the English revenue agents, became sizable to a point of attracting the attention of sufficiently

powerful vested interests. The realization that mercantilism was profitable meant that the system would be defended in its essence regardless of occasional concessions and the employment of a zig-zag policy. Andrews admits that colonial manufacturing in any form was more vigorously discouraged in 1770, after mercantilism had become profitable, than in 1699 when the first ordinance prohibiting manufacturing had been promulgated for the American colonies. But the final position of Andrews is that the contemporary American colonists were insufficiently mature or sophisticated to comprehend the English position. This marks an abrupt switch from economic fact to deduction of a social nature. Hence, the study of the origins of the American Revolution ultimately becomes largely a study of the immature American colonial mind.[34]

Several other American historians who played major roles at the turn of the century in revising the history of the American Revolution in favor of the American Loyalists and the English mercantilists ought to be briefly mentioned. George Louis Beer, *The Commercial Policy Toward the American Colonies* (New York, 1893), was the first important book in America stating the English case in the mercantilist controversy. Herbert Levi Osgood trained numerous students of American History at Columbia University to look first at the English viewpoint, during the decades before his death in 1918. Far and away the most important exponent of this trend in our own day has been Lawrence Henry Gipson, author of the monumental work, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution,* which appeared in nine volumes during the twenty years from 1936 to 1956. Gipson concluded, in the ninth volume of this work, that, so far as the record of British mercantilist policy after 1763 is concerned, "the record is far from discreditable."[35]

Gipson's special volume on *The Coming of the American Revolution* appeared in 1954. The author turns eagerly to the theme of the American Civil War as an important influence prompting us to revise our views about the origins of the Revolutionary War:

> Again, one is faced with the anomaly that in our own day the fundamental positions taken by Great Britain and America in the

> year 1775 are reversed. For Great Britain in the twentieth century repudiated its earlier position that sovereignty was indivisible within the Empire by conceding that its self-governing units were distinct nationalities with complete freedom should they so choose to sever all political connections with the parent state. The United States on its part . . . has just as surely repudiated the Revolutionary War idea that each state is a sovereign entity within the federal system, in favor of the unitary concept of sovereignty as resting in the whole American nation. . . . .[36]

Gipson, in his detailed work on the structure and policies of the eighteenth century British Empire has praised the English system as "a government of concentrated power based on a separation of functions." This England described by Gipson was the embodiment of the classical unitary state where separation of powers existed only between the upper and lower branches of a single legislature, the British Parliament (after the emasculation of the legislative functions belonging to the House of Lords in 1911, Parliament became to all intents and purposes a unicameral legislature). In England, then as now, all regional and local government was subordinate to the central authorities at London. A greater contrast than that between the traditional English unitary state and the traditional American federal system can scarcely be imagined. There is no doubt that there has been a diminution of local sovereignty in relation to the central authorities with their delegated powers in America during the modern age. Gipson is quite wrong, however, when he interprets the subjugation of the Southern bid for secession in 1865 to be tantamount to the emergence of an American unitary state. The American federal system survived the Civil War. The United States is still a federal system today. There are still excellent prospects for a reassertion of grass roots sovereignty in this country in all its pristine vigor.

The British Empire did not become either a federation or a confederation in recent years. The major work of the leading British authority on the subject, A. B. Keith, is entitled *The Dominions as Sovereign States* (Macmillan, London, 1938). A good case can be made for the argument that dominion status within the British Empire, which by now has produced an association of states with only titular unity,

is a direct consequence of Yankee victory in two wars, the American Revolution and the American Civil War.

C. M. Andrews was quite right when he maintained that the British authorities refused to modify their imperial policies despite the unfavorable outcome of the American Revolution in 1783. But the attainment of dominion status by Canada in 1867 marked a belated reversal of traditional British Empire policy in at least one important area. Canada was seething with discontent at the end of the Civil War in the United States, and the authorities at London took seriously the remarks about a projected third Yankee invasion of Canada, which might enjoy extensive popular support from the Canadians if concessions were not granted. Thus, Canada in 1867 embarked on the road which led to virtual independence at the London Westminster Conference in 1931. More recently, so-called dominions such as South Ireland and South Africa have seceded *de jure* from the British Empire without fear of reprisals from England. As Keith explained, England was merely *prima inter pares* within this particular sector of her imperial system. Of course she has managed to retain simultaneously a plethora of crown colonies, protectorates and the like. These areas have remained under direct rule from London. India is today nominally a British dominion. No one would seriously contend that England enjoys any measure of political authority in that second most populous area on the globe.

None of the imperial trends and realities described above have anything to do with the ideas of confederation and federation which prevailed in the American colonies at the time of the eighteenth century struggle against England. No one would deny that Gipson is a brilliant historian who has supplied us with a wealth of details about the eighteenth century English imperial system. He is at his best in dramatic narrative, as for instance where he describes how the Highland Scots were hanged for wearing kilts after the battle of Culloden in 1746. The presentation of minute details is his strength; synthesis is his weakness. This imaginary switching of roles between eighteenth century England and twentieth century America on the one hand, and between eighteenth

century America and twentieth century England on the other hand, has never taken place in fact.

John C. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution* (rev. ed., Stanford University Press, 1962), contends that "the American Revolution was a struggle between two peoples who spoke the same language, hated arbitrary government with equal fervor, and proclaimed the idea of liberty under law."[37]

There are two sides to Miller's argument. There is the familiar argument of Soame Jenyns, a member of Parliament during the American Revolution, to the effect that most of England was not represented in Parliament in England after 1763, and, therefore, the American colonies had no grounds for complaint about taxation without representation. Only 3% of the English people were technically qualified to vote in national elections, and the so-called cider counties had no representation in Parliament at all. On the other hand, there were the rotten burroughs, districts which existed only on paper, that were represented. The English at home certainly had as many grievances against those who governed them, whether Whig or Tory, as did the American colonists. But most of them were patient and loyal and did not believe that England needed further violent revolutions after the series of revolutions in England during the previous century. England was the domain of the English and they were not in the process of becoming a separate nationality in the style of the American colonists, who had arrived in America from so many different European countries.

This is no attempt to suggest that the English people should have revolted against their arbitrary government in 1775 merely because there was revolution in America. On the contrary, it would have been something of a stab in the back had they done so. But it is misleading for Miller to claim that the Americans and English were hating arbitrary government with "equal fervor" in 1775 at a time when the Americans were carrying on a struggle against overwhelming odds and the English were submitting passively to authority. By the same token, as suggested above, the concepts of liberty under law were already very different in England and America by

1775. Miller, of course, is right when he notes that the two people spoke the same language.

Miller complains that "The events of this period cannot yet compare to the Civil War in popular interest." This is no doubt true, but it may be partly the result of the manner in which our latter-day historians have presented the stirring events of the American Revolution. Consider the following comment written by George Bancroft one hundred years ago about Sam Adams at the time of the battle of Lexington:

> Heedless of his own danger, Samuel Adams, with the voice of a prophet, exclaimed: "Oh, what a glorious morning is this!," for he saw his country's independence hasten on, and, like Columbus and the tempest knew that the storm bore him more swiftly toward the undiscovered world.[38]

Miller is interested in explaining to his readers "in what respects our historical perspective has been altered by the new factual material that has been unearthed and by the course of events since World War II." No doubt, in connection with the latter, he is thinking in terms of such items as the 'Union Now' of Clarence Streit and the world federalist movement of Ely Culbertson. Whether or not the current events of our own time have any special relevance in determining our approach to the crucial crisis of the eighteenth century is a question that will not be debated at this point. There is no doubt that Miller, over the recent decades, has continued the tradition of Tyler and Van Tyne. Indeed, there can be no doubt that this Anglophile trend of misinterpreting the American Revolution is still the dominant one in our time. Miller offers the following interesting comment:

> While the American Revolutionaries were Conservative in the sense that they did not attempt to make a break with the American past, they left no doubt that they intended to make a break with the European past.

Miller's conception that the American Revolutionaries' cause was in fact a conservative one is welcome, but his statement about a break with the European past leaves the reader in doubt. The American Revolution was not waged against Europe as such, but against English imperialism solely and

specifically, with the Americans allied to a considerable portion of continental Europe in the struggle against England.

Miller seems to contradict himself a few paragraphs later with the following statement:

> The separation from Great Britain enabled Americans to carry on at an accelerated pace a social, political and economic revolution that was already under way by 1776.

It is singular that Miller regards the struggle against England as a suitable device for "conservative" Americans to accelerate the pace of their social, political and economic *revolution* (italics mine) that was supposedly already under way by 1776. Some historians, such as Charles Beard, have regarded the American Constitution of 1787 as the reactionary retreat from a somewhat radical position adopted in the Declaration of Independence. There is good reason to disagree with such a viewpoint, but the issue will not be argued here. The point is that no historian, with the possible exception of Miller, has discerned a radical trend in the events at the national level leading from the Declaration of Independence to the adoption of the American Constitution in 1789. Equally fuzzy is another statement by Miller:

> . . . the American Revolution has not yet run its course. Indeed its effect upon colonial peoples has never been greater than at the present time.[39]

Leaving aside the question of the relative importance of the twentieth century's world wars and communism, on the one hand, and the eighteenth century American Revolution on the other, in encouraging the contemporary colonial people to revolt from their imperial masters, it is misleading for Miller to suggest to his readers that the American Revolution as such is some sort of never-ending subversive movement. As Miller himself concedes, the American Revolution was, in fact, a conservative defense against mercantilist encroachments which reached its logical fulfillment in the 1783 treaty of peace and in the successful federal constitution of 1789.

The emphasis on the prevailing Tory-Loyalist interpretation of the American Revolution in this chapter should not give rise to the impression that all of the top American histo-

rians dealing with this period are deviating in the same peculiar direction. An example of a very different approach may be found in Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, *Give Me Liberty: A Struggle for Self-Government in Virginia* (American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1958, 275 pp.). Wertenbaker is the author of some thirty books on eighteenth century America, and his reputation in this field of study has been maintained without challenge since the publication of his first major study more than fifty years ago. In the next chapter, we will consider the exciting theme of how a similar trend toward an Anglophile presentation of the cause of the War of 1812 has recently been reversed. Everyone in the field of eighteenth century American studies has heard of the recent "boom in George Bancroft," to employ the popular phrase. A return to a sane and solid appreciation of our heritage from the American Revolutionary War period may be just around the corner. If it is, historical truth will be served in the instance at no expense to our national cause.

Chapter II: The War of 1812

The American Revolution was victorious. When the Cornwallis troops at Yorktown in 1781 marched out to surrender with their band playing "The World Turned Upside Down," that was American victory. It did not matter whether or not there were more French than American troops in the trenches of the besiegers at Yorktown. It did not matter, from the American viewpoint, that Great Britain won the war in Europe against France, Spain and Holland after Rodney's victory over the French fleet in the West Indies in 1782. It did not really matter to any decisive extent that the British for over thirteen years refused to evacuate certain American territories recognized by England to be American in the peace treaty of 1783. Nothing could change the fact that American independence had been achieved, and that the United States were victorious.

The War of 1812 presents a very different picture. Whatever legends there are and may be, no historian can claim with any real justification that America was victorious in that war. There were some individual American victories in limited engagements. The South won a lot of victories in the Civil War, but it has never been argued successfully that their war effort as a whole was a successful one. No doubt the fact that Andrew Jackson won the last land engagement, a purely defensive action after the peace treaty had been signed, was of great psychological importance in creating the myth of victory for the generation that had been sorely harassed by the war. But such illusions tend to fade with time when seen from a fresher perspective. Far more important than the battle of New Orleans in 1815, was the fact that the general European wars which England had promoted since 1793 also came to an end in 1815, with the final overthrow of Emperor Napoleon I. The arrival of general peace produced the illusion that America's own war effort had something to do with the

happy results which followed. There is, of course, no iota of logic behind this position. France, America's ally, went down to crushing defeat in 1815. England, America's enemy, emerged victorious with vast gains in colonial territories (for instance, Dutch South Africa was just one item of booty), and with a military prestige incomparably greater than that possessed by any other nation in modern times.

Let us briefly consider the context of the War of 1812 in its world perspective. Pitt had predicted to Parliament in 1791 that the French Revolution would immobilize France militarily for at least one generation. But, as so often happens, the destructive revolutionary dynamics produced great military prowess. Revolutionary France picked a quarrel with Prussia and Austria in 1792 and by the following year the French were winning great victories. England considered that the time had come to 'redress the balance of power.' This meant, in plainer language, that England did not intend to permit French prestige to overshadow English prestige in Europe.

It was not until 1794 that General Pichegru conquered Holland for France. Concern about the low countries as an invasion route to England gave the English leaders another motive for continuing the conflict. Still another motive was the discovery by the English merchants that the war was good for business. Both enemy ships and enemy markets were subject to seizure. Then too, a belligerent England could attain advantages at the expense of the neutrals. Consider the case with neutral America. Shortly after declaring war on France, the English leaders promulgated their own rules for the conduct of maritime warfare, through their usual channel, the Orders-in-Council. It seemed that certain limitations ought to be imposed on the trade of neutral America with the French West Indies. The Yankee skippers were not informed of these latest official English decisions, but the English seemed to believe in the motto that ignorance is no excuse. Scores of Yankee ships in the West Indies were seized by the British in 1793 without any knowledge on the part of the Yankees about the motives or policies behind the seizures. These events were ominous at a time when the English land forces were still stubbornly garrisoning a number of points on

American territory, such as Detroit. It was obvious to every thinking person in America by the end of 1793 that another war against England was a real danger. Seen in this light, the fact that the war did not come for nineteen years ought to be regarded in itself as a real American contribution to the cause of world peace. Conciliatory gestures from the English side were few and far between, arrogance was the rule, and manifestations of English friendliness were rare. Perhaps the general English attitudes can be best symbolized in the comment of Francis "Copenhagen" Jackson, the last English minister in the United States before the outbreak of war in 1812, about America's incomparable Dolly Madison: "She is fat and forty but not fair."

The question arises why the general conflict in Europe was of such fantastically long duration. Had it been a four year war, like the American Civil War or World War I, or a six-year war like World War II, America would have remained neutral in the conflict from beginning to end. The fact is, however, that the conflict lasted, except for one year of truce following the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, for twenty-two years. This conflict was primarily a struggle between England and France. The other European nations were in and out like customers at an automat restaurant, with the responsibility for this endless conflict mainly that of England or France. A brief glance at the record will help to place this matter in perspective.

So far as war guilt for the outbreak of the fighting in Europe is concerned, both England and France were guilty. The French insisted upon taking seriously the innocuous Pillnitz Declaration of 1791 (declaration of monarchical solidarity by Austria and Prussia on behalf of Louis XVI, but with action promised only in the case that all the other monarchs agreed to act; everyone knew that it would be impossible to drag Catherine II of Russia into a senseless war against France; therefore, the declaration was merely a harmless gesture to appease the French refugees). It is not easy to see, however, why the French war against Prussia and Austria entitled England to declare war against France. Of course, the pretext for England was the execution of Louis XVI in 1793. But

this was an internal French affair and the French had not declared war on England when the English executed their own King Charles I in 1649.

The revolutionary fanatics mismanaging France were usurped by Napoleon Bonaparte in the famous Brumaire coup d'état in 1799. From that moment, the responsibility for French foreign policy rested with Napoleon himself; this remained true regardless of the particular French foreign minister of the moment. The record shows that Napoleon Bonaparte made no less than three peace offers to England in 1800. He flattered the British, and referred to them, along with France, as one of the two most civilized nations in Europe. He insisted that France had no demands of any kind against England and that she was willing to discuss with England the limits and nature of her aims and aspirations on the European continent. The English rejected Napoleon's overtures, but the smashing Napoleonic victory at Marengo put Austria, the last of England's continental allies, out of the field. The English reluctantly decided to try a truce, but in April, 1803, they renewed the war against France, after having refused to evacuate Malta, at that time a possession of the Knights of St. John, although England had agreed to evacuate Malta in the 1802 Peace of Amiens.

The renewal of war between England and France in 1803 meant that there would be new English efforts to raise a coalition against Napoleon on the European continent. The English effort was successful, and during the period from 1805 to 1807, no less than three of the principal continental European powers waged war against France at England's behest. However, this victorious English diplomacy did not resolve the conflict between England and France. Napoleon defeated Austria, Prussia and Russia in that order. At Tilsit in 1807 his generous peace terms to Russia won him a new ally in Tsar Alexander I. England ought to have quit, according to the ordinary rules, but she was determined to destroy Napoleon regardless of the cost to anyone else. Furthermore, England had a trump card that may be summarized in one word: economics. Since the days of Elizabeth I, Russia had been heavily dependent on England for imports desired by her

most influential classes. Alexander I made it clear to Napoleon that he would eventually be subjected to tremendous anti-French pressure at home unless Napoleon could figure out some way to supply Russia with the goods which had previously been supplied by England. Since this was the era before the steam railroad, Napoleon faced a real dilemma. He liked to build roads, but building enough of them to supply Russia with the bulk goods she required was an impossibility. France produced most of these goods, but transportation was the crucial problem. Most of the French merchant marine had been destroyed or captured by England. There was virtually no maritime commerce between France and Russia after 1807. In 1810, Alexander I switched sides and threw in his lot with England. In 1812, Napoleon tried to win Russia back by means of a punitive military expedition to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The expedition reached Moscow but it never arrived in Russia's newer capital on the Baltic. Instead, the Russian winter destroyed the cream of Napoleon's forces and the French emperor was never really able to recover from that blow. England pressed her advantage, and with the help of additional European allies, she won her final victory over Napoleon in 1815.

A brief summary of the events outlined above reveals that the perpetuation of warfare in Europe during the years from 1800 to 1815 was primarily the responsibility of England. The outbreak of war between England and the United States in 1812 was a mere incident in this larger picture.

There was no American Loyalist Party during the War of 1812, although things were moving in that direction at the Hartford Convention in 1814 when several New England governors were considering the possibility of seceding from the American Union and concluding a separate peace with England. America was badly divided during the War of 1812, but without matters coming to a head and without the actual launching of a so-called party of treason. Rehabilitating, defending and glorifying the American Loyalist of the American Revolution had been accepted as a great and worthwhile challenge by an entire school of American historians. It was difficult to find a similarly glamorous cause in order to justify

reversing the established American patriotic tradition about the War of 1812. The patriotic tradition went something like this: "Another war between America and England was a misfortune, but they gave us no choice. They violated our honor by seizing our citizens and our ships under illegal circumstances. They refused again and again to negotiate a reasonable settlement of this difficulty. Self-respect required us to retaliate and although we suffered many grievous military defeats, including the collapse of our expedition against Canada, the destruction of our blue water warships and the burning of our capitol, our honor was preserved."

During the years after the American Civil War, when one historian after another was challenging the patriotic position so far as the American Revolution was concerned, the old views about the War of 1812 were left relatively unscathed. We had our view of events about 1812, and the English had theirs; the two did not coincide. For instance, James Hannay, *History of the War of 1812 Between Great Britain and the United States of America,* (Morang, Toronto, 1905), presented the traditional English view of the 1812 conflagration. Kendrick Charles Babcock, one of the more Anglophile American historians, expressed naive amazement that this should be the case in his review of the book in the July, 1906 issue of the *American Historical Review:* "It is strikingly like certain histories of the United States which appeared about the middle of the 19th century when the chief aim was to awaken patriotic emotions and pride without much regard for historical accuracy or for careful and discriminating distinctions such as marked the later accounts of the period of the Revolution and the War of 1812." Babcock objected to Hannay's opinion that there was "an insane hatred of England" in the United States. He did not like Hannay's description of America's General Hull as a "ruthless relic of the Revolution." Babcock also objected to Hannay's distorted judgment that it was the "impressment of British seamen found on board of American vessels" which mainly caused the American resentment that Hannay claimed produced the war. Hannay made no allowance for the impressment of American seamen by British captains. Babcock deplored Hannay's statement that there

was "no reason why any American of the present day should feel offended at reflections on the actions of men who lived ninety years ago." Babcock was doubtless right in assuming that Hannay's logic, when applied to American sensibilities, would be less than an asset in the campaign of certain American historians to rewrite early American history from a standpoint favorable toward England.

Mention has been made of the fact that there was no faction of American Loyalists (i.e., loyal to England) during the War of 1812. On the other hand, there is no doubt that American party rivalry, in which foreign affairs played a part, seriously weakened American unity during the conflict. The Federalist party, claiming to be the party of the Constitution (a ridiculous claim when one considers that James Madison, one of the principal authors of the Constitution, was a Republican leader), were driven from power in 1800 because their leader, President John Adams, refused to wage an unnecessary war against the Directory government in France which had preceded the rule of Napoleon. Adams has gone down as the courageous exponent of the slogan that it is better to be right than to be president (unlike the case of Henry Clay, who used it with a trace of the sour grapes of the Aesop's fable).

Thomas Jefferson became the first Republican president in 1801, and two years later the vast Louisiana Purchase was acquired under his auspices. Federalist opposition to the purchase as a party measure did not increase their popularity. Jefferson served two terms, in accordance with the sacrosanct tradition of Washington, and was followed by another Republican president, James Madison. The Federalists had been out of power for nearly twelve years when the War of 1812 began, and their dispositions had not been improved by that fact. Nearly eighty years later, Henry Adams, the great-grandson of John Adams, the last Federalist president, produced his monumental *History of the United States During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison* (9 vols., N. Y., 1889 to 1891). This work still stands in 1964 as the best narrative history of the early years of the nineteenth century in the United States. It is equally evident that this excellent narrative is presented from the Federalist viewpoint of 1812,

and with special animus against Thomas Jefferson and his alleged Anglophobia (Madison is always considered by Adams in the role of Jefferson's lieutenant). Yet, when all due allowance is made for this inherited element of Federalist bias against the Republican administration which led the United States into war in 1812, the fact remains that Henry Adams nevertheless presents the origins of the war itself from the perspective of traditional American patriotism.

This traditional approach was also reflected by Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power and its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols., Little, Brown, Boston, 1905). Mahan was at the peak of his career when his special study on the War of 1812 appeared. Probably no American historian has exerted as great a direct influence on world politics. He succeeded in applying Mommsen's theories on the importance of maritime warfare in relation to military operations in general during the Punic Wars to the military operations of the modern world after 1500. British, American and German leaders have gone on record with glowing testimonials about the importance of Mahan's brilliant narrative history and analytical judgments. It is Mahan's thesis in the book on 1812 that the English leaders simply did not have enough respect for American naval power at that time to accord the Americans decent treatment when the latter found themselves in conflict with the English blockade policies.

Mahan regarded the War of 1812 as a desperate effort on the part of the American to defend their position against English provocations despite the fact that America was militarily unprepared. As Mahan put it, in an article for the *American Historical Review* in October, 1905: "The government of the United States had been honestly loath to declare war in 1812, and had signalized its reluctance by immediate advances looking toward the restoration of peace." Mahan points out that President Madison was looking for several concessions from England, and it is important to note that these did not include any program of American aggrandizement such as a conquest of Florida or Canada. One of the requested concessions concerned the revocation of the 1807 Orders-in-Council. This involved no difficulty at the moment,

since the English, unknown to Madison, had decided to repeal the orders on June 16, 1812, two days before the American Declaration of War against England. The other concession which Madison was seeking concerned the impressment of American seamen. The United States wished England to abandon categorically this unjust practice which had caused so much grief in the relations between the two countries. However, the English refused to agree to this concession during the course of hostilities, and they maintained their refusal in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Peace in 1814. Mahan points out that Madison sent his so-called peace instructions to America's envoy in England, Jonathan Russell, on June 26, 1812. The latter finally managed to see Castlereagh, the English Foreign Secretary, on August 24, 1812. Castlereagh informed Russell that England had no intention of modifying her impressment policy. Word of this meeting reached Tsar Alexander I at St. Petersburg. Alexander told John Quincy Adams, America's envoy, on September 21, 1812, that Russia continued to sympathize with the United States despite the fact that she was at war against Napoleon and that America was at war against England, Russia's new ally. Alexander promised to exert pressure on England to negotiate with the United States on the impressment issue and any other issues which obstructed the restoration of peace. President Madison accepted Tsar Alexander's good offices on March 11, 1813, and he proceeded to send the Federalist, James A. Bayard, and the Republican, Albert Gallatin, on a bipartisan peace mission to Europe. Castlereagh raised obstacles for many months, but direct negotiations were finally agreed upon on January 5, 1814. John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell served with Bayard and Gallatin on the mission, thus constituting a very able team; Castlereagh was content to negotiate through minor figures with no reputations whatever. Despite Russian pressure, the American peace terms were categorically rejected by Castlereagh on July 28, 1814.

News of the capture and destruction of the American capitol reached Western Europe two months later. The American mission abandoned all hope of obtaining concessions,

and a peace treaty was signed according to the English terms on December 24, 1814. None of the American objectives in the war had been achieved, but Mahan cites with approval the opinion of Albert Gallatin in 1816, that the war had not been without positive results because the people "are more Americans."[1]

A continuation of the traditional patriotic approach to the War of 1812 is found in Ralph D. Paine, *The Fight for a Free Sea* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1920): "It was in this renewed defiance of England that the dream of the founders of the Republic and the ideals of the embattled farmers at Bunker Hill and Saratoga achieved their goal."[2]

A significant turning point in the interpretation of the War of 1812 was reached a few years later. Its first significant harbinger was an article by Louis M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812," in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (Vol. 10, 1924). Hacker, who was noted for his application of Marxist terminology to the Turner thesis on the American frontier, suggested that all the talk about a free sea was largely a rationalization on the part of Westerners and Southerners to disguise their greed and their desire to grab territory at the expense of England, Spain and the Indians. Hacker reminded his readers that the people who suffered most from misfortunes in maritime affairs were New Englanders, who favored peace with England instead of war. The most important statement of the thesis that the War of 1812 was a war of naked conquest and aggression on the part of the United States appeared the following year. This book was a commercial success, and its major conclusions have since appeared in the leading college textbooks on American history such as those of Morison, Commager, Nevins, Bailey, Riegel, Hicks and Faulkner.

Pratt followed Hacker in emphasizing the importance of applying the Turner thesis: "The result of such examination has been the placing of new emphasis upon the western demand for the annexation of Canada." Pratt was following Hacker in the sectional argument: "If the real grievances which caused the war were interference by Great Britain with American commerce and the rights of American sailors, why

was war to redress these grievances opposed by the maritime section of the nation and urged by the inland section, which they scarcely affected?"[3]

Pratt was careful to fortify his position against the charge of onesidedness in the presentation of the issues. He very cleverly pointed out that he was not seeking to be comprehensive in his narrative, but that he was concentrating on the Florida and the Canada arguments for the sake of clarity.

Pratt's presentation of the English viewpoint and the case against America concerning the origins of the War of 1812 proved to be one of the most successful ventures in American historical writing. He presented his arguments smoothly and graciously to the accompaniment of a mass of seemingly incontrovertible details.

W. H. Goodman, "Origins of the War of 1812" in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (Vol. 28, 1941), offered some additional details derived from primary research to support Pratt's position. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that the Pratt thesis, although for years the dominant one, was ever universally accepted by the leading American historians. It was largely due to the influence of Charles Callan Tansill that the older approach was followed in the epochal survey of American foreign policy, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,* 10 vol., (N. Y., 1927-29; Vol. III relates to the War of 1812). In another instance, Irving Bryant, *James Madison, the President, 1809-1812* (Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1956), refused to accept the Pratt thesis in explaining the considerations which prompted President Madison to request a declaration of war against England from Congress on June 1, 1812. (It took Congress eighteen days to make up its mind after the President's request.) Nevertheless, despite these distinguished exceptions, the Pratt thesis dominated the approach of the American historians to the origins of the War of 1812 from 1926 down to 1962. Some of the disciples of Pratt were men of great ability whose misfortune it was to accept the primary research of Pratt in arguing the case from his premises. An example of this would be Albert Z. Carr, *The Coming of War, an Account of the Remarkable Events*

Leading to the War of 1812 (Doubleday, N. Y., 1960, 330 pp.). Carr's study along the lines laid down by Pratt was subsidized by Lawrence S. Finkelstein of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carr employed the concept of brinkmanship that has repeatedly been used to characterize the American diplomacy of John Foster Dulles during the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower. Brinkmanship implies a deliberate willingness to gamble on war, to lead the country to the brink of war, in order to gain certain definite points. Carr listed four dates when America was on the brink of war against England prior to 1812: 1794, 1807, 1809, and 1810. The first crisis was surmounted by President Washington's willingness to accept the Jay Treaty of 1795, which was tantamount to keeping peace on English terms. The 1807 crisis, prompted by the savage attack of the English man-of-war *Leopard* on an American public vessel, was surmounted by President Jefferson's unwillingness to accede to the public clamor for war. Again, war was avoided in 1809 when President Madison refused to regard British Foreign Secretary George Canning's repudiation of the Erskine agreement between the two countries as a cause for war. War was surmounted in 1810 when the United States agreed to conform to certain highly controversial English blockade measures. Each of these crises was followed by revived hope of peace. As Carr summarized it:

> For decades prior to 1812, England and America carried on a bitter diplomatic contest marked by sporadic violence, but they managed to avoid open warfare.
>
> Then all at once, in a crisis no more serious than those which had gone before, a new combination of circumstances pushed President James Madison to his reluctant decision that the war must be fought.

This new combination of circumstances referred to by Carr consisted, in his opinion, very largely of changes on the American scene which bore little direct relation to English policy. In other words, Carr is prepared at the start to assign the primary guilt for the conflict in 1812 to the United States. He does imply, however, that the Americans had been subjected to considerable provocation during the preceding years:

> Most Englishmen and Americans at the time, even those who did not want war, felt a sense of relief when it came. Nerve tissue had worn thin; whatever its perils, the war put an end to tensions and uncertainties which had been too long endured. The coming of the War of 1812 exemplifies an obvious but often neglected fact: that a nation challenges another in the fatally provocative terms preliminary to war only because its leaders have chosen to use such terms.
>
> The 'causes' which historians often assign for wars—desire for territory, economic competition, religious antagonism and the like —are not truly causes. They are only motives for conflict and persist in peacetime as well as war. Where leaders on both sides are competent men dedicated to peace these pressures are adjusted without war.

Carr's brilliant formulation of the problems connected with the question of war guilt deserved a far better researched narrative to support it. Carr gladly gives credit to Washington, Adams and Jefferson for avoiding earlier conflicts, but his judgment of Madison is as stern as one might expect within the context of the general Pratt thesis. Carr begins his narrative with the closing events of the American Revolutionary War. The following generalization is rather typical of his carelessness with the facts he is discussing: "The main topic of the time (1782) was the exhausting sea struggle which France, Spain and Holland were waging against weary England in the hope of pulling her down from her high place under the guise of aid to the American Revolutionists."[6]

To suggest that Holland was interested in pulling down England during the American Revolutionary War is a rather misleading way to state the case. The fact of the matter is that England attacked an unsuspecting Holland without warning in order to seize her merchant fleet for use against the American colonists and the French. Possibly Carr would contend that one is being unnecessarily meticulous to refer to such matters.

Carr presents several brilliant abstract considerations in the conclusion of his narrative, but there is one concrete point that deserves special consideration. As Carr puts it: "There is no warrant whatever in the facts for the assumption that

the War of 1812, or any other, could not have been avoided indefinitely. Half a dozen times since the Treaty of Potsdam (1945) men in the higher circles of the American government have solemnly assured each other of a war with Russia within a few months."

To adopt Carr's position that any war at any point whatever in history can be avoided indefinitely is to assume a relativistic stance of indefinable nature. According to this view, every recourse to armed force in human history has been in itself a proof of man's innate depravity. No sensible person would be inclined to deny that the unnecessary wars of history have outnumbered the necessary ones, but to state that all wars by definition are unnecessary is to subject to a relativistic nihilism every existing patriotic tradition in the world. As a matter of fact, excellent arguments have been made about the need for Americans to defend themselves in 1775 and in 1812. The simple truth is that Carr has ignored most of these.

For Carr to assert that men in the higher circles of American government have expected the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union in any concrete situation since 1945 is merely a dogmatic assertion on the part of the author which thus far has not been supported by evidence.

Carr is on safer ground in predicting that the officials in the Soviet Union would have no doubt about war guilt in the event that there ever was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States: "The Russians . . . have been assured since 1917 that only capitalistic imperialism and its implicit contradictions prevent the abolition of war. For orthodox Marxists it follows that the 'guilt' for another war would lie squarely on America."

Carr's ultimate attitude on the problem of determining war guilt reflects cynicism as well as relativism: "Was Russia or Japan right in 1905? In the upshot, the winner's moral position usually looks better, but only because he is better able to advertise it. If Germany and Japan had won the second world war the peoples of the conquered allies would soon have been brainwashed into guilt feelings for their 'aggressions' for did not the United States and England try

to keep the German and Japanese people in a reduced status?" (Although Carr might regard the point as being too meticulous, German and Japanese victory in World War II would not have included an invasion of the United States but rather merely a successful defense against American efforts to invade Germany and Japan.)

The relativistic position of Carr is illustrated by a further generalization which he makes: "It is often forgotten that Hitler was the product not only of Germany, but of all western civilization at a time of despair."[7]

This conception is rather typical of Carr. One might express it in the form of a classic Greek syllogism. Major premise: Germany is one of the nations of western civilization. Minor premise: Hitler is a German. Ergo: Western civilization as a whole is responsible for Hitler. Much has been written about the excessive terms imposed upon Germany by the Allies at the Versailles Conference in 1919. But not enough has been written about Germany's share of culpability in accepting those terms. The old excuse that Germany had to do so because she was under blockade and would otherwise starve is a myth. Due to the intercession of Herbert Hoover, the Allied blockade of Germany was lifted in April, 1919, before the peace terms of the Allies were even presented to the Germans. Public opinion in the Allied countries would have rendered impossible the restoration of the hunger blockade of Germany under any circumstances. The Weimar leaders contended that the peace terms were in flagrant contradiction with the Fourteen Points which the Allies had voluntarily accepted as the basis for the forthcoming peace treaty when the Armistice was signed (the only exception was Point 2 on freedom of the seas, which the English refused to accept). The position of the Weimar leaders on this point was undoubtedly correct, but they did not draw the logical conclusion by refusing to sign the treaty when it was presented to them. Had they refused to sign, there would no doubt have been a full Allied occupation of Germany, but German honor would have been saved, and the people would not have starved. America's independence is solidly based on the heroic tradition of Valley Forge.

The French Third Republic established its heroic tradition when it refused to surrender to the Prussians following the capture of Emperor Napoleon III at Sedan. The Weimar Republic in Germany began with a cowardly surrender. Instead of passive resistance in 1919, there was craven submission. Everyone knows that the complaint about the Treaty of Versailles was one of Hitler's two main arguments in his effort to come to power in Germany. It was the Weimar German leaders, not western civilization as a whole, where the primary responsibility for giving Hitler this argument must be found. The second principal argument of Hitler was economic. In the 1928 elections, after campaigning for nearly ten years, Hitler received less than three percent of the German vote. Then came the economic depression of 1929. Everyone knows that developments in the United States were of central importance in producing this world-wide economic crisis. Nevertheless, it would scarcely be fair to saddle the Americans with the inadequate measures of the German Weimar leaders in seeking to cope with the economic depression in Germany. The betrayal of the Weimar recovery program by the Social Democrats produced the unnecessary German national election of 1930 which gave Hitler his real start. It would scarcely be logical to blame France, England or the United States for the policy of the German Social Democrats in 1930. It is an evasion of responsibility in any real sense to blame western civilization, rather than Germany, for the fact that Hitler came to power in 1933. This point has been dealt with because it explains at least partially why Carr has failed to turn up any important new points in his own research on the origin of the War of 1812. He is quite content to offer us his dazzling generalizations supported by the earlier research of Pratt. Some of these generalizations have led him into some rather fantastic speculation:

> There was also a more subtle force (in the United States), not yet clearly expressed, but which had begun to generate hatred of England. A few years earlier, Parliament, in a humanitarian mood, had forbidden Englishmen and English ships to engage in the slave traffic. From this question it was but a step to the conclusion that to protect their most sacrosanct institution against northern attacks the prestige and influence of England in America had to be cut away.[8]

The fact of the matter is that the English for a long time had realized that the American Constitution of 1789 provided for the abolition of American participation in the slave trade not later than 1808. This provision, when it was adopted, had received even stronger support from the South than from the North. The South did not begin to perceive the role which would be played by the Wilberforce moment for the abolition of slavery within the British Empire until much later. The English abolished slavery within their empire in 1833. There is no doubt that this act and the movement which produced it exerted a great influence on the thinking of many New Englanders about the institution of slavery in the United States. But these events of the 1820's and 1830's can scarcely be assigned a role in explaining the reasons for the outbreak of the War of 1812. Carr does not cite a single source to substantiate his remarkable thesis that some Southerners were evidently favoring a war against England in 1812 as a means of defending slavery.

One further example illustrates Carr's method:

> Madison's internal discomfort (in 1812) was further increased by knowledge, not yet given to the American people, that from the beginning of 1807 to the end of 1811, French seizures of American ships had substantially exceeded those of England.[9]

It just so happens that Carr's statement is technically correct so far as the tonnage of contraband disposed of by prize courts is concerned. What Carr neglects to say, however, is that during the period mentioned, the Yankee skippers were conforming to the English Orders-in-Council while defying the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon, the French counter-blockade by which Napoleon attempted to retaliate against the English usurpations in the field of maritime international law. As a result, the Americans were automatically more vulnerable to the French than to the English seizures. This fact enhances rather than diminishes the American complaint about the results of the English Orders-in-Council, and of course it has nothing whatever to do with the issues of impressment.

There is a vast contrast between the disheartening performance of Carr and the study by Reginald Horsman, which

offers a real contribution to our knowledge about the origins of the War of 1812. It ought to be mentioned in passing that Horsman is not very impressive when discussing the events in Europe contemporary with our second war against England. But in all fairness, it ought to be emphasized that the diplomatic history of Europe during the era of Napoleon is not the author's primary concern. For instance, Horsman accepts uncritically the old English propaganda platitude that Napoleon I was "seeking world dominion."[10]

There are several other isolated examples of this archaic viewpoint about the struggle between England and Napoleon. For instance, Horsman observes:

> England was indeed shocked in the summer of 1812 that the United States could have thrown her forces on the side of Napoleonic tyranny.

Elsewhere, he attempts to define American policy on the basis of this predication as follows:

> Even as late as 1940 many Americans could not be convinced that a victory for Hitler would be disastrous to their future safety.

This American attitude in 1940 is not really so surprising when one considers that the talk about a challenge to American safety at that time was merely propaganda which, by way of repeated emphasis, Horsman and many other Americans have since come to believe.

Horsman begins his examination of the causes of war in 1812 with an analytical treatment of some really important basic issues. One of these was the traditional American distrust of England:

> The fact that France was an old ally, and England the old adversary was of no small importance in influencing American policy in the years before 1812. England was distrusted in America after 1783—it was to take far longer than one generation for the two nations to discover that they had so much in common.[12]

One very important feature of Horsman's work is the attention paid to the prevailing English attitude toward the United States before the outbreak of the War of 1812. This area of inquiry was ignored by Henry Adams when he discussed the Jeffersonian attitude toward England. The one

periodical in England which was friendly to the United States, the London *Monthly Review,* conceded in March, 1808, that "hatred of America seems a prevailing sentiment in this country."[13]

Horsman follows the third volume in the Bemis series by citing James Stephen, *War in Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags* (London, October, 1805, 200 pp.) This was the book which received official sanction in England and prepared the way intellectually for the new English Orders-in-Council of 1807 which were in effect down to the outbreak of war in 1812. Stephen believed that there ought to be "a total prohibition of the American carrying trade" at any time it was decided in London that such prohibition would be useful to the English war effort. This policy was premised on the assumption that the United States ought to recognize that Emperor Napoleon I was the enemy of all mankind and that England was fighting for the welfare of all mankind. Stephen knew that the English had conducted a considerable propaganda campaign along these lines in the various neutral countries. Such propaganda no doubt had its effect, but the usual American attitude remained that of Thomas Jefferson on August 21, 1807:

> I say down with England, and as for what Bonaparte is then to do to us, let us trust to the chapter of accidents. I cannot, with the Anglomen, prefer a certain present evil to a future hypothetical one.[14]

The English tended to believe that their American propaganda was successful with the people who counted. Thomas Barclay, the British Consul General in New York City, reported to George Canning on July 2, 1807, after the shocking attack on the *Chesapeake* by the English frigate *Leopard,* that "the lower order of the Americans are much irritated and inclined for violent measures." In effect, he was telling Canning not to worry about American *canaille.*

One of the most important subjects of Horsman's study concerns English policy among the Indians resident on the territory of the United States. By dealing with this question he is carrying the fight directly to Hacker and Pratt. From the standpoint of fairness, Horsman makes every possible allowance to the English. He concedes that the English

authorities in Canada were genuinely fearful of a possible American invasion following the *Chesapeake* incident. Governor Sir James Craig was pursuing a dual policy: a public one of denying that the English authorities were in contact with Indians across the border, and a private one of doing everything possible to prepare these Indians as allies for a future war. By 1808, the English were in contact with the tribes as far south as the Mississippi Territory and the Spanish frontier. Especially significant were their contacts with Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee prophet, and his brother Tecumseh. An optimistic official English report of February, 1809, predicted that the English forces in Canada, in alliance with the Indians, could conquer all the American territory north of the Ohio River in a few months. The English at this time were busily supplying the Indians with arms and military advice for the day of reckoning with the Yankees. This picture was sufficiently clear to the American Westerners by the time of the indecisive battle at Tippecanoe in Indiana on November 7, 1811. Horsman summarizes this aspect of the situation as follows:

> British Indian policy in the years before the War of 1812 was designed to enlist the Indians for the defense of Canada against American attack. The British officials in Canada were led to expect this attack by the extent of American anger at British maritime policy. They thus sought out the Indians and endeavored to win their allegiance for a future war. In practice, it was found most difficult to keep the Indians completely defensive.[16]

It also would be difficult to compose a more restrained, fair and moderate summary of the material which Horsman has brought to light.

The idea that the American western section could have carried the United States into war against England is ridiculed by Horsman. Most of the West was under territorial government in 1812. There were only three states: Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee. These states had only 10 seats in the House of Representatives among a total representation of 142 members.

As one would expect in a comprehensive study centered on the origins of the War of 1812, Horsman is especially

careful in describing in detail the events during the period from 1809 to 1812, the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. He does not agree with Carr that the *impasse* in 1812 was just another incident in a series of incidents settled peaceably and without undue difficulty in the past. Horsman summarized his position as follows:

> British policy, both in England and in Canada, remained inflexible in the years from 1810 to 1812. In England, though there was considerable unrest and opposition, the government was firm in the maintenance of its maritime policy. America had tried everything but war. The time was now ripe for offensive action.[17]

Horsman makes a gentle reference to Pratt's *Expansionists of 1812* in his annotated biblography:

> This stimulating work has proved the most influential of this century on the origins of the War of 1812. It has encountered increasing opposition in recent years.[18]

The real opposition to Pratt has been provided by Horsman himself, and since the facts in the argument are preponderantly on the side of the latter, it is difficult to see how the work of Pratt and his disciples can ever be rehabilitated among historians in any meaningful sense of the term.

Of course, as in other instances involving cultural matters, we must allow for certain inevitable time lags. For instance, consider the following statement in Thomas A. Bailey, *The American Spirit: United States History as Seen By Contemporaries* (Health, Boston, 1963):

> The Western War Hawks in Congress, bitter about maritime grievances against Britain, and British succored Indian raids, engineered a declaration of war on Britain in 1812.
>
> The American frontiersmen blamed the British for egging the Indians on to them, but actually American greed was good enough.[19]

What Bailey is actually saying is that the expanding American frontier would have been sufficient in itself to promote further conflicts with the Indians in the old northwest. He may also be right in surmising that a good deal of the impetus in connection with the frontier movement was prompted by the incredibly high prices on land in the United States, or

what Bailey might call greed. If this is so, it relates to an internal American affair. The contemporary English entrepreneurs were conducting certain policies in regard to the exploitation of human labor which might well be considered objectionable from the humanitarian standpoint, but this would scarcely have excused an American attempt to supply arms and ammunition for one of the numerous labor riots in England at this time. In short, relations among the United States government, the frontier settlers and the Indians on American territory were an internal affair of the American government. The supplying of arms by the English to the Indians on American territory was in itself an act of war.

There is no reason to doubt that Bailey and the other American historians who are still following the Pratt thesis will find occasion to revise their views when they have had an opportunity to absorb the implications of Horsman's research. At least it is more than likely that most of them will do so. The Pratt thesis is in the process of consignment to the realm of legend.

Chapter III: The Mexican War

There has been more criticism and stronger denunciation of American policy in connection with the Mexican War of 1846-1848 than in the case of any other major armed conflict involving the United States from the American Revolution down through the Korean War. The international press praised American Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy for denouncing American policy in the Mexican War to an Indonesian student in February 1962. Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz* (U. of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Ky., 1962) states the case as follows: "Even American historians agree that the war of 1846 was an aggressive act against Mexico—Americans desired Mexican territory and took it" (*ibid.*, p.v).

The reasons for this prevailing attitude are not far to seek. First of all, there is the myth that the United States soldiers outnumbered the Mexicans twenty-one to one during the war. This is based on the assumption that Indians and Mestizos were not allowed to serve in the Mexican Army, and that the Creole (white, born in America) population of Mexico was not more than one million. As a matter of fact it is true that only Creoles served as officers in the Mexican Army, but the enlisted men, including the non-commissioned officers, consisted largely of the other national groups. There is no doubt that Mexico was the underdog in the conflict, even though the odds were not twenty-one to one, and it is a traditional American tendency to sympathize with the underdog.

There is a second point which concerns the Monroe Doctrine. Our previous two wars had been against a European power. The pressure and filibuster tactics which brought us Florida were carried on against Spain, another European power. Mexico, however, was a sister American nation, a privileged independent member of the community of nations in the

western hemisphere. America's unilateral Monroe Doctrine, which had been pushed through by John Quincy Adams against the wishes of President Monroe and most of Adams' cabinet colleagues (they favored a joint American declaration with England), was based on the following principles: One, the United States considers the western hemisphere closed to further European colonization. Two, the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of her sister American nations. Three, the United States does not object to the maintenance of such European colonies in the western hemisphere as now exist. Four, as *quid pro quo* (reciprocal exchange) for our proposal that European nations desist from further colonization efforts in the western hemisphere, we announce our unalterable resolve never to intervene in the affairs of the eastern hemisphere whether in Europe or Asia, and never to acquire territory outside of the western hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine, 1823; point four received further clarification in the Poin Corollary of 1845, which denounced the British doctrine of the balance of power).

It is evident from the above that a war between Mexico and the United States, which resulted in the annexation of half of Mexico by the United States, could be regarded, at least at first glance, as a palpable betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine solemnly promulgated twenty-five years earlier.

A third factor involves the Conscience Whig Doctrine that the Mexican War was a part of the ostensible conspiracy on the part of the "slave power" to spread the South's peculiar institution into vast new areas of northern Mexico. According to this doctrine, Andrew Jackson arranged for the nomination of Polk by the Democrats the year before Jackson's death in 1845 because he knew that Polk was the instrument of the slavery interests. James Russell Lowell expressed it pithily in *The Biglow Papers:* "They just wants this Californy so as to lug new slave states in." Mexico had abolished slavery.

A further general argument in condemnation of the Mexican War goes back to the presidential campaign slogans of 1844. In response to the initiative of Lewis Cass of

Michigan, Polk and the Democrats came out in favor of both the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of the entire Oregon country from the California line to 54°, 40′ North. The Oregon country had been under Anglo-American joint occupancy since 1818. The English, and especially Lord Aberdeen, were thinking along the lines of a compromise solution with the boundary of a partitioned Oregon to run along the 49th Parallel from the Rocky Mountain Divide to the Columbia River, and from that point to follow the Columbia River *thalweg* to the Pacific Ocean. The Democratic Party campaign slogan in favor of taking all of Oregon was tantamount to defiance of England. After his election, President Polk permitted Secretary of State James Buchanan to inaugurate diplomatic negotiations with the English which resulted in the partition of Oregon along the 49th Parallel from the Rocky Mountain Divide to the Straits of Juan de Fuca. It was argued that Polk was willing to compromise with England because of English military strength, and that he ruthlessly aggrandized the United States at Mexican expense because Mexico was weak. No one likes a bully, and least of all a cowardly bully.

Edward G. Bourne, in a lecture entitled "The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848," at the American Historical Association meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on December 29, 1899, drew a parallel between the Spanish-American and Mexican-American wars. Bourne was a follower of Bryan and an anti-imperialist; he drew no distinction whatever between the overseas imperialism implicit in the war against Spain, and what he considered to be the equally rank imperialism in the American war against Mexico. Bourne regaled his audience with a profound paradox:

> What a curious coincidence that in the one case we should have assisted the exiled Santa Anna to return to Mexico, counting on his friendly aid in attaining our dominance and that in the other the exiled Aguinaldo should have been brought home and his followers equipped as our allies.

At the time Bourne spoke, American military forces in the Philippines were carrying on a bitter war against Aguinaldo and his Filipino freedom movement. Bourne recalled that

some Americans in 1848 had favored annexing the entire country of Mexico to the United States. This result had been averted, and Bourne still hoped there would be an American withdrawl from the Philippine Islands, with Aguinaldo left in control and in a position to realize his cherished dream of Philippine independence.

Bourne confused political party platforms and campaign oratory with policy when he claimed that Polk, with the possible exception of Grant, "was the only American president to enter office with a positive and definite policy of expansion." The 1844 presidential campaign was the one in which Polk's rival, the Whig candidate, Henry Clay, was outsmarted by the telegraph. Clay had gone on record in the North as opposed to the annexation of Texas and the extension of the slave power. He gave a last minute campaign speech at Mobile, Alabama, in which he came out in favor of the annexation of Texas, without realizing that the news of this speech would be telegraphed to the North before the voters went to the polls. Most observers agree that Clay's tactical blunder cost him the election. It seemed to many that Clay had reversed his familiar motto to read: "I would rather be President than Right!" It was all part of political campaign methods during this period. Polk was not involved in similarly complex tergiversations, but, in view of the flamboyant nature of the American convention and campaign procedure already in vogue at the time, it would be naive to conclude that Polk had decided to fight England, if necessary, rather than to abandon his claim to the entire Oregon country. So far as the existence of American interests in Oregon were concerned, this so-called policy of expansion had been laid down during the time of President Jefferson, and it was merely continued by Polk. It is true that Polk came out squarely for an agreement on the annexation of Texas. This does not change the fact that the annexation itself was consummated on March 1, 1845 by Polk's predecessor, John Tyler, who had been elected vice-president on the Whig ticket in 1840. The presidential candidate, William Henry Harrison, had died forty days after his inauguration, and Tyler had been president since that time. It may be argued that Polk's advocacy, along with Jackson's,

of the annexation of Texas, made it easier for Tyler to consummate the annexation itself. It had nothing to do with Tyler's determination to do so. Tyler had gone on record in favor of acquiring Texas long before Polk had done so.

Bourne suggests that Polk "welcomed, if he did not provoke, the war with Mexico." If this charge is true, the elaborate efforts of Polk to negotiate prior to May 1846, must be regarded as mere dumb show. If this is true, it would seem probable that Polk was also determined to acquire California at any cost. However, publication of *The Diary of James K. Polk,* 4 vol. (N. Y., 1910), in no way substantiates Bourne's speculation that Polk was pleased at the outbreak of war between Mexico and the United States. Part of Bourne's thesis in his lecture was that the country owed no thanks to Polk because the horrendous blunder of annexing all of Mexico had been avoided. Bourne makes two points in this connection. Most of the leading American politicians had come out by 1848 either in favor of, or opposed to, the annexation of the entire country of Mexico. For instance, John C. Calhoun was most emphatically against the seizure of that unhappy country. Polk avoided taking any position prior to receiving a draft copy of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which had been signed by Nicholas P. Trist and Santa Anna. Trist had received instructions from Polk prior to signing the treaty that his diplomatic services were terminated, and that he had no authority to negotiate with Mexico. Polk's action was based on the conviction that Trist had proved himself to be an incompetent diplomat and a regular Whig partisan. No thought of any possible softness toward Mexico was involved. Polk was understandably furious when Trist proceeded to sign the treaty after receiving word from the president that his mission was over. But Bourne makes it look as though Polk's fury arose from the fact that the treaty could serve as an obstacle to the annexation of the entire Mexican domain. This is overrefined speculation. Polk was not obligated to submit this patently illegal treaty to the Senate; nevertheless, he did so, and the treaty was ratified on March 10, 1848 by a vote of 48 to 14. Mexico was saved. The agitation for the annexation of

"all Mexico" failed primarily because it lacked sufficient time to organize a successful campaign.

One of the most popular American historians at the time when Bourne delivered his lecture was Professor Woodrow Wilson, who was extremely critical of Polk's policy toward Mexico. Wilson's first historical article was published in 1876, and his books had been popular ever since the enthusiastic reception of *Congressional Government* in 1855. (A major thesis of this book was that the American national government would function more successfully if it learned a few lessons from the system of parliamentary government in England.) Wilson's most ambitious historical work, *A History of the American People,* 5 vols. (Harper, N. Y., 1902), enjoyed a remarkably wide sale. Wilson's popularity as a historian at that time prompted the following observations from Michael Kraus in his *History of American History* in 1937:

> Woodrow Wilson is hardly remembered today as an American historian whose works were once widely read by students. His own attitude towards his historical work sufficiently accounts for the modern student's disesteem. His main interests were primarily political, and historical writing was always subordinate.[2]

Kraus made the following comment about Wilson's major historical work:

> The great number of allusions, sometimes irrelevantly placed in the narrative, make this history much bulkier than it need be; it might easily have fitted into two volumes.[3]

Wilson's political interests included such features as a more generous interpretation of the Southern role in the Civil War, a lower American tariff to harmonize with the English free trade system, and an attitude toward England which would give the English favored-nation treatment so far as American affections toward foreign nations are concerned. One can understand the indignant reaction of William Randolph Hearst, Sr., when he learned Wilson's response to a reporter's query as to his favorite newspaper: "The London *Times*, of course!"

Kraus makes the following comment about Wilson's treatment of the American Revolution in the *History of the American People:*

> It is interesting to observe that in this history, written mainly for popular consumption over thirty years ago, a generous interpretation of the Loyalist point of view prevails, after the manner of Moses Coit Tyler.[4]

Kraus makes the following comment in connection with the third volume of Wilson's *History:*

> Wilson refers to the second struggle with England as a "gloomy, fool-hardy, haphazard war." The nine volumes of Henry Adams on Jefferson's and Madison's administrations are compressed into swift-moving sentences that fill only a few pages in Wilson's history.[5]

It should not surprise us, in the light of Wilson's opinions indicated above, that the Princeton scholar was not very sympathetic toward what he called Mr. Polk's war against Mexico. In Vol. IV of his major work, we encounter the following:

> . . . in 1846 the Senate consented to a treaty which continued the line of the forty-ninth degree of north latitude to the Georgian Straits (this is the English nomenclature; the Spanish name, Juan de Fuca, is usually employed in the United States) as the definitive northern boundary of the Union.
>
> Texan boundaries were another matter. Here the government dealt with a rival and neighbor with whom no compromise was necessary.

Wilson made the following comment about Polk's Message to Congress on May 11, 1846:

> War indeed existed,—but by whose account Congress was no longer at liberty to inquire.[7]

It seemed obvious to America's future wartime president that Jame K. Polk had presented Congress with a ruthless *fait accompli* on the vital matter of peace or war for the United States.

The Texas problem was at the root of the troubles between the United States and Mexico in 1846. American policy in relation to Texas was severely censured by George P. Garrison, "The First Stage of the Movement for the Annexation of Texas," in the *American Historical Review,* October, 1904. Garrison made the important point that American colonists were already crossing the Sabine River to settle in

Texas before the United States voluntarily relinquished all future claims to Texas in the 1819 treaty with Spain. Prior to 1819 there had been no attempt to delineate the border between the Louisiana Purchase and the adjacent Spanish possessions in North America. The United States was in a hurry in 1819 to obtain Spanish consent to the annexation of east Florida. There were good reasons for this American impetuosity. Miranda and Bolivar had ignited the flames of revolt in Spain's Latin American colonies. The United States had refrained from expressing sympathy with the revolutionaries because American leaders did not wish to antagonize Spain before the Florida question was settled.

In the meantime, England was rapidly becoming trump in Latin America. The English were supplying and encouraging the Creole insurgents. They were openly expressing their enthusiasm for independent Latin American states willing to accept English concepts of free trade and to reject the mercantilism which Spain pursued, but which England discarded at the close of the Napoleonic Wars.

After seven years of negotiation with the Spanish restoration regime of 1812, it became evident that the United States would have to choose between Florida and Texas. This choice was not difficult. Florida had been consigned to the English colonial regime at the Peace of Paris in 1763. In 1783, however, England relinquished Florida to Spain rather than permit it to join the United States. It was only natural that Florida had possessed top priority among the regions claimed by the United States after 1783. Sections of west Florida had been acquired in 1809 and 1811. A treaty with Spain which brought home east Florida was regarded by Jefferson and his followers, including President Monroe, as the proverbial dot on the 'i'. John Quincy Adams was unsuccessful in his opposition to the voluntary American relinquishment of Texas claims. Mexico's independence was recognized by the United States shortly after the conclusion of the treaty with Spain. According to the doctrines of international law, American recognition of new Spanish frontier on the Sabine River was automatically inherited by Mexico. This was a fundamental and incontestable proposition. It prompted the Mexican authorities to

accept continued American immigration into Texas. America had given her word that this immigration would never be followed by American claims to Texas. The early American settlers in Texas gave every indication of their willingness to become and to remain good Mexican citizens.

One vital point in Garrison's treatment concerns the slavery argument. He did not believe that the abolition of the earlier Mexican Federal Constitution (1824), the creation of a centralized regime in Mexico, and the prohibition of slavery, were the primary factors behind the American revolt of 1835. Garrison placed major emphasis on the prohibition of further American immigration into Texas in 1830. The American settlers reacted to this policy much as the Japanese government did to the exclusion of immigration to the United States by Japanese nationals in 1910. Japan considered American policy at that time to be incompatible with the friendship tradition inaugurated by Perry. The American settlers in Texas considered that their willingness to become Mexican citizens was being repaid with discrimination and ingratitude. Despite the centralized government and the prohibition of slavery, there never was any Mexican attempt to interfere with the practice of slavery by the American settlers in Texas.

Garrison's treatment ends with the first request by Texas for annexation to the United States on August 4, 1837. The American government replied that such an arrangement was scarcely feasible since Mexico had not recognized the independence of Texas following Houston's victory at San Jacinto in 1836. In the absence of such Mexican recognition, the American government considered itself morally obligated to respect the Sabine frontier. It ought to be added, however, that such restraint need not be a permanent consideration in this or any comparable situation. Comity among nations allows ample room for both precedent and practice. If, with the passage of time, Texas continued to maintain her independence despite Mexican non-recognition, and if most of the principal nations recognized diplomatically the independence of Texas, such facts would necessarily supersede America's earlier obligation in the 1819 treaty.[8]

The question of when the United States could, with propriety, consider the possibility of annexing the new republic of Texas at the request of the latter was one of the major factors in establishing responsibilities for developments in Mexican-United States relations. Another factor, even more important, was the extent to which the United States attempted to obtain agreement with Mexico about the course of future events in relation to Texas. The definitive treatment of this difficult and crucial theme is to be found in Justin H. Smith, *The War With Mexico,* Vol. I (Macmillan, N. Y., 1919). Smith was the first scholar of any nationality to see all of the relevant documents pertaining to this question. As he put it:

> By special authorization from the presidents of the United States and Mexico it was possible to examine every pertinent document belonging to the two governments.[9]

It is Smith's basic thesis that in the period from America's refusal to accept the 1837 Texas offer down to the inauguration of Polk in 1845, there was simply not enough political stability in Mexico to make possible the successful conclusion of serious negotiations. President Tyler's willingness to approve the annexation of Texas by the United States before Polk was inaugurated was regarded by Mexico as an act of war. The problem confronting Polk was to negotiate an armistice in this so-called war before actual fighting commenced. A great deal depends upon whether or not the various efforts made by Polk in this direction were sincere. It goes without saying that difficulties were enhanced by reason of the fact that Texas was excluded from the discussions. Success or failure depended upon the willingness of Mexico to accept this situation. After all, ten years had passed since Texas revolted against Mexico. British influences were strong in Mexico, and the British themselves hoped to use Mexico as an instrument to prevent the union of Texas with the United States. This explains Mexico's offer to recognize the independence of Texas after all, provided that Texas would agree not to join the United States. Under international law, any such offer contained a hopeless paradox. It is impossible to recognize the sovereignty of a state on the one hand, and simultaneously to place servitudes over its free exercise of

policy. This same type of ridiculous situation is sufficiently familiar to us in our own day. Consider the 1955 treaty of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France with Austria, in which Austrian sovereignty was recognized on the one hand and Austria was simultaneously forbidden to join Germany. The monstrosity of any such situation under international law is identical in both cases. Besides, the United States had agreed to the annexation of Texas before the terms of the Mexican offer had even reached Washington.

Smith had to contend with strong opposition from his colleagues.

Jessie S. Reeves, "The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," in the *American Historical Review,* January, 1905, traces the sequence of Polk's diplomatic efforts with Mexico during the fourteen months from Polk's inauguration down to the outbreak of the Mexican War. The Reeves narrative is incomplete in some details, and the account is heavily prejudiced against Polk. Indeed, the American president emerges as the embodiment of the ruthless and immoral principles described for posterity by Nicolo Machiavelli. The diplomacy appears as a smoke screen to hide Polk's efforts to promote the establishment of a defeatist regime within Mexico which would be willing to sell out vital Mexican interests in exchange for American support in remaining in power.

The Mexican villain of the piece is Santa Anna, who had earlier been captured by Houston at San Jacinto. The difficulty with the thesis is that the famous episode of Santa Anna's return to Mexico from exile took place after the outbreak of war. The reader searches in vain for the source of Reeves' statement that Polk imagined Mexican resistance would be broken within ninety days in the event of war.

Reeves mentions the ironical fact that Nicholas Trist received no compensation from Polk for negotiating the Treaty of Peace in 1848. Polk insisted that Trist's compensation ended the day he received word that he had been recalled. Trist argued that Polk's acceptance of the treaty implied an obligation to compensate Trist's services for the entire period of his stay in Mexico. Congress finally decided this issue in favor of Trist twenty-two years later.

Smith's article "The Mexican Recognition of Texas," in the *American Historical Review*, October, 1910, marked a new milepost in scholarship concerning the events of this period. Smith pointed out that Oregon was not the only area of Anglo-American rivalry. English influence over the governments of Mexico was often sufficient to dictate the direction of Mexican policy. The Mexican recognition of Texas in 1845 was an example of this. There were other examples. It is obvious on the basis of Smith's research that the United States had good reason to fear a deal between Mexico and England which would guarantee England preponderance in California. This was especially evident at a time when the English were considering the possibility of annexing the Sandwich Islands. (This archipelago was later referred to by both the English and the Americans as Hawaii, its native name.)

The background for Andrew Jackson's enthusiastic support of Polk's candidacy in 1844 was explored by Eugene C. Baker.[10] It is ironical that Jackson became so enthusiastic about annexing Texas in 1830. He led the opposition against John Quincy Adams in 1819. At that time, Adams had argued in vain that America would one day regret her renunciation of Texas. Jackson denied that this would be the case, and he was scornful when he learned in 1825 that Adams, who was president of the United States at that time, was seeking to repair the damage of the 1819 treaty by negotiating with the Mexicans through Henry Clay. Jackson was noted as an impetuous man, and the naval cadet who tweaked his nose in the famous Chesapeake Bay cruise incident displayed more than usual courage. But Baker found Jackson correct in his relations with Mexico during the period of his presidency, despite the fact that his personal friend, Sam Houston, was pressing for a more dynamic American policy:

> Throughout his administration, General Jackson displayed, it seems to the writer, a desire to maintain unsullied the dignity and honor of the United States in regard to the Texas question.

When Jackson left office in 1837 he was succeeded at the White House by the man he had selected, Martin Van Buren. The economic depression of 1837 fatally weakened Van Buren's political position. The Whigs won the national election of

1840. When Jackson was able to choose another candidate in 1844, he selected Polk, Speaker of the House of Representatives from Tennessee. If Polk was actually as crooked as the so-called Whig historians have maintained, it seems odd that Jackson, with his conception of American honor, would have selected him. On one point all historians are agreed. Polk and Jackson were from the same state and had been close acquaintances for many years. Jackson's knowledge of Polk's character and intentions was thorough and complete. Old Hickory died in 1845 in the conviction that the best man available had reached the White House.

The first lengthy American study of the Mexican War, apart from the contemporary and journalistic accounts, appeared in 1913. The author was George L. Rives, a professional historian who had been Assistant Secretary of State for a number of years.[12] The author was unable to obtain many of the sources used by Justin Smith, but he made a real contribution to historical scholarship by adding to knowledge about the English role in the Mexican situation. As he summarized the situation of 1844:

> British policy . . . so far as it concerned itself with Texas at all, sought to build up a strong republic independent alike of both Mexico and the United States. As the interests of France were small, Guizot, French Premier under Louis Phillippe, was perfectly willing to gratify Aberdeen by a promise to support British policies in Mexico and Texas; but beyond friendly and peaceable representations France would not go.

Rives showed that with English support Mexico had actually held a very strong hand which she had played very badly. There were several occasions when England could have reconciled Texas and Mexico, persuaded the Texans to accept an alliance with England, and frustrated the danger, from the Mexican standpoint, that the United States might expand at Mexican or Texan expense.

The traditional Whig interpretation of President Polk's role in relation to Mexico had experienced no modification whatever during the sixty years following the close of the Mexican War. For instance, John Bach McMaster, in the 7th volume of his *History of the People of the United States,*

declared that Polk had decided to go to war against Mexico on May 9, 1846, before "a dispatch from Taylor announced that war had already begun."[13] The reader of McMaster's detailed narrative is left with the impression that Polk was willing to provoke a war against Mexico without even the excuse of a previous military incident.

At last, more than seventy years after the close of the Mexican War, the first, and to date only, exhaustive study of the origins and the course of the Mexican War appeared. Smith's preface to his great work, which was dedicated to Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., was modest and almost apologetic: "As everyone understands, our conflict with Mexico has been almost entirely eclipsed by the greater cause following it."[14]

Probably no event in American history has been used more often and with more effect against the American reputation than the Mexican War. Even Norbert Wiener uses it in this way in the introduction to his *Cibernetics,* (M.I.T., 1948), although he misses the correct dates. It is a popular theme of Communist propaganda not only in Latin America but throughout the world. Responsible patriots or responsible scholars, whatever their personal feelings might be, would not for one moment desire to conceal from the view of the world such excesses as have actually occurred in American history. It is quite another matter in regard to the alleged rapacity and ruthlessness of James K. Polk. If this legend were not true, it had to be exposed. Smith succeeded in doing this once and for all. But it is an interesting study of human emotions to discover how many historians have thus far refused to acquaint themselves with Smith's display of the facts. This is perhaps understandable when such historians do not attempt to judge or to discuss the event concerned. It becomes highly questionable when they do so. It would be comparable for a historian to discuss the events which led up to Pearl Harbor without having read Charles Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War in 1941.*

Smith examined more than 100,000 manuscripts, together with thousands of books, pamphlets and periodicals on the Mexican War. Writing seventy years after the event, he naturally asked himself what proportion of the material that

he was using had been consulted by other historians from Europe, Latin America, and the United States. He came to the dismal conclusion that "probably more than nine-tenths of the material used in the preparation of this work is in fact new." Smith adds that "as a particular consequence of this full inquiry, an episode that has been regarded both in the United States and abroad as discreditable to us, appears now to wear quite a different complexion." Smith notes that he began his research ten years earlier with the prevailing New England prejudice against President Polk and his policy. The interpretation at which he arrived after a decade of research, was diametrically opposite to his initial pre-suppositions.[15]

Smith's work begins with an analysis of Mexico's population of seven million in 1845. The original poor Spanish immigrants in Mexico had been hard workers, but their sons were often lazy. It was a case of too many chiefs and not enough Indians. At one time, the army had 24 thousand officers and only 20 thousand soldiers. Spanish mercantilism in Mexico was even worse than English mercantilism in America prior to 1783. The growth in Mexico of grapes and olives was prohibited prior to separation of the country from Spain to prevent competition with Spanish production. The revolution against authority in 1808 was provoked by the oligarchy of officials born in Spain. They usurped the Spanish Viceroy when he sought to give the Creoles a share in the government.

The first revolution led by Hidalgo, a renegade monk, ended in failure, and the leaders were captured and executed in 1811. One of the leaders against the insurgents was Antonio López de Santa Anna, who later fought against Texas and the United States. Mexico's second revolution was successful, and its leader, Itúrbide, proclaimed himself emperor in 1821. He was soon overthrown, a constitution was established, and Mexico's first constitutional congress convened in 1825. A federal system closely patterned after the United States had been established. Most of the Spaniards fled the country at this time but, as was expected, Spain made one formal effort to reconquer her colony. A Spanish invading army landed at Tampico in 1829, but it was decimated almost

at once by malaria. The Spanish commander wished to surrender, but Santa Anna, the Mexican commander, refused to be denied the pleasure of attacking Spanish forces. The Spaniards inflicted bloody, heavy losses on the Mexican attackers and then surrendered after the initial Mexican assault had failed. Santa Anna achieved the reputation of having saved the country from Spanish tyranny. His overthrow of the Mexican federal system and his establishment of a dictatorial unitary state was followed by the revolt of Texas. Santa Anna's capture by the Texans seriously injured his reputation. He promised to retire permanently from politics when he returned from Texas to Mexico in 1837, but he broke his promise in 1844 and plunged the country into a new civil war. Santa Anna was defeated and vanquished the following year.

Smith recognized that Santa Anna was a man of great talents and charm, "but in reality he was a charlatan." Smith described Santa Anna's successor, General J. J. Herrera, as "a fair, basic, reasonable and honest man." Unfortunately, Herrera was never able to win the loyalty of the Mexican officer corps and without that loyalty he was in no position to govern Mexico effectively. It was expected that the officers would revolt at any time, in order to bring Santa Anna back into power. Herrera actually favored the federalist constitution of 1824, but he was in no position to implement a domestic policy. In foreign affairs, he was forced to accept English tutelage. The leading newspaper *El Amigo del Pueblo* (The Friend of the People) declared on November 30, 1845: "There is no government in Mexico." Smith has no trouble documenting his contention that "some of the more thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate" in order to escape from "the anarchy of weakness which constitutes the government."[16] Smith considered at great length the circumstances connected with Tyler's annexation of Texas. He comes to the following conclusion:

> The annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral and political grounds entirely legitimate.[17]

The independence of Texas had been recognized by the leading commercial powers of the world. Texas had requested annexation by the United States on a number of occasions

before she obtained America's consent. Had consent been refused to Texas in 1845, Sam Houston might have made an empire of his own extending as far as Oregon. Houston could have relied on English support for such an endeavor, because the purpose of England's influence in both Texas and Mexico was at all times to harm the United States. When Polk was inaugurated, Almonti, the Mexican Minister, terminated diplomatic relations and left the United States despite the efforts of Secretary of State Buchanan to dissuade him. The Mexican government told American Minister Shannon that he was *person non grata.* All of this resulted from the fact that the United States had finally accepted the desire for union of a nation whose independence had been recognized by the leading powers. The Mexicans took the position that by annexing Texas the United States had declared war against Mexico.

Polk conferred with Buchanan about the next move. They decided to send W. S. Parrott to Mexico as trouble-shooter in an effort to restore normal relations. They were also concerned about European interference. French Premier Guizot, whose foreign policy was based on the conception of a permanent Anglo-French entente, declared that the time had come to establish a balance of power in the western hemisphere. What he meant was that the European colonial powers ought to play off the Latin American countries against the United States in such a way as to enervate the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of American leadership in the western hemisphere once and for all.

Parrott's mission failed, but he expressed the belief that a regular American envoy of sufficient stature might be accepted by the Mexican authorities to conduct serious negotiations. Polk responded by commissioning Slidell as plenipotentiary on November 10, 1845. But the Herrera government was in the process of dissolution, and, on December 20, 1845, Slidell learned that the Mexican authorities did not dare to receive him. A few days later General Paredes overthrew Herrera, and, on January 4, 1846, the new leader promised that he would attempt to reconquer Texas. Slidell attempted

to negotiate with the new foreign minister, Castillo, but this effort failed.[18]

Smith describes at considerable length the anti-Mexican agitation in the United States which accompanied the Mexican refusal to receive Slidell and the defiant utterances of Paredes. He emphasizes that there was a great deal of popular chauvinism and "manifest destiny" talk. For instance, the New York *Morning News* came out categorically in favor of the annexation of the entire North American Continent by the United States. None of these manifestations of excessive nationalism have been attributed to President Polk personally during this period.

The resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico was an absolute necessity by 1846 if war was to be avoided. Texas was now a part of the United States but there was no agreement whatever between the Texans and the Mexicans about the common frontier. The Texans claimed the Rio Grande, at one time regarded as the border between Louisiana and New Spain. The Mexicans, when they agreed to recognize Texas as an independent state, had failed to specify their version of the border, although it was obvious it would not be the Rio Grande. In other words, there was a zone of disputed territory much as there had been until 1842 between England and the United States in Maine and New Brunswick. It also was obvious that a border would either be determined by negotiation or by the arbitrament of war. General Zachary Taylor's march from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, which began in March, 1846, was not intended either as an act of war or an attempt by the United States to occupy the entire disputed region. It was believed that the presence of both Mexican and American forces in the disputed zone would prompt the Mexican government to recognize the urgency of negotiating a solution. Taylor began to build Ft. Brown on the left bank of the Rio Grande across from Matamoros on April 7, 1846. Taylor sent a message to the Mexican authorities at Matamoros asking for an armistice and friendly relations between the armed forces of the two nations pending the conclusion of negotiations by their respective governments. However, there were no negotiations at all.

The situation was in every respect analogous to the refusal of Poland to negotiate over differences with Germany during the period from March to September, 1939. In the latter instance, the Poles made the situation more tense by mobilizing their armed forces in March, 1939. In the case of Mexico in 1846, General Arista arrived at Matamoros on April 24th with orders to attack the Americans. Taylor had no idea about these orders when he sent Captain Thornton with sixty dragoons to reconnoiter the movements of Mexican forces on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. Thornton was hemmed in by Mexican cavalry some twenty-eight miles from Taylor's camp; some of his men were killed and the rest surrendered. In those days, much more readily than in our own, serious incidents of this kind were generally regarded as acts of war. Taylor reported to Polk on April 26, 1846, that "hostilities may now be considered as commenced." General Arista declared publicly in December, 1847: "I had the pleasure of being the first to begin the war."[19]

This presentation of the principal events leading to the outbreak of war in 1846 between the United States and Mexico has never been successfully repudiated. Smith's study is exhaustive; he did not miss any of the important problems. No historian is infallible, but the record to date indicates that Smith's occasional slips on minor details have been surprisingly few in view of the scope of his work and the range of his sources.

There were serious implications in Smith's study for those historians who were seeking to revise the presentation of early American history from the Anglophile viewpoint. Condemnation of American policies during the Revolution and the War of 1812 had usually been accompanied by especially eloquent condemnation of Polk's policy toward Mexico in 1846. Smith not only showed that these judgments were unwarranted; he also showed that the English hand in the events concerning Texas and Mexico was far from clean. If his revision were allowed to pass unchallenged, the chances would be increased that the entire Anglophile position could be undermined. The first volume devoted exclusively to the Mexican War to appear after Smith's monumental work was Nathaniel Stephenson,

Texas and the Mexican War, (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1921). Stephenson conceded that Smith's version of Polk's comprehensive efforts to restore diplomatic relations was accurate; "but in all these efforts he (Polk) failed to consider the Mexican point of view. . . ."[20]

Evidently Stephenson was seeking to shift the line of argument: "Undoubtedly Polk did not want war but he was as ignorant of the Mexicans as Adams or Jackson and treated the Mexican ultimatum (against the annexation of Texas) as of no consequence."[21]

Quite apart from the fact that Polk could scarcely have repudiated the annexation of Texas consummated by Tyler, Polk was not as ignorant about Mexico as Stephenson seemed to assume. Indeed, when the Polk diary is compared to Stephenson's own narrative, it would seem that Stephenson was probably less accurate in his ideas about Mexico than the former American president was. It is especially ludicrous to accuse John Quincy Adams of ignorance about Mexico. As Samuel Flagg Bemis suggests in his biography of Adams, many of our top authorities consider that Adams was the most learned and competent secretary of state that the United States has ever had. He had spent many years of travel and study in a dozen foreign countries. He was noted for his ability to put himself in the other fellow's place, to display in his conduct of policy the full understanding of the values and premises of the foreign friends and rivals with whom he was expected to deal.

George Lockhart Rives, who had done some good work in this field, was nevertheless somewhat alarmed by the forthright boldness of Smith's conclusions concerning English policy in Texas and Mexico. After all, Smith's work appeared the year when the Treaty of Versailles was signed and the United States had supposedly just completed their task of helping England save democracy throughout the world. As Rives condescendingly put it, "Smith's book bears too heavily on the hypothesis of a British conspiracy."[22]

Stephenson concluded his own study with the following general smear of Smith:

> Aiming to rid the story of the partisan interpretation fastened upon it by the Whig school of American historians, Mr. Smith is as artful in his silences as he is effective in his utterances. As to military events, since Mr. Smith has had access probably to all existing documents of importance, many of which have never before been used by historians, his version may be considered authoritative.[23]

This generalization has been described deliberately as a smear because it is not accompanied by any effort to prove that Smith has dodged important issues or that he has been either artful or deceitful in the presentation of his narrative. Stephenson most emphatically did not succeed in demonstrating that Smith's work is not authoritative in treating the origins of the war. This is not surprising in view of the fact that Stephenson consulted only a tiny fraction of the sources used by Smith in the preparation of his work.

One of the worst attacks on Smith was made by Theodore Clarke Smith, "The Writing of American History in America from 1884 to 1934," in the *American Historical Review,* April, 1935. He contended that Smith's two-volume study could be eliminated from the realm of serious study because it was allegedly partisan to Polk and hostile toward Mexico. T. C. Smith, who was president of the American Historical Association at this time, was noted for a position very far to the Left. Consider the following remark in the same article relating to the implication of Beard's 1913 study of the Constitution:

> Nothing is left to the 'Federalist,' the fountainhead of political thinking on the Constitution, but the status of a collection of verbal arguments to veil the real intentions of the advocates of the ratification of the new document.[24]

In other words, Smith was not in good company; he was accused by T. C. Smith of being hypocritical and insincere along with James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton.

Old prejudices die hard and this has been the case with the Anglophile school of historians in relation to the principal events in American history during the period before the American Civil War. In 1963, Thomas Bailey entitled the section of his *Pageant of American History* which deals with the Mexican War as follows: "Provoking War with Mexico."

The most encouraging fact about the situations described in the first three chapters of this survey is that the American traditional position in relation to the Revolution, War of 1812, and Mexican War, is a very strong one, and, above all, it is a position worth defending. On the other hand, the Anglophile approach, which gained influence as part of a general trend described in the second section of this study, is in fact a relatively weak one when viewed without the elaborate and eloquent rationalizations which have disguised it. It is not unreasonable to predict that the ultimate verdict of Clio will be sympathetic toward historians such as Reginald Horsman and Justin Smith. It may also be assumed with confidence that an exhaustive history dealing with the American Revolution will appear in the near future.

Chapter IV: The American Civil War

A civil war is proverbially considered to be the worst political disaster that can afflict any nation. The principal theme in Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union,* 2 vols. (Scribners, N. Y., 1947), is that the American Civil War was not an "irrepressible conflict" but an unnecessary war. Sectional problems and disagreements about slavery had been a part of America's experience since 1776. Nevins believes that the beginning of the crisis which led to the outbreak of war in 1861 can be traced to the Mexican War. The acquisition of Oregon in 1846 did not raise doubts in anyone's mind so far as the slavery issue was concerned, because of the vast distances which separated the Oregon country from the slave-holding states. Conflict with Mexico, following on the acquisition of Texas, was quite a different matter. The impression was widespread that the territory of northern Mexico might be invaded by the "slave power" in the event of American victory in the Mexican war. Nevins is very precise in dating what he believes to be the beginning of the fatal crisis:

> On a hot summer evening in 1846, a portly young Democratic Representative from northern Pennsylvania, David Wilmot, had stood up in the House to move that a pending appropriation bill be amended to debar slavery from all lands acquired in the war.[1]

Nevins deserves only praise for his eloquent effort to point out that the Civil War was an unnecessary conflict, and he is quite right in regarding the motion which led to the Wilmot Proviso as marking the beginning of a very serious crisis. The fact remains, however, that this crisis which began in 1846 was actually surmounted in 1851. The crisis which ended with the acceptance of the Compromise of 1850 and the defeat of the Radical effort to take South Carolina out of the Union in 1851 marks just one crisis in a series

which began with the 1819 struggle over the admission of Missouri to the Union as a slave state. There were a series of individual crises in the period before the outbreak of the American Civil War, just as there was a similar series of individual crises during the years before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

Nathaniel Stephenson, "Southern Nationalism in South Carolina in 1851" in *American Historical Review*, January, 1931, performed a notable service in emphasizing for his colleagues and the reading public how narrowly the disruption was averted in 1851 after the 1850 Compromise had been accepted. The general trend among the earlier historians was to regard the struggle over the 1850 Compromise proposed by Clay as the climax in the controversey which Wilmot had inaugurated. Stephenson demonstrated that events in the single state of South Carolina in 1851 presented another climax of equal importance. As Stephenson put it:

> There seems to be little doubt that almost all South Carolinians in the summer of 1850 were in favor of some sort of secession. The issue was not upon seceding or not seceding, but upon seceding alone or in concert.

Stephenson shows that the issue was not decided in favor of a moderate policy until Langdon Cheves managed to defeat the Radical forces headed by Rhett in the South Carolina state election of October 13, 1851. Had Rhett triumphed, South Carolina would undoubtedly have left the Union in December 1851, just as she actually did nine years later in December, 1860 by means of a special convention. There is good reason to believe that South Carolina's departure from the Union in 1851 might have persuaded some of the other slave states in the deep south to do likewise. This is what happened nine years later.

The Compromise of 1850, which Clay and Webster supported, could not hide the fact that the traditional balance in the Senate between free states and slave states had been irrevocably abandoned. California came in as a free state in 1850 without any immediate prospects for a slave state sister. This was a new turn of affairs which prompted some of our shirt sleeve diplomats to consider seizing Cuba from

Spain. (This type of thinking ultimately resulted in the famous Ostend Manifesto of 1854, where the leading American diplomats in Europe informed the world that they intended to obtain Cuba one way or another.)

South Carolina and other Southern states left the Union after Lincoln's election in 1860 because they contended that the new president had virtually no supporters in their section and that his election marked an intolerable precedent. In the past, the presidents had drawn their support from all the major sections of the country. This was a point, but the departure from tradition in this case was no more drastic than had been true in 1850 with the abandonment of the traditional balance in the Senate.

Had secession of the Southern states come in 1851 and 1852 instead of 1860 and 1861, the South would have had a much better chance to win her independence. The orderly system of railroading that existed in the Northern states by 1860 was still in considerable confusion in 1852. During the 1850's there was an unprecedented wave of immigration to the Northern states from Ireland and Germany. The manpower resources of the North were much more extensive in 1861 than they had been in 1852. Most important of all, the chances for active Anglo-French intervention on behalf of the South were much better in 1852 than in 1862. The Bonapartist coup d'état of 1851 was followed by the restoration of the Anglo-French entente the following year. As is often true in such cases, the new diplomatic arrangement worked best during its early years. For instance, in 1854 France and England joined in an assault on the Russian Empire. By 1856 there were clouds of suspicion between the two countries in the peace negotiations at Paris terminating the Crimean War. The entente was not destroyed, but it was weakened. By 1859, following Napoleon III's agreement to intervene for Cavour in Italy, there was little likelihood of a concerted Anglo-French policy of intervention. A prime example of this new state of affairs is offered by events in Mexico. Spain, France and England attempted to collect their debts from Mexico by force in 1861, but Spain and England refused to cooperate with France in a comprehensive program of inter-

vention throughout Mexico. By the time the Civil War in America actually began in 1861, England and France were so suspicious of each other that it was unlikely either would risk a separate major involvement or that they could agree to conduct one as allies. Mere diplomatic cooperation, as in the case of the Polish insurrection against Russia in 1863, was an entirely different matter.

It is at least likely, in view of the facts above, that the South could have made good her independence had she attempted to organize a separate confederation as early as 1852. There is a close parallel between the South Carolina crisis of 1851 and the first Moroccan crisis of 1905. It ought to be evident that the South would have assumed a larger share of guilt had she impatiently deserted the Union in 1852 because of the loss of the traditional balance in the Senate which she had hitherto regarded as essential to the preservation of her interests in politics. At the same time, had it come to war, the South probably would have been successful. We see the same situation in the 1905 Moroccan crisis. The Anglo-French entente of 1904, together with the Franco-Russian Alliance, revealed that Germany had been tightly encircled by a hostile combination. The French attempt to seize Morocco in 1905 was a violation of a series of international treaties concluded since 1880. Germany might have made this French move the pretext for a preventive war against France. Had she done so, France would almost certainly have been defeated. Russia, France's continental ally, was temporarily paralyzed at that time following her defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the destructive 1905 Revolution in Russia. Had Germany reacted in this way to French moves in London and at Morocco, she would inevitably have earned a much larger share of guilt for the conflict than was the case in 1914, when Germany agreed to stand behind her threatened ally, Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, just as in the case of the South, German chances of military victory would have been far greater in 1905 than they were in 1914. This comparison between Germany and the American South within this specific context is about as close as one can ever come to a perfect historical

analogy. One of the main lessons to be learned from the 1851 secession crisis in South Carolina is that in any crisis there is always hope for a peaceful solution until an actual conflict begins. The worst disservice that any citizen can perform is to adopt a gloomy or fatalistic view about the prospects in such matters.

Willingness to resist when a conflict comes is a very different stance from assuming that one crisis or the other must inevitably lead to war. Attempts have been made to find good results in a tragedy such as the American Civil War, which A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *Partisan Review* (December, 1949) called "one of those inevitable log jams of history which had to be blown up by dynamite."

Charles and Mary Beard popularized the notion in American historical circles in their *Rise of American Civilization* (1927 2 vol., MacMillan, N. Y.,) that the American Civil War was tantamount to a sort of second American industrial revolution. As they saw it, a certain amount of meaningful industrial advance had taken place after the termination of English mercantilist controls, but the country had remained predominantly agrarian. They traced the industrial revolution which created an overwhelmingly urbanized America to the Civil War. One historian after another has considered this version of affairs to be self-evident.

The *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* in September, 1961, published Thomas Cochran's epochal article "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" This article contains a small but eloquent sample of Cochran's research findings on this vital subject. His study has centered on industrial indices, creation of capital plant and equipment, monetary evaluation, and comparison of industrial growth in the years from the Mexican War to the Civil War and during the generation after the Civil War. Cochran reached the conclusion that the Civil War actually slowed down the rate of American industrial development which had been attained in the 1850's. No doubt his findings are a bitter pill to those like A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Causes of the Civil War" (*Partisan Review,* 10, 12/49), who have been seeking to count the blessings that resulted from the slaughter and death of over 600,000 Amer-

ican men in the Civil War of 1861-1865. There is certainly nothing inherently wrong in seeking to find some positive results in a disastrous situation. More questionable would be an attempt to argue that a national disaster of this kind produced more good than evil. It would be difficult to deny that the assumption of such a position would imply a willingness to condone and approve disasters of this sort.

Advocates of the present Union may be excused for taking a milk and cherries approach to the events of the 1846-1851 crisis. Had President Zachary Taylor not refreshed himself with milk and cherries on a hot summer day in 1850 and then gone for a brisk ride on his horse, the Union might well have been lost. Taylor had announced his determination to veto the Compromise of 1850. The South nearly left the Union even though the Compromise of 1850 was adopted. A disruption of the national edifice would have been inevitable had the compromise failed. Fillmore succeeded Taylor as president in 1850 and cheerfully accepted the Compromise measure. Historians such as Allan Nevins, J. G. Randall, Avery Craven and William Hesseltine, are known as revisionists on the American Civil War not because they favor the South against the North, but because they dispute the once dominant Radical Republican view that the Civil War was in fact an irrespressible conflict. The avoidance of secession in 1851 has suggested to them that it could have been avoided indefinitely.

Some estimates place the date when the South would have voluntarily abolished slavery as low as 1870. Slavery was virtually bankrupt by 1861. The suppression of the slave trade and the embodiment of this suppression into international law, the high price of Negroes, the low percentage of profit on their employment—all these suggested that the slavery system in the United States was on its way out by 1861. If one considers the additional fact that serious projects were being launched to use an ever-increasing proportion of the southern Negroes in manufacturing, where the functioning of slavery would have been an anachronism, a strong case can be made for this viewpoint.

The above-mentioned historians are not inclined to speculate about the chances for peace once the actual Southern

decision for secession had been made. For instance, William B. Hesseltine, *Three Against Lincoln* (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1960), emphasizes the fact that the three presidential candidates who opposed Lincoln in 1860 were all strongly represented in the South. Lincoln may have been a regional president, but he was also a minority president. The South had good reason to expect that the next election would bring to office someone who had support in their section. Hesseltine agrees that the South had been steadily provoked by the Republican politicians, but he is equally convinced that the Southern reaction to Lincoln's election was an unduly sensitive one from the constitutional standpoint.

This issue furnished the subject for the most celebrated debate by the American historians during the 1930's. Arthur C. Cole, author of a number of books on the Civil War, came out squarely against the Southern traditional view that Lincoln's election in 1860 constituted a direct threat to Southern institutions. His article "Lincoln's Election an Immediate Menace to Slavery in the States?" was published in the *American Historical Review* in July, 1931, and the same periodical carried an article under the identical title by one of the Southern champions, J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, in July of the following year. Cole closely followed James Randall's interpretation of Lincoln as a conservative who had turned liberal, but not radical, in the presentation of his case. Cole argued that, the American presidential office being what it was, the nature of the president himself was a decisive factor in answering the question which had been raised during the 1960 presidential election campaign. Cole insists that "from the beginning he (Lincoln) condemned abolition fanaticism as much as he deplored the blind zeal of the proslavery zealot."[2]

The gist of Hamilton's reply the following year was that there were other members of the Republican Party besides Abraham Lincoln. Southern animus was not centered on Lincoln until his surprising nomination in Chicago in 1860. Hamilton considered that Cole was being both naive and unhistorical in his approach to challenge the Southern attitude toward Lincoln prior to the secession of the Southern states

in terms of what we have learned about Lincoln since the firing on Ft. Sumter on April 12, 1861. It was indeed a very meaningful parallel when the program committee of the American Historical Association, decided to organize a panel for the Washington, D. C. meeting in 1955 in which Herbert Feis lectured on the role of President Roosevelt in relation to the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor, and Richard Current lectured on the relation of Lincoln to the Confederate attack on Ft. Sumter (*American Historical Review,* April 1956). There is general agreement among historians today that both Lincoln and Roosevelt were strong personalities. However, Hamilton explained that there was nothing in Lincoln's record prior to 1860, including the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, which indicated that Lincoln would ever exercise control of his own party, let alone retain such control. After all, even William Henry Seward expected to control Lincoln as he would a puppet, until April, 1861 when Lincoln refused to follow his lead in relations toward France and Spain and in the vital matters concerning Ft. Sumter.

Seward advocated the abandonment of Sumter and an attempt to reunite the country on the basis of a new warlike approach to certain foreign issues. Lincoln considered the latter to be April Fool nonsense, and he was determined to reinforce the Northern position at Ft. Sumter as a sort of thorn in the side of the new Southern body politic. Lincoln's defiance of the man who had led the Republican Party for a number of years showed that he was no puppet. But if this had not been evident to Seward and the Republicans before secession, it could not have been evident to the South. Secondly, even if one were to accept Cole's picture of Lincoln as being applicable to the events of 1860, the thesis that there were other men in the Republican Party still applies. The Republicans had received only 40% of the vote in 1860, but, once they captured the presidency and began to implement their public land, education and tariff policies, they had a good chance to consolidate their position indefinitely. The South was a minority section in terms of representation in both houses of Congress, and their influence on the Supreme Court was waning. With the presidency in Republican hands, there was

a good chance that the South would be deprived of influence over the formulation of national policy for a generation or more. Hamilton did not contest the record of Lincoln's opposition to the abolitionist fanatics who had favored destroying the American Constitution during the years prior to the Civil War. This did not change the fact that Republican ascendancy at Washington, D. C. carried with it the danger that the abolitionists would soon control national policy. Republican leaders such as Thad Stevens and Charles Sumner were determined to destroy Lincoln's position if he did not accede to their wishes in such matters.

It was the general concensus among historians that Hamilton had the better of the argument against Cole in 1932. Later, Cole antagonized many Southerners by attempting to saddle them with a master race complex. The following passage occurs in Cole's book, *The Irrepressible Conflict*, which appeared in 1938:

> Some Southerners consoled themselves with the thought that they were of the blood of a master race, a noble Norman stock not to be crushed by Northern Puritans of vulgar Saxon origin.[4]

Cole's principal source for this remarkable theory was the wartime Boston *Evening Transcript*, July 28, 1862.

The fact that Hamilton won a debate against Cole in no way demonstrates that the South was justified in seceding from the Union in 1860-1861. Her decision was based on a hypothetical assessment of what would happen. Cole was wrong in attempting to deny that the South did not have a solid case for her forebodings and presentiments. On the other hand, it is altogether possible that dissension would have produced the disintegration of the Republican coalition had the South been more patient and waited on the course of events for a few years.

The fatalistic approach toward the Civil War is represented by Kenneth M. Stampp, professor of history at the University of California and the author of a number of books on the origins of the American Civil War. Stampp assumed the following position in one of his books:

> It has not been my purpose to overtake what appears to me the fruitless and impossible task of proving or disproving that the Civil War was inevitable.

> To me the conclusion seems inescapable that this conflict was a product of deep and fundamental causes and that most of the compromise proposals were essentially superficial.
>
> There was no basis for sectional harmony as long as Negro slavery survived and as long as Northerners used their overwhelming political power in Congress to advance their special interests at the expense of the South. Since the dominant groups on neither side were willing to yield on these points, separation was the last hope for a peaceful settlement. Why the Southern attempt to apply this solution did not produce peace between North and South will be the major theme of this book.[5]

Stampp's emphasis on events after the major issue of secession had been decided followed the precedent set by Henry Adams, "The Secession Winter, 1860-61," in *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, Vol. 43, 1910, pp. 660-687. Stampp describes in minute detail the steps by which Lincoln asserted his mastery in the Ft. Sumter affair. The climax came when the president pushed a decision to reinforce the outpost through his cabinet against the advice of Seward, his Secretary of State, and Scott, the Commander in Chief of the Federal military forces. Stampp also describes how Lincoln informed the Southern leaders without delay of the decision reached so that the maximum impact would be attained by the time the Federal supply ships reached Charleston. It was much like waving a red flag before a bull. The Confederate decision at Montgomery, Alabama not to use force in asserting Confederate claims evaporated when faced by the concrete test of Ft. Sumter. The firing of Confederate batteries on April 12, 1861 electrified the North and produced a unity in that section which had previously been lacking. However, Stampp is emphatic in denying that Lincoln planned it that way: "But the Machiavellian implication that he started the war to achieve that purpose remains unproved."[6]

It is interesting to note that the two principal twentieth-century American historical biographers of Lincoln became increasing skeptical about many of the policies of their hero as their research program advanced. (Carl Sandburg, the poet, is usually prized as a literary rather than a historical biographer of Lincoln.) Albert J. Beveridge, who had established an international reputation as a first-rate biographer

through his monumental work on John Marshall, did not complete his study on Lincoln. The sudden death of the former Indiana Senator terminated the narrative at the end of Volume II, in 1858, seven years before Lincoln's assassination. This work is a torso much like Schubert's "Unfinished Symphony," but it throws a flood of light not only upon the crucial years of Lincoln's personal development, but also upon the development of social, political and economic conditions in the United States as a whole. In one phase of the project after another, Beveridge blazed trails of pioneer research. In his Hoosier youth, he regarded Lincoln as the greatest statesman America had produced. He considered it his duty to revise this opinion as the result of his research, and he described this as one of the most painful emotional experiences of his entire life. It was just the reverse of what had happened with the Marshall study. Beveridge had approached Marshall in the expectation of exposing flaws which ultimately never appeared. This experience probably increased his enthusiasm for tackling the project on Lincoln. Above all, it was Lincoln's inconsistency, opportunism, personal ambition and expediency which disturbed Beveridge the most.[7]

The late James G. Randall had a similar experience in dealing with Lincoln. Little by little, Stephen Douglas began to overshadow his Illinois rival in Randall's estimation. In the course of his painstaking research, Randall came to appreciate that Douglas, although sometimes opportunistic himself, was more interested in averting the tragedy of an American Civil War than he was in any other issue. Furthermore, despite the fiasco of the 1860 Democrat Party National Convention at Charleston, where Douglas failed to hold the loyalty of the Breckinridge faction, Randall decided that Douglas alone held the political formula which might have resulted in a reconciliation between the rival sections thus averting the Civil War. However, unlike Beveridge, Randall was able to appreciate to the fullest extent the beneficent and constructive ideas which Lincoln developed during the Civil War about the future reconstruction of the South. These insights received their most forceful expression in two of Randall's specialized volumes: *Lincoln and the South* (Louisiana State University

Press, Baton Rouge, 1946, 161 pp.) ; and *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln* (rev. ed., University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1957, 596 pp.). Randall's four-volume description of the events from Lincoln's rise to national prominence down to the Gettysburg oration in 1863 remains as the greatest individual historical work dealing with Lincoln.[8]

It is rather disheartening to compare David H. Donald, *Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era* (Knopf, N. Y., 1956, 200 pp.), with Randall's work. Unlike Randall, who believed in the dictum of Swiss historian Eduard Fueter, that every historian must decide whether he will describe a series of historical events from his own point in time or from the standpoint of the events described, Donald seems to be constantly trying to square his picture of Lincoln with the ideals of Chief Justice Earl Warren. For instance, Lincoln's innate prejudice against the Negro and his continuous efforts to deport all the American Negroes to South America and Africa are to be ignored at all costs. This attempt at camouflage is rather ludicrous in view of the many writings, including those of Randall, which reveal in detail Lincoln's actual views on the Negro question. Those views were common to most people of that era who came from a poor white background in the upper South. They did not like slavery, and they did not like the Negro.

This question about the importance of the slavery issue and the Negro, in relation to the origins of the American Civil War, is a much argued one. By emphasizing the Civil War as a contest between industrial and agrarian America, Charles Beard tended to deprecate the importance of the Negro question as such in relation to the causes of the war. Beard's approach was carried much further by Richard Hofstadter of Columbia University in his sensational article "The Tariff Issue and the Civil War," in the *American Historical Review*, October 1938. Undoubtedly Hofstadter performed a great service in bringing the importance of the tariff issue fully into view. Low or high tariff meant more in terms of dollars and cents than any other issue. The manufacturing North desired protection against European competition. They wanted to have the South as a captive market where only Yankee

industrial goods could be purchased. Before Hofstadter wrote his article, the complaints of the Southerners that they had to cut their wood with Yankee axes and be wrapped in Yankee sheets when they died was already familiar. But the implications of these wails of protest were never expressed quite so succinctly until Hofstadter's article appeared. The Southern economy was based on the export of agrarian produce—cotton, tobacco and rice—to both the North and to Europe. Since European manufactured goods, and especially those of England, were much cheaper than those of the North, it went without saying that the South favored a lower tariff not merely for her own self-respect and freedom as a section, but also because dollars and cents were involved. When the profit from slavery was declining year after year, costs of imports was an issue of crucial importance. The fight over the tariff became especially bitter when a local economic depression struck the North, but not the South, in 1857. After reading Hofstadter's article many historians began to see that the slavery issue was merely a smoke screen to disguise the really vital issue involved: whether or not the South would be allowed to trade in markets of her own choice.

Like many new hypotheses, the bête noire tariff approach suffered from exaggeration and overemphasis. Many American historians were amazed when A. H. Conrad and John Meyer of Columbia University announced in 1955 that they planned to challenge their distinguished colleague in a series of team studies in depth about the slavery issue and its importance. A sample of their work appeared in the *Journal of Political Economy*, in April, 1958. They attempt to challenge the thesis that slavery was on the way out merely because it was becoming less profitable during the 1850's, and argue that at least it was still profitable to an impressive degree and that new methods of exploitation might have assured its permanence. They even question the familiar assumption that slavery had reached its natural geographic limits in North America by 1850. Their work illustrates a tendency in the 1950's, during the contemporary integration struggle, to revise the importance of the slavery issue and the Negro question in relation to the origins of the Civil War.

It should be mentioned in passing that Richard Hofstadter has followed Beveridge and Randall in his estimation of Lincoln's career. This was clearly indicated in the special chapter on Lincoln in Hofstadter's *The American Political Tradition* (Knopf, N. Y., 1948). It is Hofstadter's thesis that Lincoln's personal ambition prompted him to take steps, often inconsistent, which increased the danger that there would be a war between the rival sections. Hofstadter even refers to the "little engine of Lincoln's personal ambition which would give him no rest." It would seem that there is a pattern involved in Hofstadter's overemphasis of the tariff issue and overemphasis of the defects in Lincoln's character as revealed by Beveridge and Randall.

Lincoln was almost a paragon of virtue by comparison with the principal Republican leaders who encouraged the North to adopt an even more aggressive and provocative policy toward the South. The two principal leaders in this drive were Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. These men emerge in a rather hideous perspective even at the hands of biographers of the present time who are friendly toward them. Typical examples of the eulogistic biographies of Stevens and Sumner which dominated the scene of Northern historical literature during the first forty years after the Civil War are the following: Samuel W. McCall, *Thaddeus Stevens* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1899); and Moorfield Storey, *Charles Sumner* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1900.) The criterion employed by these writers toward their heroes was whether or not they had been friendly or hostile toward the ante-bellum South. The greater the hostility toward the South, the greater the virtue. On the basis of this criterion, Stevens and Sumner emerge as sterling characters of the first rank.

Woodrow Wilson's *A History of the American People* was published a few years after the appearance of the biographies cited above. Wilson's work, which has since been recognized as mediocre historical writing, had one major and very important influence during the years immediately after its publication when it was in great vogue. Wilson contributed to a milder interpretation of the South's role in American history

during the 1850's and 1860's. In doing this he shared with James Ford Rhodes and Edward Channing in spreading a national doctrine of sectional reconciliation. These writers did not impute war guilt to either section, but adopted the conciliatory approach that both regions were fighting for what they believed to be right, and emerged with honor from a period of grim travail. Wilson struck hard at the smearing which the South had taken during the generation after the Civil War: "It was the accusation of moral guilt in the matter of slavery that stung the southern men most intolerably."[9] Although avoiding the question of war guilt, Wilson wished to leave no doubt in the reader's mind that the South had a strong case: "The North had not realized as the South did what the election of 1860 meant."[10]

The national school of reconciliation created an equilibrium which was followed by a pendulum pattern. For instance, during the 1930's the weight of historical writing about the Civil War seemed to be moving slightly in favor of the South; whereas, in the 1950's, during the integration era, the pendulum was evidently swinging in the opposite direction in favor of the North. It is during this later phase that the two most definitive biographies to date of Stevens and Sumner appeared: Fawn M. Brodie, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South* (Norton, N. Y., 1959); and David Donald, *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War* (Knopf, N. Y., 1961).

Fawn Brodie made her reputation as a historical biographer of the first rank with her study on Joseph Smith and the Mormon Movement. Despite the plethora of biographies on Smith her book was a solid contribution. She has an introductory section in her study of Stevens containing an evaluation of the many earlier biographies of the Pennsylvania Radical. The first one she takes seriously is Alexander Hood's eulogistic study in 1872. She strikes hard at Richard M. Current, *Old Thad Stevens, a Story of Ambition* (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1942), on the grounds that Current overstepped the boundaries of objectivity by revealing his "indignation" at the excesses committed by Stevens. On the other hand, Ralph Korngold, *Thaddeus Stevens* (N. Y., 1955) goes at least as far in eulogizing Stevens as the earliest major

studies by Hood and Alexander Harrison (1876). Other major biographies of Stevens were by Edward Callender (1882), Samuel McCall (1889), James Woodburn (1913) and Thomas Frederick Woodley (1937).

The Brodie biography begins with an able and eloquent attempt to make excuses for some of the details of Stevens' career; after all, his methods were those of the politicians of the present day: persuasion when it suffices, coercive legislation by Supreme Court or Congress, and the application of physical force if coercive legislation is defied. The implication is that we have come full circle, and that unless we are prepared to condemn the political ethics of our own generation—something which most people are never inclined to do—we ought to be tolerant toward Stevens.

We are reminded that Sevens suffered from a severe physical handicap, his clubfoot. She is right in emphasizing that Stevens was suffering from personal calumnies during his career. She cites the example of two editorials by George M. Drake, an Alabama editor, who visited Stevens and his mulatto mistress on May 23, 1867. On the one hand, she described the editorials as brilliant pieces of defamation, and on the other she concedes that Stevens had a bad personal reputation everywhere by that time. One thesis of her study for which much can be said is that the public careers of men should not be judged by their private lives or morals.

She dwells at length on the sad fact that Thad's father deserted his family in Vermont because he was weary of his clubfooted children. The father was later killed in the War of 1812. Thad developed a special devotion for his mother and in later years he always consigned her to a special category before declaring that all women are degenerate. Thad Stevens was a confirmed bachelor, although Fawn Brodie speculates that he may have considered marrying at an early point in his career. After graduating from Dartmouth College, Stevens spent a brief period in Vermont before moving to Pennsylvania in 1815, when he was twenty-three years old. He was soon admitted to the Pennsylvania bar and he opened his law office at Gettysburg. By 1821, he was a wealthy man. During his twenties, his main concern was to amass a fortune regard-

less of principle. For instance, the future great friend of the Negro earned a handsome fee by helping Norman Bruce, a Maryland slaveholder, regain a slave who had escaped to Pennsylvania. Yet the same Stevens, once his fortune was made, emerged as an ardent abolitionist.

In 1824 Stevens was suspected of murdering a Negro servant woman in Gettysburg whom he had supposedly made pregnant. But he had a strong position by this time and the matter was never pressed. Two years later he gained national prominence by helping to head the movement to abolish the Masonic Lodges in Pennsylvania. It was at this time, however, that it also became widely known that Stevens had weighed his childhood Christian religion upon the scales and found it wanting. Stevens became so proud of his arguments against the validity of Christianity that he welcomed debates on the subject with theologians. He called himself a rebel against God.

Stevens was involved in many situations with colored women during his career which gave rise to slanderous gossip. Fawn Brodie believes that there was one colored girl whom he truly loved: Lydia Smith. He met her in 1831 when she was eighteen or nineteen years of age. However, she had a husband and she did not come to live with Stevens permanently until her husband died in 1848. She brought her two colored sons with her into the Stevens household. Stevens adored her. He commissioned one of the leading portrait painters of the day, Jacob Eichholtz, to do her portrait. When he was elected to Congress, he took her with him to Washington D. C., despite the inevitable gossip. Stevens admitted to his friends that his relationship with Lydia Smith was in every sense complete.[11]

Fawn Brodie mentions Lydia Smith's Catholicism as a possible obstacle to marriage with Stevens, but, if so, this was only because Stevens' atheism would have been unacceptable to the church authorities. She also argues that the behavior of Stevens with Lydia Smith and other Negro women was no worse than that of many Southern aristocrats with Negro women. However that may be, it should be recalled that Stevens was seeking to lead the political party in power during the Civil War era, and that standards are customarily

applied to top leaders in a different manner than to anonymous individuals. No Southern leader of rank during this period was known to cohabit with Negro women.

Stevens opposed Lincoln's nomination in 1860 because he considered the Illinois politician to be conservative and unenthusiastic about the Radical Republican plans for the future of the American Negro. On the other hand, Stevens condemned John Brown's wild raid on the Southern Whites at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, on the pragmatic grounds that it had failed. Stevens prided himself on being a hard man, and he said about Brown: "Damn him, he ought to be hung!"[12] For the same pragmatic reason, Stevens later praised Brown when the fanatical abolitionist acquired a powerful posthumous reputation.

Stevens and Lincoln were in perpetual conflict after the latter became President. Stevens attempted to dominate Lincoln and to dictate his Cabinet appointments. When Lincoln insisted upon appointing Cameron Secretary of War, Stevens accused the latter of dishonesty and declared to Lincoln that he would steal anything except a red hot stove. Lincoln reported this conversation to Cameron and the latter remonstrated with Stevens. Stevens returned to Lincoln and said that he had changed his mind; Cameron would steal a red hot stove. Both Lincoln and Stevens had a sense of humor, but in the case of the latter there was a destructive quality which repeatedly disturbed Lincoln. When Stevens saw that he could not dominate Lincoln, he prepared a campaign to destroy him, which was only interrupted by the assassination of the president in 1865. Fawn Brodie argues, however, that Stevens would have been a less effective spokesman for the Negro had he not possessed many vicious qualities.[13]

All criticism of Lincoln's earlier opportunism and occasional inconsistency pales into insignificance when compared to the character of Thad Stevens, the Speaker and absolute master of the United States House of Representatives during the Civil War and the early reconstruction period.

David Donald's biography of Charles Sumner offers a similar attempt to glorify a Radical Republican leader without

attempting to disguise any of his unpleasant qualities. Donald cites with pride the opinion of Bruce Catton that the physical assault on Sumner by Preston Brooks in 1856 was the first blow of the Civil War. Donald claims many virtues for Sumner. He describes him as "an advocate of international peace," a great education and prison reformer, the principal organizer of the anti-slavery Whigs, the most illustrious founder of the Republican Party, and chief of the Radical Republicans during the Civil War, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during and after the Civil War, and a pioneer leader of the so-called Liberal Republican movement of 1872.[14]

Donald points out that the so-called complete published works of Sumner, in fifteen volumes, included only a fraction of the recorded public statements of this illustrious master politician. The special collection of Sumner papers at Harvard University contains more than 50,000 items. Donald rightly claims the most exhaustive biography of Sumner to date, and he adds with pride that all of the previous biographies, beginning with D. A. Harsha in 1856 and ending with Walter G. Shotwell in 1910, had been favorable. He adds that Laura A. White was recently prevented from finishing another new biography project because of her untimely death.

Charles Sumner was born in Boston in 1811; his father was the illegitimate son of one Esther Holmes. Charles Sumner's mother, Relief Jacob Sumner, was an uneducated seamstress when she married. Sumner's father was ambitious for his son's success, and Charles was admitted to the distinguished Public Latin School in 1821. His father's appointment as Sheriff of Suffolk County in 1826 greatly improved the family's fortunes, and the son's formal education was guaranteed. He graduated from Harvard in 1830, a confirmed opponent of the predominant Congregational Church in Massachusetts of his day. As Sumner put it: "I am without religious feeling."[15]

Sumner spent an idle year after graduating from Harvard before entering the Harvard Law School in 1831. Like Stevens, he found his true profession in the law. He made the acquaintance of Federal Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph Story, who lectured part time on the Harvard law fac-

ulty. Story smoothed the way for Sumner's career and provided him with valuable connections. However, Sumner's law practice was singularly unsuccessful by the time he departed on an extended tour of Europe in 1837. As Donald put it, the "insistent note of antagonism" in his letters from Europe disturbed many of his friends at home. Sumner made some brilliant but superficial contacts in Western and Central Europe during his three year visit. He returned to the United States, somewhat distressed that his European sojourn was over. In referring to the close of his tour, he said: "The iron curtain has fallen upon it."[17]

Sumner's trip had been expensive, but his mother paid off his creditors (his father died while he was abroad.) Sumner's law practice continued to decline. In the meantime, Sumner professed to be in love with one eligible woman after another while coyly avoiding any situation which might result in marriage. Like Stevens, he was an incorrigible bachelor. He was deeply grieved whenever a friend married.

Sumner first achieved his national reputation through his July 4, 1845 address to a group of civilians and military men at Boston. He surprised his audience by coming out with a militant advocacy of pacifism. He accused military men of being so many lions, tigers or other wild beasts. The originality of his assault consisted primarily in the vulgarity in his choice of language and the patriotic occasion on which to express himself.[18]

Elihu Burritt, the leader of the American Peace Society, bestowed warm praise on Summer for his speech, only to be bewildered a short time later when Summer in 1849 began denouncing pacifism. Sumner soon became one of the most vehement spokesmen for factions hoping to crush the South.

Sumner wrote to the leading political scientist, Francis Lieber, in 1836 that "we are becoming abolitionists in the North fast." (Lieber was teaching in the South at that time.) Sumner opposed the annexation of Texas and referred to Polk as that "fourth rate lawyer." He worked hard to promote collaboration among the Tories, the Liberty Party and the Conscience Whigs. In 1851, Sumner managed to reach the United States Senate on the Free Soil ticket. The main phase

of his career had begun, and it consisted primarily of inciting insurrection and war. Sumner's three and three-quarter hours speech against the South in the Senate on August 26, 1852, was so extreme that Lieber denounced Sumner as "Jacobinical." Stephen A. Douglas declared publicly that Sumner's position was incompatible with the tenets of the American Constitution. Sumner's oratory, with its *ad hominem* argumentation and vicious invective, was depressing to most of his colleagues. In fact, his language was so extreme that Douglas predicted "that damn fool will get himself killed by some other damn fool."

Cass of Michigan, the dean of the Senate, referred to Sumner's speech of May 20, 1856 as "to date the most un-American and unpatriotic that ever grated on the ears of the members of this high body."[20] Douglas wondered if Sumner was trying to get himself kicked like a dog in the street. William Henry Seward, at that time Republican party leader, wrote that Sumner had gone much too far, but was inhibited about rebuking the influential Massachusetts Senator. Sumner's defamation of Senator Butler from South Carolina, when the latter was ill and absent from the Senate, prompted Preston S. Brooks, a Representative, to give the influential Massachusetts Senator a caning. This incident took place in May, 1856 at the time of the Southern raid on the abolitionist settlement in Lawrence, Kansas.

In the sense that feeling in the North ran high after the assault by "Bully" Brooks, Sumner had achieved his goal. Brooks was arrested and fined, but not expelled from the House of Representatives or imprisoned. Although Sumner recovered physically in a very short time from injuries sustained during the one minute caning, his mental condition was such that he required more than three years following the caning before he resumed his regular duties. Donald suggests that his illness was something in the nature of a traumatic experience. Brooks died before Sumner returned to the Senate.

On June 4, 1860, Sumner delivered a four-hour speech on the subject of "The Barbarism of Slavery." In this speech he set a new precedent for violent language against the South.

When Confederate cannon fired at Ft. Sumter the following year, Sumner assumed a sanctimonious stance in condemning innate Southern wickedness, without pondering his own role in bring about the Ft. Sumter disaster. Sumner soon joined Stevens in censuring Lincoln's wartime policies and in working to undermine the political position of the wartime president. Like Stevens, Sumner believed the Civil War would solve many problems. Also like Stevens, the main fear of Sumner was that the treatment of the conquered South might be too soft. These two Northern politicians had many things in common besides rejection of religion, opposition to marriage, and cruelty toward their opponents. Apart from these personal matters, Sumner and Stevens conducted a program which helped to make war inevitable in the belief that a Civil War of this kind constituted a positive blessing for the advancement of the human race. Both of them favored total integration of the American Negro, North and South, in society as well as politics, without temporization, delay, or transitional preparation. These men indeed had many of the characteristics often implied in the United States by the word Jacobin. Whatever Lincoln's faults, the North's wartime president occupied a much higher moral position than Sumner and Stevens, who emerged as the two dominant Radical Republican leaders. It was Sumner and Stevens, not Lincoln, who determined the nature of the fifteen year Northern military occupation of the South.[21]

An excellent work which puts the congressional work of Stevens and Sumner in perspective is Edward Boykin, *Congress and the Civil War* (McBride, N. Y., 1955). This book, which begins with the Missouri crisis in 1819, demonstrates how the situation in Congress deteriorated after the departure from the scene of intellectual giants such as John Quincy Adams (1848), John C. Calhoun (1850), Daniel Webster (1850), and Henry Clay (1850). The epigoni took over, and in the case of Sumner and Stevens, the real leaders, the epigoni were decadent indeed.

Dealing with the causes of a civil war is a very different procedure from describing the outbreak of a conflict between one nation and another. Many historians have recognized

this, but T. Harry Williams, "Lincoln and the Causes of the Civil War," in *Lincoln Images* (Augustana College Press, Rock Island, Ill., 1960), does not think that they have succeeded:

> It has been reported that historians have not been notably successful in describing the factors that brought on the struggle or the motives moving such central actors in the drama of Abraham Lincoln. This failure is not surprising. The methodology of history . . . does not lend itself to interpretation of the illustrative emotions that lead men to fight for a cause.

If this generalization is true, then historians have failed lamentably in one of the most important spheres of their endeavor: describing the origins of conflicts. Williams justifies his statement with the assertion that history has been weak in "exploiting the related disciplines." There might have been at least some basis for this statement had it been made in the nineteenth century in connection with Edward Freeman's history of the Norman conquest. In those days, many historians were still agreeing with Freeman that history is past politics and politics is present history. But for a writer to contend in 1960 that historians do not practice and acknowledge the importance of training in such related fields as statistics, economics, psychology and anthropology, is very controversial indeed. As a matter of fact, the article by Williams does not seem to reflect much of the achievement that has been made in the field which he describes. Some of his generalizations about trends from one decade to another are suggestive and valuable, but one does not receive the impression that credit has been given where it is due.

One receives a very different impression from the comments of William B. Hesseltine, *The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Braziler, N. Y., 1962). Hesseltine reports that "there are 150 Civil War Round Tables, from Chicago, New York and Atlanta to Wiesbaden and London where hobbyists assemble monthly to discuss the Civil War."[22] Hesseltine is fully aware that determining the responsibilities for the outbreak of civil wars is generally a more complex and subtle problem than dealing with other types of conflict. He agrees with Williams that many questions remain to be answered:

> Repeatedly, for almost a century, Americans have been reviewing the background of the war, sometimes in scholarship, and sometimes in controversy, in an attempt to resolve the problem and to offer an explanation.

Unlike Williams, he believes that real progress has been made. One example would be in relating the outbreak of the conflict to the emergence of modern American nationalism. Another would be the progress made in eliminating the notion that the issues behind the outbreak of the war were essentially moral or democratic:

> The differences between chattel slavery in the South and wage slavery in the North were more apparent than real. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address might have been delivered just as appropriately by Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America.[23]

It had been fairly well established by 1962 that Thomas Jefferson had provided the moral basis for Southern secession in 1798 and more than one historian also believed that the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of that year offered the moral basis for reunion after a conflict of appalling destructiveness. The American Civil War was far and away the most destructive one on the entire planet during the century from 1815 to 1914:

> Of the 35,000,000 total (population) 26 were in the North, and 9—including 4,000,000 slaves—were in the South. The military populations were, respectively, 4,600,000 and 1,065,000. More impressive still was the casualty list. Out of the 2,750,000 soldiers in the North, 360,000 were killed or died of wounds and disease, while the southerners lost 358,000.[24]

Probably no single American historian has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the Civil War than Avery Craven, one of whose parents was Northern and the other Southern. He opened new perspectives with his "The Coming of the War Between the States," in the *Journal of Southern History* (Vol. II, 1936, pp. 303-322). This was followed by a series of major studies: *The Coming of the Civil War* (Scribner's, N. Y., 1942, 491 pp.), *The Growth of Southern Nationalism,* 1848-1861 (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1953, 433 pp.), and *The Civil War in the Making, 1815-1860* (Louisiana State University Press, 1959, 115 pp.). The

gist of his approach has been to regard the conflict as a tragedy with no redeeming features apart from a display of heroism, and one which could easily have been avoided had it not been for a few crucial blunders on each side.

In a vigorous article of September, 1865, less than four months after the surrender of Kirby Smith and the last Confederate forces in Arkansas, C. Chauncey Burr, a New York City editor, presented the case very strongly against the folly that the war had been in any way successful:

> If the people of these plundered States retain a love of honor, with correct ideas of liberty and government, they are *richer* than we to-day. If they cherish the grand philosophy of *right*, which made our revolutionary period so glorious, they will yet emerge from the poverty which our vandalism has brought upon them, and stand forth the inheritors of all the glory of this continent. Do we think because we have burned their wheat fields, and hold them, at the present moment, under the point of our bayonets, that we have therefore quenched the fires of freedom in their bosoms, and permanently overthrown the splendid structure of self-government in the new world? We may kill men; but we cannot kill things. If the principle of liberty survives in their breasts, it will one day as surely spring forth and conquer our despotism as God lives! Are we mad enough to think that we can long succeed in bringing back, and fixing upon this country the institutions of the Huns and Vandals? Do we imagine that the *law of force* is forever to displace the *law of consent*—in the land of Washington? Has military despotism permanently taken the place of civil liberty here? Have we burned the Declaration of Independence? Has the Constitution been buried so deep that it cannot be dug up? Be sure that if we have not succeeded in doing this, God holds in His hand a day of redemption for the South, and of retribution for us. O, my countrymen, God will teach us this great lesson, that *poverty* does not mean the final overthrow of liberty, nor *luxury* the everlasting triumph of despotism! We boast of our prosperity and riches. So did that rich idiot, Nebuchadnezzar: "Is not this great Babylon that I have built by the might of my power, for the glory of my majesty?" We next behold the boasting fool eating grass like an ox. Is not that God's lesson to mankind?[25]

It is evident that Burr recognized as early as 1865 that the victorious North has assumed a position not dissimilar to that adopted by the triumphant English mercantilists and imperialists in 1763. We have seen earlier how this led many historians to justify the English policy against America during

the Revolution rather than to criticize the Northern Reconstruction policy in the fashion which it deserved. Burr was probably too optimistic in imagining the future attitudes of historians toward this period, but he had no way of knowing about the horrors, atrocities and crimes which were to be committed by all the major nations during the twentieth century:

> A hundred years hence, the historian will cause shocks of horror to startle mankind at our brutalities, our despotism, and our falseness to the splendid theory of government which we inherited from a brave and virtuous ancestry. Sitting amid the ashes of their homes, the southern people are still richer than we, in the inheritance of every thing that elevates, ennobles, and honors a people.[20]

Burr concluded on the following note:

> The model men of northern power and civilization just now are the Stantons, the Sumners, the Holts, the Jim Lanes, and (God pity us!) the Ben Butlers . . . This, then, is the result of the war—that the South is poor in cash, and the North bankrupt in honor.

This is, of course, extremely strong language produced by the partisan polemical contests of the moment, but reflection on Burr's address ought to prevent anyone from adopting a shallow and complacent approach to the tragedy of the American Civil War.

Chapter V: The Spanish-American War

The Civil War constitutes a sort of watershed in the consideration of major conflicts engaged in by the United States and the treatment of their causes by historians. North and South alike blundered in producing a situation which led to disunion and war, but the interests of foreign lands were not directly involved in this struggle. It is the thesis of this study that in the principal foreign conflicts involving the United States from 1775 down to the Spanish-American War in 1898, the American case was consistently a strong one despite the efforts of a number of our prominent historians to prove the opposite. We now have good studies revising earlier misconceptions about the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, and a similar enterprise on the American Revolution is scheduled to appear in the near future.

During the long period from Lee's surrender in 1865 down to McKinley's war message to Congress in April, 1898, the United States was not involved in any foreign wars. This is not surprising when one considers that America's "manifest destiny" in terms of contiguous continental expansion was completed with the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico in 1853 (this was the final act in determining the Mexican-American frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo). The acquisition of Alaska from the Russian Empire in 1867 was not in response to any kind of American pressure, but was brought about by Russian initiative and was accepted by us as a sort of return favor to Russia for her support of the North during the American Civil War. It was widely known that embarrassing financial scandals had compromised the Russian administration in Alaska and that the Russians could see little point in holding the northwest portion of America after losing their interest in Upper California once and for all with the termination of Mexican rule.

Due to the diplomatic skill of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, the United States was able to avoid conflicts with European powers in the West Indies during the 1870's, despite several serious incidents. At that same time, the country acquired mercantile interests in distant Samoa, but that did not lead to the annexation of territory until the age of American overseas imperialism in 1898. The American pattern in China was the same after 1865 as it had been before the Civil War. We pursued what the English sometimes referred to as the Yankee 'me too' policy. Whenever the British, by armed force as in the case of the opium wars, battered down Chinese resistance to establish special concessions for themselves, we tended to ask for as many equivalent rights as we could get and exerted what pressure we could on both the English and the Chinese, without actually resorting to force or engaging in any military commitments.

During the years from 1867, when the French puppet, Maximilian, was executed in Mexico, until 1895, and the crisis with England over the Guiana-Venezuela boundary, the Monroe Doctrine was rarely invoked or even mentioned. By 1895, the Monroe Doctrine had been in existence for such a long time that most American politicians and scholars tended to regard it as an integral part of international law. It was a rude awakening when Lord Salisbury reminded American Secretary of State Richard Olney in 1895 that the Monroe Doctrine in fact was a unilateral American declaration without any binding force whatever in international law. A first-hand report of some of the dangers encountered in the Venezuelan affair was published in the *American Historical Review* in April, 1899 (George L. Burr, "The Search for the Venezuela-Guiana Boundary"). Burr, who was in charge of the American arbitration commission dispatched to South America, stressed that England and the United States very nearly went to war because of this seemingly minor dispute. Actually, Salisbury and the other English leaders adopted a very condescending and uncooperative policy in rebuffing American pretensions until the ill-fated Jameson Raid diverted their attention to South Africa. The English decided it would be more important

to crush the Boer peasants in South Africa than to seek a belated overthrow of the American Monroe Doctrine.

The issues behind the crisis in 1895 were simple enough. The boundary dispute between the independent Latin American state of Venezuela and the British Crown Colony of Guiana had existed for more than fifty years. Neither side was inclined to accept the claims of the other. The conflict remained dormant until gold was discovered at a point deep within what the Venezuelans considered to be their territory. Suddenly the English claimed the territory for themselves. President Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine in a request to the contending parties for a submission of their dispute to arbitration. The United States and England, for instance, had accepted the arbitration of German Kaiser Wilhelm I in 1871 in order to reach a settlement of their dispute over the San Juan Islands. The Monroe Doctrine rested squarely on the premise that America was opposed in principle to further European colonization in the western hemisphere. Cleveland clearly saw that the extreme English demands in the dispute with Venezuela were tantamount to further English colonization.

Cleveland has been charged with being anti-English because of the disastrous results for his political career in the Sackville-West affair. On that occasion, in 1888, an obtuse English diplomat in America, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, was tricked by a planted Republican letter into advising that American citizens with pronounced sympathy for England ought to vote for Cleveland instead of his Republican rival, Harrison. Cleveland had just introduced the tariff issue into the presidential campaign of 1888, and the English diplomat rightly concluded that the lower tariff he advocated was more in the English free trade interest than the protective tariff policy of his Republican opponent. The odds were heavily in favor of Cleveland in the election until the English diplomat committed his indiscretion: anti-English feeling was still strong in America at that time and it was the general consensus of Cleveland and the political experts that this fantastic incident cost him the election. However, he was able to return to office in 1893. Allan Nevins, in his monumental

biography, *Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage,* (Scribner's, N. Y., 1932) has examined this interesting question at length, and he has concluded that Cleveland did not in any sense become an Anglophobe as a result of his 1888 experience. On the contrary, as a conservative Gold Democrat, Cleveland was distinctly favorable toward English economic interests and financial policies in America and throughout the world. This does not change the fact that he was determined to defend America's traditional Monroe Doctrine.

Cleveland knew perfectly well that the influence of people favoring a program of overseas American imperialism was increasing. He was convinced that English pretensions in Venezuela and the aims of American imperialists were equally hostile to the Monroe Doctrine and to traditional American concepts about foreign policy. Cleveland blocked the various American efforts to annex Hawaii throughout his second term. When Cuba, the perennial land of unrest, was torn by insurrection again in 1895, Cleveland adopted a moderate policy. He had no intention of becoming involved in a dangerous crisis with England in 1895. He did become so involved because he had no conception of the contempt in which the principal English leaders held the Monroe Doctrine. American naval defeats would have been inevitable had the two countries gone to war in 1895. The tonnage of the English navy at that time was twelve times as great as the American navy. It comes with a certain sensation of surprise to recall this fact less than seventy year later when the English navy is much smaller than that of the Soviet Union and only a fraction the size of the American navy. Such are the ups and downs of world politics. A third war with England over Venezuela would have been a tragic event. The United States probably would have conquered Canada and would have become involved in endless difficulties in that country. Fortunately, the war was averted because Cleveland grasped the opportunity presented by a conciliatory English gesture which rendered arbitration possible after more than nine months of deadlock. Relations between England and the United States quickly improved and the two countries were soon busily negotiating the new Panama Canal Treaty which proved more efficacious

than the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. At one moment on the verge of war, things seemed to be moving to the opposite extreme, and there was talk of an Anglo-American entente. What possible advantage such an entente could bring to America was never satisfactorily explained.

America was in many respects the most fortunate nation in the world in 1895. She had a vast domain rich in resources with which to insure prosperity for the growing American population. Russia had a huge expanse, but, unlike America, her access to the sea lanes of the world was very unsatisfactory. The Russians were bottled up in the Black Sea by Turkey, and in the Baltic Sea by England and Germany. The White Sea Coast, distant from the principal Russian metropolitan area, was frozen solid most of the year. The American situation was very different in this important respect, with a host of excellent harbors on the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico. Unlike England, American possessions were not spread throughout the world. America, with her three million contiguous square miles, was a gigantic nation when compared to the other principal European powers. Neither France nor Germany held a share of the area in Europe comparable in size to the combined area of Oregon and California, and of course the territorial base of Italy is much smaller still. Looked at from whatever perspective, the American geographic and economic position was in many ways unique. Although the United States was still a debtor nation economically (European holdings in the United States were much greater than American holdings abroad), there was good reason to expect that, under normal conditions, America would become a creditor nation in about fifty years. In the meantime, paying the interest on foreign investments was no problem in view of the proverbial American favorable balance of trade. It was in the context of this happy situation that American leaders began to wonder if perhaps they did not need overseas colonies and an entente with England. It was very much like a sixteen-year-old girl with rosy cheeks putting on rouge.

It was against this background that the United States in 1898 decided to go to war against Spain. In any real or mean-

ingful sense, there could be no military glory in such a war. Spain had been shaken by revolutions throughout the nineteenth century. She was a fifth-rate power militarily, and the wooden steam hulks which constituted the bulk of her navy could be no match against the proud new White Squadron built by the United States in the 1880's and 1890's. Indeed, in 1898, the Spanish navy in relation to the American navy was even weaker than the American navy in relation to the English navy. The decrepit Spanish monarchy was simply in no position to resist an armed onslaught from the United States naval forces.

There was no compelling reason for the United States to go to war against Spain in 1898. It is true that the Spanish had mismanged their administration in Cuba, just as it is true that there has been no really successful government in Cuba during the sixty-six years since 1898. There is no doubt that the Spanish military forces in Cuba, as well as the Cuban insurgents, committed a number of military excesses, although these were not as extreme as the ones perpetrated later by the English in South Africa (30,000 Boer women and children died in English concentration camps during the Boer War). The important point, however, is that the Spanish authorities agreed to a military armistice in Cuba on American terms two days before President McKinley sent his war message to Congress on April 11, 1898. If justice for Cuba really had been the issue, why did not President McKinley send a special team of American observers to Cuba to see that our terms for peace were carried out by the Spaniards, instead of virtually ignoring the Spanish concessions and persisting in the plan of asking for a declaration of war against Spain? It is obvious that in this combination of circumstances, a problem of war guilt of the first order has been encountered, and this is particularly significant since McKinley was noted for his Christian faith and for his devotion to high moral principles. It would be just as wrong to label America's president in 1898 a scoundrel as it was for James Russell Lowell to apply that label to Polk in 1848. However, it is true that the American case in 1898 was a very weak one when compared to 1848.

The first major history of the Spanish-American War was published by Henry Cabot Lodge, the Massachusetts "scholar in politics," in 1899, while the Philippine insurrection was still in progress.[1] Those who had read the dedication in Lodge's two-volume military history of the American Revolution the previous year *(The Story of the Revolution,* 2 vols., Scribner's, N. Y., 1898), were not surprised by the exuberance of the 1899 volume on the Spanish War. Lodge had dedicated his account on the American Revolution as follows:

> The Army and Navy of the United States, victors of Manila, Santiago and Porto Rico, worthy successors of the soldiers and sailors who under the lead of George Washington won American independence.

No doubt these soldiers and sailors were worthy in the sense intended by Lodge on an individual basis, but a comparison between the events of the so-called parade war of 1898 against Spain and the desperate eight-year struggle of the American Revolution was grotesque. In his book on the Spanish-American War, Lodge compared the American victory in the minor skirmish at Santiago to Wellington's victory over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. This would be like comparing the Boston Massacre to the Night of St. Bartholomew at Paris in 1572.

Lodge's perspective and sense of proportion disturbed Theodore Dodge who reviewed his book on the Spanish-American War for the *American Historical Review* (Dec., 1899). Dodge cited the following generalization from Lodge:

> All men appreciate the difference between Latin and Teuton, and we regret the difficulty the Spaniard has had in recognizing the onward movement of the nations and the duties of the hour.

Lodge went on to complain about "the decadence of the Latin race," and to boast of the "superiority of the Anglo-Saxons." It would have been interesting to examine Lodge's method had he been requested to apply this generalization to another Latin power, the France of the Third Republic. In any case, Lodge's gloating and boasting about an easy military victory was intolerable to Dodge, who had no inhibitions about going into print with his criticism.

Not all of the contemporary accounts were so complacent. For instance, John W. Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1901), made no secret of his views in the introductory remarks of his study. He came out strongly in favor of the Grover Cleveland foreign policy in relation both to the Monroe Doctrine and to the colonial issues of the day.

Revisionism in depth of Lodge's chauvinistic approach to the war with Spain awaited the period after the First World War. Carl Russel Fish, *The Path of Empire* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1921), left no doubt in the reader's mind that President McKinley missed a good opportunity to follow the precedent of President John Adams one century earlier in 1798 in avoiding an unnecessary war. Fish placed considerable emphasis on "yellow journalism" (so-called because of the cartoon strip, "The Yellow Kid"). Fish still found it necessary to remind his readers that it had never been proven that the Spaniards sunk the battleship *Maine* on February 15, 1898:

> The responsibility for this calamity has never been positively determined.[2]

Fish went on to say:

> It is possible that the insurgents were responsible, but it is incredible that the Spanish government planned the explosion.

Fish made it clear that McKinley had plenty of time to call off the dogs of war:

> General Woodford (American Minister at Madrid) cabled that the United States could obtain for Cuba a satisfactory autonomy, or independence, or the cession of the island.
>
> Reluctantly President McKinley decided that he could not announce to Congress that he had secured the acceptance of the American policy.[3]

The president recommended force against Spain two days after the Spanish government had surrendered to American demands on the Cuban issue. We are asked to accept the word of Fish that McKinley was under heavy pressure. He does not attempt to define the nature of the influences that

prompted McKinley to act as if the Spanish surrender had never taken place.

The problem of the pressures exerted against President McKinley was satisfactorily explained by Thomas Beer, *Hanna* (Knopf, N. Y., 1929, pp. 221ff). This biographer of Mark Hanna, the first one based on the unpublished Hanna papers, satisfactorily explained the main elements concerning McKinley 's war message of April 11, 1898. Beer demonstrates that McKinley placed great confidence in Hanna, the Ohio political boss who vowed to place his man in the White House and succeeded. Hanna was an able organizer, a shrewd tactician and a practical thinker. Typical of his practical quality was his denunciation to fellow Cleveland, Ohio, millionaires of the absurdly repressive paternalism of George Pullman which resulted in the famous railway strike of 1895. Most of the wealthy Americans in that age of Populism and free silver agitation were denouncing the workers who had dared to defy Pullman's system. Mark Hanna was no less cool about the Cuban situation. Although McKinley had hoped, prior to his election to the presidency in 1896, that Cleveland would intervene against Cuba, Hanna persuaded him to pursue a peace policy on the grounds that American business interests did not need a colonial war which might threaten the stability of the American economic system. The nation was well on the road toward economic recovery from the depression of 1893 when Mark Hanna changed his mind and approved the war program. This was early in March, 1898. McKinley's failure to show initiative in reversing Hanna's decision does not appear surprising in the context of Beer's account in the Hanna biography, and in his other major work, *The Mauve Decade: American Life at the End of the 19th Century* (Knopf, N. Y., 1926).

The most influential American work to date on the Spanish-American War is Walter Millis, *The National Spirit: A Study of our War with Spain* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1931). The author writes from the perspective of the post-World War I period. He sees in the Spanish War a radical departure from traditional American interests and concepts of foreign policy:

> Immense consequences were to follow from it, and even now the full effects of this remarkable episode are scarcely calculable.[5]

One has the feeling that Millis sees in 1898 an acceptance of imperialism which logically resulted in the subsequent American policy moves of our century. His disdain for President McKinley is revealed in the following sarcastic comment:

> Though we accept Mr. McKinley's word that the war was terminated under divine guidance, the manner of its origins and conduct still offers a fascinating field for study in more strictly human elements.

Probably in no other generation of American history was there a more rapid process of change in the economic organization and structure of American society than during the years from 1865 to 1898. But to Millis this had been a dull period:

> Between the Civil War and the 90's there had stretched a complex and vaguely unsatisfactory period which even today we find it difficult either to remember or to interpret.

Millis hints that the country was ripe for conflict when he notes that America's Indian wars "had come to their long and bloody end." He then plunges deeply into folk psychology:

> The frontier had dissolved suddenly into the past and we looked up to find nothing before our eyes save salt water and the nations of the earth which lay beyond it.

There is an attempt here to denote a mystical and almost fatalistic dynamic pressure for the type of conflict which Millis is about to describe. The great trouble, however, is that Millis is seeking to explain this situation in terms of internal American developments. Four years after his book went to press, a flood of new light was thrown on the very genuine problem with which Millis is dealing in the first volue, chapter three, of William L. Langer, *Diplomacy of Imperialism* (Knopf, N. Y., 1935). Langer was not the first to show that the whole western world in the 1890's was flooded with nonsense, propaganda and pseudo-psychology about imperialism. Popular interest in imperialism had been relatively dormant from 1815 until the revival of grandiose new English projects for Africa and Asia in the 1870's.

Consider the fascinating and bold perspective of a solid expanse of English territory in Africa from the Mediterranean in the north to the Cape of Good Hope in the south. Consider England's objective of establishing control over the entire shoreline of the vast Indian Ocean. Consider her ambitious plan to reduce the proud Manchu Empire in China to an English sphere of influence, along the lines of which India had been subjected by 1859. In view of these grandiose objectives, which England actually proceeded to achieve step by step at very small expense, it is small wonder that other nations, such as the American, French, German, Italian, Russian and Japanese, were smitten by a veritable fever of imperialistic ardor. The magnetic attraction of the English example proved to be irresistable. Millis, in his otherwise competent study, failed to push his background inquiry along these lines. It goes without saying that the American record in 1898 looks much worse when considered in a vacuum, or evaluated apart from other events transpiring in the world at this time. Probably the only two serious defects in an otherwise brilliant book are the failure to place American imperialism in its world perspective, and the unnecessary sarcasm which crops up again and again about McKinley's sincere and very real Christian religious convictions. The treatment by Millis is excellent in describing public excitement about our new navy, the stimulating effect on American nationalism of the Chicago Columbian Exposition, and the controversies over currency, tariff, and general recovery from the depression of 1893. Millis notes that:

> It was into this situation that the news of armed rebellion in the largest, the nearest and to us the most important, of the West Indian Islands was abruptly projected.

Millis recalls that Cuba had been dubbed "The Ever Faithful Isle" because of her loyalty to Spain during the early nineteenth century when the other Spanish colonies were breaking away. Jefferson became interested in American acquisition of Cuba, but this was not unnatural in view of the fact that nearly everyone in his day expected the entire Spanish Empire in the western hemisphere to disappear quickly. It was known that the Creole Cubans resented

Spanish bureaucratic nepotism. There were insurrections in Cuba in the mid-nineteenth century; the Pact of Zanjón in 1878 ended the last major rebellion prior to the uprising of 1895. The Spaniards moved belatedly to abolish Negro slavery in Cuba in 1886. A few years later, Chile very narrowly escaped a war with the United States following the attack by a mob on some American sailors in Valparaiso. The following year, in 1892, the United States tried to buy the Virgin Islands from Denmark, but the Danes refused. There were simultaneous plans to establish American sovereignty in Hawaii, and these probably would have been realized in 1893 had Cleveland not succeeded Harrison and opposed the project.

The 1893 depression in the United States produced hard times in Cuba, coming as it did after Senator McKinley's new barrier against foreign imports in the tariff law of 1892. In the meantime, José Martí, the Cuban revolutionary leader, had been organizing for action since 1891. Economic conditions in Cuba grew worse, and Martí's forces struck their first blow against the Spanish authorities on February 24, 1895.

Martí was soon killed, and the leadership was assumed by General Máximo Gómez and General Roloff, a Polish Jew who was a naturalized citizen of the United States. These able military leaders realized they could never hope to defeat the Spanish Army. They decided upon a scorched earth terror campaign which would paralyze Cuban economic life, rivet world attention on Cuba, and pave the way for foreign intervention in support of the insurrectionary forces. The orders for the terror campaign were issued on July 1, 1895. The insurrectionary leaders knew that such tactics would not bring much popular support in Cuba, but they were more interested in maintaining discipline over their small and fanatical insurgent forces. The terror began in eastern Cuba, but Gómez had begun to carry out raids in the western part of the island before the end of October, 1895. William Randolph Hearst purchased the New York *Journal* a few days later in a deliberate effort to capture the lead in New York City newspaper circulation from Joseph Pulitzer's New York *World*. Hearst was quick to see the advantage of lurid and sensational reporting about events in Cuba and Pulitzer soon

decided to follow Hearst's lead in exploiting this field of sensational journalism. A great point in this press campaign arrived with the selection of Valeriano Weyler to lead the Spanish forces against Gómez. Bryan's free silver campaign held priority in the arena of public interest during most of 1896, but with the defeat of the Democrats in the November, 1896 election, the sensational reporting about Cuba came into its own. Oddly enough, a Filipino insurrection which broke out against Spain in 1896 received scant attention in the American press. Very few American citizens were aware of the location of these islands of American destiny when war broke out in 1898. Public interest in Cuba increased throughout 1897. Early the following year, several dramatic events brought this interest to a climax. Depuy de Lôme, Spanish Minister to the United States, learned on February 8, 1898 that one of his confidential letters had been obtained in an unorthodox way by American journalists. Since this letter contained some unflattering remarks about President McKinley, among other things referring to him as an opportunist, the Spanish Minister resigned before the newspapers even printed the letter of February 9, 1898. Millis wryly declares that the Spanish Minister's characterization of McKinley was an accurate one. This observation provides a good indication of the lengths to which Millis is prepared to go in revising traditional concepts about the Spanish-American War.[6]

Millis follows Fish in his description of the *Maine* disaster, and he adds a quotation from Captain Sigsbee's communication to Washington: "Public opinion should be suspended until further report." Unfortunately, eager journalists rendered futile any possible efforts in this direction. Millis stresses at great length the inadequacy of the Spanish Navy at this time; the only Spanish battleship was laid up in dry dock and never saw service during the war. Millis expresses indignation about the president's refusal to emphasize the Spanish surrender in his message of April 11, 1898:

> The fact that Spain had surrendered was imparted in two brief paragraphs, inserted at the end of nine closely printed pages written on the assumption that she had not.

American Minister Woodford had implored the president in a telegram from Madrid: "I hope that nothing will now be done to humiliate Spain." This advice was not followed.

The Millis treatment of the origins of the Spanish-American War is complete so far as direct relations between Spain and the United States are concerned. It does not take much account of the policies of other powers during the crisis, as can be seen from A. E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States* (Longmans, N. Y., 1960), which places the conflict in its larger world perspective. One of the odd features of the larger situation is the English attitude toward our war against Spain in 1898. Official England seemed rather hostile at the outset. Salisbury and Sir Henry Drummond Wolfe, the English ambassador in Madrid, sympathized with Queen Isabella of Spain. Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British minister at Washington, D. C., actually led two efforts on the part of the local diplomatic corps to persuade the United States to exercise moderation in their dealings with Spain. The British press, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly pro-American from the outset of the crisis. Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, had alerted the British public to the possibilities of a world-wide diplomatic entente between the United States and England. The British were especially concerned about Russian expansion in the Far East and they hoped to gain American support for their continued control over China. There were also other areas where the British were uneasy. War between France and England almost started in 1898 when the British armed forces under Kitchener forced the French to retreat from the Eastern Sudan (Fashoda Incident). Rumors were also rife that Germany had finally decided to build a formidable military fleet, and Japan was emerging as a new world power in the Far East. England's foreign policy at this time was based upon the post-Waterloo tradition of 'splendid isolation.' In the meantime, continental Europe, thanks mainly to Bismarck's mania for concluding alliances, had become organized in two hostile alliance systems (based on the dual alliance of France and Russia and the triple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). Salisbury saw no reason why England

should not continue in splendid isolation. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was all for concluding alliances. The press support for Chamberlain's ideas indicated that they were gaining in popularity. Great Britain concluded her first formal alliance since Waterloo in 1902 (Anglo-Japanese Alliance), and the trend in that direction was already strong by 1898. One English periodical after another emphasized that it would be easier to persuade the United States to lend its support to English overseas imperialism if America herself acquired overseas colonies at the expense of Spain.

One of the most fateful consequences of the Spanish-American War was the acquisition of an American colony in the eastern hemisphere, which seemed to contradict the original premises on which the Monroe Doctrine was based. Furthermore, the first solid events in Anglo-American collaboration, beginning with Secretary of State John Hay's open door notes in 1900, took place in the Far East. More than that, events in the Far East during the Spanish-American War led to the first serious friction between the United States and Germany. Lester B. Shippee, "Germany in the Spanish-American War," in the July, 1925 *American Historical Review*, presents a first penetrating analysis of this situation. Shippee states:

> On the basis of materials previously available, and perhaps colored by certain preconceived notions, it has been thought that most European nations were sympathetic with Spain and more or less passively hostile to the United States during the controversy over the Cuban situation and that Germany in particular was neutral only in the most formal sense.[7]

Shippee went on to show that the German government actually maintained scrupulous neutrality during the 1898 conflict and entertained no desire for trouble with the United States. There were solid reasons for this, because "next to those of Great Britain, Germany's imports from and exports to the United States exceeded those of any other European nation." So far as the Philippine Islands were concerned, "the German government did not intend to take any action which could arouse American resentment." And yet there was serious friction between Germany and the United States in the

Philippines during the war. It was something of a mystery how this situation came about. At last the full answer was provided by Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," in *American Historical Review,* October, 1939. The friction at Manila was actually the result of a brilliant achievement on the part of English propaganda. As neutral powers with investments and citizens in the Philippines, both Great Britain and Germany had stationed warships in Philippine waters during the military operations in that area. This concern about the interests of their respective nationals was customary procedure under international law. But the British managed to convince Admiral Dewey that the Germans had contemplated a secret attack on the American fleet and that only the presence of British warships had dissuaded them from undertaking this mad venture.

The presence of Dewey at Manila in the first place was the achievement of Theodore Roosevelt, the Under-Secretary of the Navy, who was destined to succeed McKinley as President in 1901. During the absence of Secretary of the Navy Long, Theodore Roosevelt had issued the orders which sent Dewey to the Far East long in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. Roosevelt believed that the United States, as a future great naval power, ought to have a naval base in the Far East comparable to the British bastion at Hong Kong. Fortunately, no one suggested attacking the Spaniards at Rio de Oro on the west coast of Africa.

In the years since the Second World War, historians have concentrated on the personal role of President McKinley in the events which led to the outbreak of war in 1898. William Carl Spielman, *William McKinley: Stalwart Republican* (Exposition Press, N. Y., 1954, 215 pp.) presented the President in a more sympathetic light than Millis had done. He emphasized the fact that McKinley had resisted pressure for a war against Spain from March, 1897 to March, 1898. Even McKinley's concession to Hanna in the latter month to the effect that the possibility of war ought to be envisaged was by no means final or irrevocable. Had it not been for a crescendo of almost fiendish pressure at the time of the Spanish surrender, McKinley might well have emphasized the

real facts of the Cuban situation instead of distorting them in his bellicose message to Congress on April 11, 1898.

The same understanding and sympathetic approach to McKinley is encountered in Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley,* (Harper, N. Y., 1959):

> On Saturday night, April 9, the President was informed of the results of the efforts of the powers and the Pope. The Queen Regent had instructed General Blanco to proclaim a suspension of hostilities in Cuba.
>
> A more aggressive President might have broken with Congress outright, condemned the rabid war makers, and declined to advise intervention. It would have been a lofty and gracious gesture. . .[8]

Margaret Leech attempts to soften the implications of her statement by arguing that McKinley would not have been able to prevent war. However, she presents this as a simple assertion without ever trying to prove it. In 1798, Alexander Hamilton did not believe that President John Adams would be able to prevent war against both France and Spain. Nevertheless, Adams did prevent war. Leech is admittedly right when she asserts that articulate American opinion was more for war than peace by April 9, 1898. However, the Spanish surrender created a new situation which McKinley, as leader of the nation, might have exploited. Leech suggests that, had McKinley failed to push for war, the Republicans might have been split as were the Federalists in 1798. This is no doubt true, but it is a very different thing from arguing that the war was inevitable. Leech observes:

> Tom Platt (New York G.O.P boss) shuddered to think of the combined slogan 'Free Cuba' and 'Free Silver!' in 1900. Thursday, Friday and Saturday passed in taut suspense. A resolution for war would readily pass both houses.

Leech records that McKinley did consider including the following conciliatory passage in his message to Congress:

> Let us hope that under the Providence of God some way may yet be found to bring about peace without the resort to arms.

Probably this single sentence, this one nod in the direction of peace, would have prevented the Spanish-American War in 1898. The fact is that President McKinley decided not to

include it, and Congress received the impression that he was recommending war. Nine days later the appropriate resolutions for hostilities had passed both houses of Congress. It is difficult to see how this result could have been achieved after the Spanish surrender had the President actually given his one brief nod in favor of peace. Apart from her inconclusive treatment of the causes of war in 1898, Margaret Leech's biography of McKinley leaves little to be desired as an achievement in historical scholarship. Also, even on the causes of the war, she introduced new factual material, and she did not omit any of the salient developments. Her study is based not only on a full use of the McKinley papers, but on a number of related private collections not hitherto used in this context.

The research on the story of the coming of the 1898 war is now fairly complete. It is unlikely that our understanding of the picture will change in the future, except perhaps in relation to some incidental details. The combination of events in Cuba and the high tide of imperialist fever sweeping in contagiously from abroad led to what turns out in retrospect to have been a rather vainglorious and foolish adventure from both the military and diplomatic standpoints. Nevertheless, it would not be fair to conclude with Millis that the events of 1898 committed the United States to the kind of foreign policy later pursued during the Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt eras. For instance, there was nothing irrevocable about the annexation of the Philippines. William Howard Taft was sent to the islands shortly after the Filipino insurrection was defeated, with the understanding that an eventual emancipation was contemplated. Cuba was not annexed, and there was nothing to prevent the de-annexation of Puerto Rico if the island so desired.

No one has ever demonstrated a categorical imperative for our 1917 policy arising from the events of 1898. The adventure of that year might even be called a momentary aberration; there is, however, no reason to insist that it was the first step in a permanent new direction. If one considers the total picture of American relations with Spain and the Latin American nations during the fifty years after Guadalupe Hidalgo, it is possible to express some surprise that an excess

or blunder of the sort that took place in 1898 was avoided so long. At a time when rapacious European nations were seizing vast underdeveloped areas, the weakness and chaos to the south was something of a temptation. The United States was fortunate in being able to succumb to that temptation in 1898 without having to pay the sort of price in return that many nations have paid during recorded history for similar mistakes.

Chapter VI: The First World War

There are two phases to be considered in studying the problem of American entry into the First World War. Like Italy, the United States did not take part in hostilities at the outset of the struggle. Therefore, apart from the obvious importance of the immediate steps which produced the American declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917, the problem of American attitudes toward the outbreak of the war in 1914 also assumes vital importance. This has been recognized from the very beginning by American historians. There is more than an accidental connection between the opinions about 1914 and about 1917. The historian who believes that England was fully justified in going to war against Germany in 1914 is usually inclined to take a positive view toward American intervention later, although he may deplore certain aspects of American policy, or the fact that the American intervention in Europe did not take place earlier. The historian who questions the steps taken by England in 1914 is likely to be skeptical about Wilson's decision in 1917. Oddly enough, there is by now very considerable agreement among historians on the events which produced American intervention, but there is nothing like agreement concerning 1914. This is strange when one considers how much more has been written about 1914 than about 1917. Although we have some very impressive volumes, it is safe to say that a definitive work on the origins of the European War in 1914 remains to be written.

The official British approach to the origins of the European war in 1914 was incorporated in Article 239 of the Treaty of Versailles: Germany and her allies were exclusively responsible for the outbreak of the war. This view was generally accepted in America in 1919. However, in a series of articles during 1920 and 1921, Harvard's Professor Sidney B. Fay demonstrated conclusively that responsibilities had to

be shared among the nations involved on both sides. Fay's detailed two-volume work in 1928 also contained an attempt to establish the relative order of guilt among the nations. Fay was admittedly reluctant to attempt this task, particularly in view of the fact that his researches were far from exhaustive, but continued pressure from friends prompted him to do so. He listed the guilty parties in the following order: Serbia, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Great Britain. The odd thing about this order of rank is that Great Britain and Germany, the leaders of the respective European alliance systems, are assigned the least guilt. Harry Elmer Barnes, in his 1926 volume dealing with both 1914 and 1917, adopted a similar order of rank except that, unlike Fay, he considered British responsibility to be greater than German. Like Fay, however, he was prepared to assign the primary responsibility to Serbia, Russia, Austria-Hungary and France. Oddly enough, the epochal German work by Alfred von Wegerer, *Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*. (The Outbreak of the World War, 2 vol., 1939) assigned a greater share of responsibility to Germany in 1914 than had been done by either Barnes or Fay. On the other hand, he was inclined to agree with Barnes that English responsibility for the conflict had also been greater than Fay had supposed. The von Wegerer study is the most original and exhaustive in any language to date and it has raised a number of further questions which many later writers, such as Luigi Albertini, have either ignored or failed to pursue successfully. The basic question is a very simple one. Would the nations who have been assigned primary responsibility have proceeded as far as they did in the 1914 crisis without the prompting of Germany and Great Britain respectively? There would have been a very different and more conciliatory Habsburg policy toward Serbia had the Kaiser of Germany not offered his unqualified support to whatever policy Vienna might choose to adopt. This fact is not cancelled by later German efforts to moderate the adopted policy. It is well-known that Tsar Nicholas II of Russia delayed the general mobilization order of his country for twenty-four hours before approving it most reluctantly. Would there have been any chance of his signing this document had

not Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, urged the Russian leaders that mobilization was necessary? Would the French have joined the British in urging this Russian mobilization had they not counted on British support? In short, would there have been any danger at all of a major war in Europe in July, 1914, had the British and Germans not encouraged their partners to adopt drastic policies? These questions have not been answered definitively, but it ought to be evident in 1964 that the last word on 1914 war origins has not been spoken; indeed, the most basic and fundamental questions have not been answered.

There is much greater clarity about the factors leading to American involvement in 1917. Tansill proved as early as 1938 that the Nye Congressional Committee was wrong in its original assumption that the 'merchants of death (Morgan, Rockefeller, etc.)' ordered President Wilson to enter the European war when he did. There is now general agreement that the ultimate decision on war or peace remained with Wilson. There is general agreement, also, that the pro-English bias of Wilson and many other American leaders made it difficult for the United States to avoid involvement in the war. But it is also agreed that, at least until January, 1917, there was real suspense in the drama of whether or not the United States would enter the war.

The broad range of disagreement today is not so much on how America became involved in the conflict, as it is over the question whether such involvement was good or evil. There have been four major movements of the pendulum to date concerning this question. Originally, the overwhelming American opinion was that it would be exceedingly unwise for the United States to intervene in the European struggle. After January, 1917, the conviction became almost universal that it was America's duty to intervene, and that the results of such intervention would be beneficial to the entire world, even to the Germans. Grave doubts about such assumptions became widespread during the 1920's and the pendulum began to move again. It would be difficult to deny that the great economic depression of 1929 had some effect on American thinking in relation to this question. It was the generally

accepted American viewpoint during the 1930's that American involvement in the First World War had been an unnecessary and ghastly blunder. Thinking began to change again when President Roosevelt succeeded in involving the United States in the Second World War. Although there is nothing like an overwhelming opinion about the righteousness of American intervention in 1917 today as there was earlier, it is nevertheless safe to say, a few experts to the countrary notwithstanding, that most American intellectual thinking about world affairs is now predicated on the assumption that American intervention in 1917 was in fact necessary.

When war came in 1914, the respective governments issued their official apologia, the so-called colored books. There were the British Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the German White Book and the Russian Orange Book. These were based on selected and oftentimes edited passages from official documents, and in every case they were virtually worthless in helping the ordinary citizen to understand the real origins of the conflict. So far as neutral America was concerned, it soon became evident that the English propaganda was far more pervasive and effective than the German. Some observers were surprised at this development because so many Americans of that generation had pursued at least part of their graduate studies in Germany and had maintained direct contact with that country. Nevertheless, the First World War experience in general proved that the English propaganda performance in that particular struggle was vastly superior to German efforts.

Sidney B. Fay, one of the American historians who had studied in Germany, refused to jump to conclusions about responsibility on the basis of the colored books. Although early modern constitutional history was his major field, he became intensely interested in the possibility of emerging at some later date as a leading expert on the 1914 origins. It was for this reason that he was especially careful not to risk his reputation at a time when many of his colleagues proved rather reckless about what they were willing to put into print. Fay did not remain altogether silent. For instance, in the July, 1916 *American Historical Review*, he blasted away at a

recent English publication on the theme of Hohenzollern history: J. A. R. Marriott and C. Grant Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia: The Making of an Empire* (Oxford University Press, 1915, 459 pp.). This work was one long smear of the Prussian princes, accusing them of a consistent record of treachery, cynicism and ruthless duplicity. Fay complained:

> The authors do not sufficiently emphasize two features which have been fairly characteristic of most of the Hohenzollerns of the last three centuries—their confidence in God and their work for the social welfare of their subjects. The Great Elector's remark "I am convinced that I owe the preservation of my position and my territories to God, and, next to God, to the standing Army," was sincerely meant, and might have come just as well from the lips of any of his successors, except Frederick the Great.

Fay had the satisfaction of going on record for historic objectivity at a time when many of his colleagues were being influenced by wartime propaganda.

One of the most influential anti-German works published in the United States after the outbreak of the First World War was by the Icelandic-American sociologist and economist, Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1915). This book was reviewed enthusiastically by Guy Stanton Ford, University of Minnesota historian and later editor of the *American Historical Review*.[1] Ford, like Veblen, was known as an expert on Germany; both men were eager to emphasize that the industrial Germany of the twentieth century was a perverse socio-economic phenomenon. In the meantime, William Howard Taft, Wilson's predecessor as president, had written an introduction to the American public for the first lengthy local analysis of the factors producing war in 1914: George H. Allen, *The Great War*, Vol. I, *Causes of and Motives for* (George Barrie's Sons, Philadelphia, 1915, 377 pp.). In explaining the thesis of the book, Edward Raymond Turner of the American Historical Association noted that the "the author defends the course followed by England."[2]

Allen lacked the sophistication of Fay and he had little source material at his disposal; therefore, it seemed to him that a defense of English policy could only be successful if it

was accompanied by a blanket defense of the foreign policies of France, Russia and Serbia. Edward Raymond Turner, *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914* (Yale University Press, 1916, 311 pp.), supported the Allen thesis. Charles Seymour, later president of Yale University, reviewed Turner's book for the *American Historical Review* (July, 1916). Although Seymour declared that Turner was naive in some of his statements, such as the notion that Bismarck had prompted the German people to venerate only brute force, he accepted the basic thesis of Turner on war guilt:

> When Russia made it plain that she would resist, Austria receded, whereupon Germany at once intervened decisively and forced the issue.

Future research was to show that this assumption was a precise inversion of the real facts. Germany had earlier encouraged Austria because she did not expect Russia to intervene in favor of Serbia. After all, Russia in 1914 was a monarchical country and the successful attack of the Serbian conspirators against the heir to the Austrian throne was an attack against monarchy everywhere. Later, when Germany discovered that Russia was considering support to Serbia, the German government attempted to moderate Austrian policies, without success. It was really astonishing in 1916 to encounter seasoned historians like Seymour and Turner who were prepared to assume that they could know the truth about clandestine diplomatic operations without possessing any significant amount of original source material from which to form their judgments. There was something of a pattern in the fact that Allen, Turner and Seymour proceeded to follow their assumption about war origins by arguing for American intervention in the war. In the meantime, events were moving inexorably to involve the United States in the European conflict. The first and last comprehensive historical narrative of how this happened appeared in 1938: Charles Callan Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Little, Brown, Boston, 2nd ed., 1963). None of the other historians of the tragic procedure have taken the time and trouble to examine the bulk of the source materials relative to the process. It has been remarked quite truthfully that one might follow the major developments

in American foreign policy from Washington and Jefferson to Roosevelt and Kennedy, in the specialized articles and monographs of this one historian. He was the most prolific contributor to the grand ten volume survey of American foreign policy edited by Bemis (*American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*); and, in addition to major works on American involvement in each of the wars, Tansill also wrote an account of the origins of the European war in 1914, at the request of Congress. He modestly refrained from having the latter published because of his satisfaction with the treatment of 1914 events in Europe by Fay and Barnes. Tansill devoted ten full years to research on the 1917 story. He made adequate allowance for the long term trends in the background, as well as the immediate causes. For instance, Tansill noted:

> One of the most important factors that led to war between the United States and the German Empire in 1917 was a long background of sharp suspicion and increasing distrust on the part of many Americans with reference to the policy of the German government.[3]

It is obvious from reading Tansill's account that this suspicion and distrust was unfounded; nevertheless, it was a fact that Americans would never have been susceptible to English propaganda after 1914 had they not been conditioned to receive it during the years before the war when England was already allied with France and Russia against Germany. After dealing with this vital matter, Tansill proceeds to another important theme: American support of the Anglo-French war effort before the United States entered the war. It is a truism that great powers such as Russia and Germany were defeated by economic blockades in the First World War. Russia was blockaded by Germany and Germany was blockaded by England. It was paradoxical for the Russians to suffer from a blockade while they were allied to England, the world's leading naval power. The loss of Anglo-Russian influence in Turkey, due to diplomatic blunders, was the main reason for this. Half of the Russian exports had gone out through the Bosphorus before the War. The loss of Turkey enabled Germany to cut Russia off from normal trade with the rest of the world. Had Russia's efforts to guarantee her position

at the straits before the war, much in the style of England's position at Suez and America's at Panama, been supported rather than blocked by England, Russia's ally, it is extremely doubtful that there would be Bolshevism in Russia today. But alliances between nations do not always signify genuine friendship, and England was actually more hostile than friendly toward Russia during the period when the two nations were allies.

Had the United States not shipped hundreds of millions of dollars worth of material to England and France during the years before our entry into the war, it is extremely likely that the English leaders would have been compelled to support President Wilson's request for a compromise peace. The early German advance deprived France of most of her heavy industry in the Lille district, and put these vital resources, along with Belgian heavy industry, at the disposal of Germany. England had fallen behind Germany in the industrial competition which preceded the First World War. England alone would never have been able to supply both the French and English armies in such a way as to prevent the capture of Paris. Only the United States was in a position to do this. Tansill reminds us that "thanks to huge importations from America, the British army was able to stage the long heralded drive (Somme offensive) of 1916."[4] As Tansill puts it:

> America, under the guise of neutrality was serving the Allied Powers in a manner most suitable to their military plans against Germany.[5]

A third theme by Tansill concerns problems of neutrality in relation to international law. The latest attempt to codify maritime international law prior to 1914 was embodied in the Declaration of London of 1909, which had not been ratified when hostilities commenced. Nevertheless, since the declaration of London contained most of the earlier established traditions, the United States hoped that both belligerents would recognize it in their dealings with neutral powers. The British Orders-In-Council of August 20, 1914, revealed that on important points such as contraband and the doctrine of continuous voyage, the British government intended to pursue an independent course. This meant a heavy blow against American commerce in Europe, and Tansill recalls that:

> With characteristic British thoroughness and open disregard for neutral rights, these seizures began immediately after the outbreak of the World War.[6]

The American government had good reason to believe that the importance of their trade was such as to enable them to persuade the English to change course. Secretary of State Bryan prepared the American protest note of September 26, 1914, but President Wilson's principal advisor, Col. Edward Mandell House, raised objections. Tansill analyzes these as follows:

> It is interesting to note the attitude of Colonel House toward the instruction of September 26. Despite his meager knowledge of international law, and his slight acquaintance with American precedents, he did not hesitate to pronounce as 'exceedingly undiplomatic' a note which merely defended with vigor American rights, and which was written in so direct a style that it could not be misunderstood. This same style when later employed in notes to Germany evoked no criticisms from the Colonel, nor did he intervene in order to 'soften' their phraseology.

The objections of House were by no means the end of this softening process. A new protest note to London passed through Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador; Tansill is somewhat less than enthusiastic about him:

> . . .he went so far as to co-operate with the officials in the British Foreign Office in their constant efforts to circumvent American opposition. He justified this reprehensive conduct by the fiction that the Allies were the saviors of civilization, and that President Wilson and his advisers were too provincial to understand the simplest facts in world politics.[7]

British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was informed on October 22, 1914 that:

> The United States feels obliged to withdraw its suggestion that the declaration of London be adopted as a temporary code of naval warfare to be observed by belligerents and neutrals during the present war.

This American concession was quickly followed by a new infringement of international law in the British declaration of November 2, 1914, "that the North Sea was thereafter to be considered as a 'military area' or war zone." This meant in

effect that England reserved the right to determine the extent of any and all foreign trade through the North Sea although she was not in a position to sustain a close blockade of the German coastline, the only measure of this kind which would have been valid under prevailing international law. The latest English step produced a German reprisal which also violated international law; hence, a vicious circle was established. Smooth and fast talkers at the German Admiralty persuaded a reluctant German Kaiser that he could now trample on international maritime law with impunity, despite the energetic objections of Admiral von Tirpitz, the principal builder of the modern German battle fleet. The Germans proclaimed on February 4, 1915 that they were about to establish a submarine war zone around the British Isles; this zone actually was established by order of the Kaiser on February 22, 1915. There were as yet no regulations for submarine warfare under international law, although a submarine craft had first been used by Americans as early as the American Revolutionary War. During the First World War, British submarines attacked both German and neutral commerce in the Baltic Sea. The United States, however, voluntarily abstained from sending merchant ships to that area. It was obvious that American clashes over the submarine issue would be with Germany. The Germans were naive to imagine that British infractions would persuade the Americans to ignore German infractions. Tansill admits that:

> It was apparent that the British blockade of all foodstuffs to Germany would entail terrible suffering upon the civilian population of that country, and would probably cause a much larger number of deaths than the strictest enforcement of German submarine warfare. It was true that from the ethical point of view the action taken by Germany could not be condemned as severely as that taken by Great Britain.[8]

Having conceded this much, Tansill proceeds to point out that German infractions were certain to strike the United States directly, which was not the case with the British blockade of Germany. Therefore, Tansill concludes that initial German reasoning about repercussions from use of the submarine was faulty.

Secretary of State Bryan sent identical notes of protest about infractions to Great Britain and Germany on February 20, 1915. The Germans replied that they would gladly desist from using the submarines at all if the British would agree to lift the hunger blockade of Germany. As ought to have been expected, the British refused to surrender their most effective weapon.

An event then took place which Tansill in retrospect considers to have been decisive. The American authorities on March 3, 1915 agreed to give armed British merchant ships in American ports the status of unarmed craft. Tansill declares that "it is right here that we come to the supreme crisis in the story of American neutrality."[9]

This would not have been the case had America followed the British practice of the Russo-Japanese war period, 1904-1905. The British government proclaimed at that time that British nationals travelling on vessels under the Russian or Japanese flags, regardless of the nature of such vessels, could not expect any protection whatever from the British government. Had the United States taken cognizance of this English precedent from ten years earlier, President Wilson would have divorced the American government at the outset from any responsibility for American nationals travelling on English craft throughout the entire period of the war.

Only three American lives were lost because of damage done to American ships by the belligerents from 1914 until America broke diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917. All of the other American lives were lost because of action taken against belligerent ships. The failure to follow the obvious rule produced the tragedy. Leon C. Thrasher, on March 28, 1915, was the first American to die because of German action against an English ship. His death caused a great outcry in the United States.

Tansill points out that the German submarine campaign of 1915 was being conducted against such allied merchant ships as carried their own armament. Even had the American government attempted to protect American citizens on belligerent ships, the loss of American life would probably have been small if the United States had refused to cooperate

with the unauthorized arming of merchant vessels (as opposed to warships). Tansill puts it this way:

> If he (Wilson) had closed American harbors to belligerent merchant ships carying *defensive* armament, the British Government would have immediately removed all guns from their merchantmen (after all, American trade was indispensable), and Germany would no longer have sunk enemy passenger ships at sight.[10]

Far and away the worst incident involving American loss of life during the period of American neutrality was the torpedoing of the British Cunard liner and auxiliary cruiser, *Lusitania,* on May 7, 1915. Warnings to American citizens to travel on the British craft had gone unheeded. The huge cargo of explosives carried by the ship increased the magnitude of the disaster. One hundred twenty-eight of the one hundred ninety-seven Americans were killed. Emrys Hughes, *Winston Churchill: British Bulldog* (Exposition Press, N. Y., 1995), contains the following observation:

> Most baffling are the following facts. When the Lusitania sailed from New York the regular captain had been suddenly replaced by Captain William Thomas Turner (decorated by Churchill after the disaster). When the ship reached the danger zone it disregarded strict sailing orders. The formal sailing orders Turner had in New York instructed him to avoid the highly dangerous area where the vessel was actually sunk, to increase his speed in the danger zone, and to steam in a zigzag course so as to increase the difficulty of being hit by a torpedo. All of these orders were violated.[11]

Tansill recalls that "if Mr. Bryan had won the support of the president to his view that American citizens should be kept off belligerent merchant ships, there would have been no *Lusitania* incident." Tansill adds that "it is now definitely known that the *Lusitania* had in her cargo 4200 cases of metallic cartridges, and 1250 cases of shrapnel."[12]

Secretary of State Bryan resigned on June 8, 1915 because of the inconsistency of Wilson's foreign policy. There was to be "strict accountability" for Germany while British violations of international maritime law were tolerated, condoned, or approved. The torpedoing of the French steamer *Sussex* in 1916 involved a further loss of American life. The danger of war between the United States and Germany was obviously increasing, and Kaiser William II, on April 18, 1916, agreed

to the so-called Sussex Pledge in a last desperate effort to avoid a conflict. On the surface, Tansill is correct in describing the pledge as "a distinct surrender to the American demands"; however, it was more than a surrender, it was a bargain. President Wilson empowered American Ambassador Gerard to tell the Kaiser that in exchange for the German abandonment of submarine warfare the American President would work for a compromise peace if re-elected in November, 1916. In effect, the Germans were to desist from retaliating against the British blockade until that time in the expectation that Wilson would help them to achieve the compromise peace which they had proposed earlier the same year. In the upshot, Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing, destroyed the sincere effort of Wilson to propose a compromise peace by telling the British that, even if they ignored American suggestions, the United States would respond by entering the war as the ally of England. In short, any hope of exerting American pressure on England for a compromise peace was enervated by Lansing's tragic disclosure. The British were committed to a peace of victory. However, their economic situation was such that they would have quickly agreed to a compromise peace had any genuine American pressure ever been exerted on them. Needless to say, had a compromise peace been achieved in 1916, the Russian tsardom would scarcely have been overthrown the following year, and there would have been no basis for a Bolshevik revolution in Russia. But Wilson did not keep his part of the Sussex bargain of 1916, and the formal German compromise peace offer of December 12, 1916 was left hanging in the air like a sore thumb without any neutral support. Only in 1916 was there any real chance to organize the peace without victory which Wilson was later to proclaim as a slogan.

It would be wrong to assume from the above that Tansill proceeds to absolve Germany from any blame for the outbreak of war in 1917. On the contrary, Tansill emphasizes the important German conference on submarine warfare of January 8, 1917. The English blockade, and the accompanying famine, had created such hysteria in Germany that even the Social Democrats, traditional opponents of the government, were advocating a renewal of submarine warfare as a reprisal

weapon which would compel the English to desist from starving the children and the old people of Germany. It was short-sighted in the extreme for the German leaders to allow this popular hysteria to influence their policy. Tansill shows that German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg expressed his conviction at the conference that the renewal of submarine warfare would bring the United States into the war against Germany. The Chancellor himself was obviously opposed to the submarine policy, but Hindenburg, the leading German General, claimed the submarine could compel the British to accept peace before the United States intervened decisively in Europe against the exhausted German troops. In view of the mighty British and American navies, Hindenburg's assumption was reckless and even foolhardy. Nevertheless, the Kaiser bowed to the popular clamor and the pressure from his military leaders on January 11, 1917. Germany announced her intention to torpedo any armed allied freighters encountered in the future. Since there were bound to be American nationals on at least some of these ships, war between the United States and Germany was virtually assured. Wilson had gone on record as being unwilling to tolerate the loss of any more American lives. The events from January 11, 1917 down to April 6, 1917, when the United States declared war against Germany, have something of the fatalistic character of a Greek tragedy. Although fifty-six American Representatives and Senators voted against a declaration of war, there never seemed to be a concrete chance of avoiding war after Wilson's second inauguration. This is ironical when one recalls that Wilson won the election against Hughes on the slogan: "He kept us out of war!"[13] It would be incorrect to assume that Tansill's monumental description of the American and German mistakes which led us into war (it is difficult to criticize the British for seeking to gain another ally) has exhausted this interesting field of research, although there is general agreement about the main facts of American entry. The possibilities for further research are demonstrated by such a recent book as Forrest McDonald, *Insull* (University of Chicago Press, 1962.), which is considered later in this survey.

The actual entry of the United States into war against Germany on April 6, 1917, produced a tremendous impact on

American historical scholarship. This is illustrated by J. Franklin Jameson, "Historical Scholars in War-Time," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1917. Jameson was the initial 1895 editor of the *American Historical Review*, and he was in his second term as editor when America entered the war. The American Historical Association was regarded as a useful instrument in mobilizing American historians in support of the war effort. Jameson placed the following questions to his colleagues in 1917:

> Apart from such services as can be rendered equally well by any other able-bodied or intelligent man, what can the "history man" do for his country in time of war, of things for which he is especially fitted by his professional acquirements and habits of mind?
>
> What is more essential to the successful prosecution of a great national war than an enlightened, unified and powerfully acting public opinion? Why is France so heroically strong a combatant and Russia with four times the population so weak?
>
> It is notorious how large a part, in giving to German public opinion its marvelous unity and cohesion, has been played by the chauvinistic history lessons of the German school-master. Heaven forbid that we should imitate the chauvinism; the American enters the war distinctly as a citizen of the world. Rather, he enters the war with that intention; but to make him truly such a citizen requires an enormous expansion of his political education, a quick shift of his point of view, rapid reinforcements to his knowledge of European conditions.

Jameson pointed out that a National Board for Historical Service had been organized under the auspices of the Carnegie Institute at Washington D. C., in April, 1917. The chairman was a Canadian citizen teaching at Columbia University, James T. Shotwell. Jameson announced that the American Historical Association had pledged its full support to the Shotwell program. The purpose of that program was to mobilize all such American historians who had not been called to the colors for the intellectual sector of the American war effort.

It is interesting to refer to the recent comments of James T. Shotwell concerning his wartime service for the United States in 1917 and 1918. The Canadian savant was born in Ontario in 1874. He has received a one year graduate scholarship to Columbia University in 1898. The following year he

journeyed to Europe where he met Lord Bryce, the famous English historian and political scientist who directed much of the English propaganda effort in the United States prior to 1917. At Columbia, Shotwell had come under the influence of James Harvey Robinson and Charles Austin Beard. Robinson was leading the fight of so-called science against conventional Christianity, and he was famous for his classroom attacks on the Protestant Reformation. Beard had become a socialist while studying at Ruskin College, Oxford, "the creation of the intellectual socialists."[14]

One of Shotwell's principal mentors was concentrating his attack against Christianity, while the other was mainly interested in attacking Capitalism. Shotwell makes the following remarkable comment about one of Beard's major books (*An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,* 1913), which was "intended to imply a Marxian interpretation of The Constitution"[15]:

> His theory that the speculators were those who had a sinister interest in putting The Constitution through is not carried to an extreme in the text. It was carried to an extreme by his followers afterward and has been criticized by recent historians.[16]

Shotwell's contention that Beard's theory was not carried to an extreme in the text is rather remarkable when one considers that The Constitution emerges as a sinister product indeed, from the description of its genesis in Beard. Beard persuaded Shotwell to join him in lecturing at the Rand School, a Socialist institution.[17]

When the European war broke out in August, 1914, the new situation prompted Shotwell's colleagues at Columbia to turn to him for the British viewpoint. They knew that he was retaining his Canadian citizenship and maintaining extensive contacts in England. Shotwell, in 1961, recalled his viewpoint in those days:

> As long as it was a purely European war the policy of non-involvement held, but for those who like me were convinced—and historical research now bears me out (sic.)— that Germany and Austria were guilty of having forced the issue on the battlefield, neutrality in thought was utterly immoral.

> By the autumn of 1916 it was clear that unless we joined the embattled forces of freedom, we should find ourselves alone, without allies, faced with a ruthless military power, dominant not only in Europe but on the high seas throughout the world.[18]

The fact that Shotwell could repeat these old propaganda chestnuts without choking on his own tongue offers eloquent testimony about the man who still insists that Alger Hiss was an admirable choice to head the Carnegie Institution. No one ought to question the right of Shotwell to entertain the views cited above. It is rather strange, however, that this son of the British Empire was selected to direct the wartime program of American historians. Evidently it was felt that none of the American historians was equal to this task.

Shotwell reports that in Washington, D. C., he was soon working with the Socialist George Creel, one of the most unscrupulous propagandists of all times. Creel at an early date had added support of Wilson to his program on behalf of socialism, and the President selected him to direct America's wartime propaganda effort. Shotwell described Creel in 1961 as a "forthright journalist." Shotwell and Creel were soon laboring together to coordinate the thinking of the American intellectual and the American common man. Although they failed to exert a lasting influence, they won a transient victory in the war of ideas and served as pioneers for the later efforts of the Franklin Roosevelt group. Creel, in his memoirs, boasts that he was "an original Woodrow Wilson man," having 'boosted' him as early as 1905 in the Kansas City *Independent*.[19] Creel disagrees with all the other experts by insisting that Woodrow Wilson knew perfectly well before the 1916 presidential campaign that he would soon be leading the United States into war.

Perhaps Creel did not realize it, but his contention is tantamount to the worst possible defamation of the President. If Creel be right, Wilson was then as cynical and insincere in 1916 as Roosevelt proved himself to be in 1940. Fortunately, the evidence is overwhelming that Creel is wrong on this point. Creel took the offer as chairman of the C.P.I. (Committee on Public Information) on April 14, 1917. He was soon in conflict with men like Robert Lansing, Mark

Sullivan and others whose consciences were appalled by the ruthless dishonesty of Creel's methods. Of course, Creel claimed he was merely trying to de-bamboozle the American public from the effects of German propaganda by telling bigger and better lies. But Creel's war was directed more against traditional America than against the Germans. For instance, he had nothing but contempt for those "who still thought in terms of Washington's Farewell Address."[20]

The best account of the astonishing mess created by Creel's propaganda is H. C. Peterson and G. C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1919* (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1957). These authors emphasized that American public opinion opposed involvement in the European war until the last moment. They recall that in March, 1917, "petitions against war flooded Congress."[21]

When New York City's mayor, John P. Mitchell, remarked at a Carnegie Hall meeting on March 23, 1917, that the United States was on the verge of war against Germany, he was drowned out by shouts of opposition and left the meeting. David Starr Jordan, the distinguished president of Stanford University, was engaged in an eastern speaking tour against the war when Wilson sent his message to Congress. William Jennings Bryan, the former secretary of state, was speaking day and night against war to the accompaniment of huge acclaim. Wilson asserted in his April 2, 1917 message to Congress that: "The world must be made safe for democracy." Senator Norris replied on April 4, 1917 that it was "war upon the command of gold," and Senator LaFollette insisted that "Germany has been patient with us." Senator Warren Harding, who was destined to succeed Wilson as President, denounced the "war for democracy" slogan and Wilson's implicit threat to overthrow the German government by revolutionary action, thus opening the gates of central Europe to Bolshevism.[22]

Creel's propaganda offensive started in April, 1917. The distinguished Wall Street attorney, Elihu Root, was soon insisting that opponents of the war ought to be shot, and an American Protective League was organized "to suppress the slackers." The campaign did not get into full swing until 1918,

which the authors refer to as "the American reign of terror." There were waves of arrests, burnings of German books and many killings. It was common practice to use force in compelling foreigners to kiss the American flag. There were burnings in effigy, beatings, and the liberal application of tar and feathers. By 1918, Creel had 150,000 so-called 4-minute men who were popping up everywhere to deliver their packaged hymns of hate. The normal and sensible American people, like any other people under similar circumstances, reacted much as Creel predicted they would when he launched his pioneer propaganda experiment.

The best treatment of the Creel operation (Peterson & Fite is best on the effects), is James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton University Press, 1939). They refer to "America's first 'propaganda ministry' and its dynamic leader, George Creel."[23] The authors proceed to offer the best biography of Creel in print, giving special emphasis to his socialism, and they then outline the propaganda operations of his organization in minute detail. They discuss such movies as "The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin," "The Prussian Cur" and "To Hell With the Kaiser." They admit that Creel's group made free use of Bolshevik propaganda as, for instance, with "Russian appeals to the German workers to throw off the yoke of oppression."[24] This is ironical when one considers that no industrial workers in the world were more privileged than Germany's, and that the Cheka terror was at its height under the lawless and unconstitutional Russian regime at that time. Equally distorted were the assertions of Creel and his group that they had positive proof of Germany's intention to make a colony of the entire United States and to deport the entire non-Germanic population to a tiny reservation in the south of New Mexico. This fantastic nonsense was purveyed as truth by Creel and his ruthless gang. Somewhat discouraging after their able analysis is the contention of the authors that the United States needs another Creel organization to "weld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope".[25] Mock and Larson remind their readers that:

> This book goes to press at a moment when no one can say that America will surely avoid facing once more the issues and problems of 1917-1919. The lessons of the Creel Committee are calling aloud for recognition in this tense year of 1939.[26]

Typical of the works of academic corruption during the 1917-1919 period is Thomas F. A. Smith, *The Soul of Germany: A Twelve Years' Study of the People from Within* (Doran, N. Y., 1917). The author was an instructor in literature at the delightful and picturesque Franconian University of Erlangen from 1902 to 1914. Since there was a ready market for grotesque distortions about Germany, he took full advantage of his opportunity and earned a tidy sum from his book of hate at the expense of the Germans whom he had previously admired.

A similar book is Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East* (Doran, N. Y., 1917). Lewin had looked into his crystal ball to discover that the tiny Pan-German League had actually been governing Germany for many years. He then proceeded to ignore the fact that this small pressure group in the years prior to 1914 had opposed German territorial expansion in Europe. He pictures them as vandals seeking to carve out a huge empire rich with booty in the east.

The original author of the myth about the Pan-German League was Roland G. Usher, whose book on that subject fortuitously appeared just before the outbreak of war in 1914. This gave Usher something of the reputation of a prophet; he had become virulently anti-German and had gone on record about it before his colleagues realized that it was expedient to do so. An article in the April, 1918 *American Historical Review,* "Austro-German Relations since 1866," is typical of Usher's work during the war. Usher offers the dogmatic assertion that "the promptitude of support (Germany to Austria). . .made clear the intention of both countries to precipitate the European war." It would be difficult to imagine a statement on the origins of the First World War more completely at variance with the truth.

One of the most ambitious wartime attempts to explain the origins of the war in 1914 from a propaganda standpoint was William Stearns Davis, William Anderson, and Mason W.

Tyler, *The Roots of the War: A Non-Technical History of Europe, 1870-1914* (Century, New York, 1918, 557 pp.). This work was hailed by Charles Seymour as a "notable success." In chapters such as "Sowing the Wind—The Serbian Note" and "Reaping the Whirlwind—The Scrap of Paper," the authors proved to their intense mutual satisfaction that Germany and Austria were entirely to blame for the war and that England, France, Russia and Serbia were entirely innocent.

In the meantime, Sidney B. Fay, who was destined to expose every one of these concocted works as either lies or ignorance, was still reserving his judgment. After all, this was the only thing that intelligent men who kept their heads could do in view of the fact that the relevant evidence toward establishing responsibility for the 1914 war was simply not available to American scholars in 1918. Those who wrote as if it were, were acting the parts of fools.

The Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 and the subsequent refusal of the Western allies to accept the Bolshevik demand for a peace of no indemnities and no annexations was followed by the opening of the tsarist archives. Most of the documents which began to appear from Russia in 1918 were far from compatible with any of the absurd theses about European war origins propounded hitherto. Fay cautiously began to write about subjects relevant to pre-1914 European diplomacy on the basis of such materials as were becoming available. A typical example was his article "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Tsar 1904-1905" in the *American Historical Review,* October, 1918.

Bjőrkő was the rendezvous on the east shore of Viborg Bay in the Gulf of Finland where Kaiser William II, on the royal yacht *Hohenzollern*, met the Tsar on the Romanov royal yacht *Polar Star* on July 24, 1905. The Tsar signed a treaty presented by the Kaiser "which, if it had become effective, would have had momentuous consequences." Fay was not exaggerating when he added that "the great war has brought strange changes, and nowhere stranger than those which have taken place in Russia." The Bolshevik Revolution resulted in the destruction of Christian Russia. This would scarcely

have happened had not the two traditional allies, Germany and Russia, become involved in a conflict. The original impetus for this disastrous trend was provided by Bismarck, who, despite his brilliant record in connection with the unification of Germany, placed Austria Hungary ahead of Russia as the most-favored nation in his conduct of German foreign policy. The purpose of William II in his 1905 treaty was to restore the traditional German-Russian friendship. The Tsar was willing, but the situation was gravely complicated by the Anglo-French entente of 1904. The formal ties of alliance and the formal objections of ministers brought to naught the attempts of the sovereigns to avoid the doom implicit in a German-Russian conflict, which ultimately allowed other nations to garner the spoils of victory and which led Russia and Germany to defeat, revolution and ruin. Although Fay's article is not a unique contribution, it gave some indication of what he could do in support of the cause of historical truth.

Three articles by Fay in the *American Historical Review* during 1920 and 1921 had a Copernican impact on the interpretation of the origins of the First World War in the United States. Let us consider for a moment the testimony of the distinguished American social scientist, Harry Elmer Barnes:

> During the First World War I believed implicitly all the Allied propaganda against Germany and fully accepted the alleged sole war guilt of Germany. I even helped to write some of the most bitter indictments of alleged German aggression and bellicosity in its putative program of war and conquest. I was not awakened to a consciousness of the error of my ways until the publication of the striking articles on the truth about 1914 by Professor Sydney B. Fay which were printed in the leading American Historical Journal, the *American Historical Review* in 1920-1921. These were soon followed by important books in both Europe and America supporting his views.

The articles by Fay are entitled "New Light on the Origins of the World War, I, II and III" (*American Historical Review*, July, 1920, Oct., 1920 and January, 1921). The articles are primarily analytical, with a heavy accent on problems of historiography. The delightful narrative style which characterizes the later two-volume treatment by Fay is not evident in this first formidable work on preconception and

prejudice about 1914. Fay had no doubt about the momentuous implications of the question with which he was dealing and he predicted "the future war of words." Fay struck out at the myth that German military preparations prior to 1914 were more extensive than those of her neighbors. Precisely the opposite was the case. France alone had a larger standing army in 1914 than did Germany, although the French population was less than two-thirds the size of Germany's. The Germans did increase their military budget shortly before the war, but Fay demonstrates that "Germany's own great military increase of 1913 was thus more than offset by that of her neighbors." Henry Morgenthau, Sr., Wilson's wartime Ambassador to Turkey, had spread a legend about a mythical crown council at Potsdam on July 5, 1914 which coldly deliberated about the best moment to start a war. After tearing Morgenthau's story to shreds by means of precise historical criticism, Fay concluded that "we must therefore reject the whole story of a crown council on July 5."[28]

Fay made it clear once and for all that the Kaiser's pledge to Austria on July 5, 1914, was offered in the absence of German Foreign Minister Jagow, but with the consent of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. The military men and the bankers were not consulted, and it was in no sense a pledge for war. The Kaiser's support was based on the assumption that Britain and Russia would be horrified by the Serbian regicides and would stand aside. After all, when the Serbians massacred their own Obrenivič royal family in 1903, the horrified English government terminated diplomatic relations with Serbia for three years. Who could have imagined that the same England eleven years later would be eager to fight for Serbia when Serbian regicides slaughtered the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife?

Fay's second article dealt with the events in the latter part of July, 1914. Fay pointed out that the Kaiser did not issue his proclamation on the imminence of war until noon, July 31, 1914, after news of the Russian general mobilization against both Germany and Austria-Hungary had reached Berlin. It was an axiom in pre-1914 Europe that general mobilization meant war. This decisive step was first taken

by Russia from among the great powers involved in the ensuing conflict. Fay demonstrated that the recent Russian, German and Austrian documents (all of them were made public by Marxist opponents of the previous regimes) "cleared the German government of the charge that it deliberately plotted or wanted the war." Fay added that the existence of a few eccentric military or Pan-German writers, who had no influence over official German policy, had nothing to do with the question. Fay concluded his presentation of the case as follows:

> Germany did not will the war. In a narrow sense, even, looking merely at the events of these three days (July 29-31, 1914) one can easily see how the Germans had become convinced that the war was forced upon them.

Fay went on to add that he was not denying the contribution of the German military tradition, along with the military traditions of other countries, toward creating the atmosphere of dangerous tension.

Fay's third article dealt primarily with Russia and England. Very important here was Fay's admission that Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov was "undoubtedly strengthened" in his measures by the promptings of British Ambassador Buchanan, the moving force behind the scenes. Fay was unwilling to draw the logical conclusion from this admission and to proceed to assess the English share of guilt, but at least he brought the relevant facts into the record for other scholars to interpret.

Over in England, Lord Loreburn, *How the War Came* (London, 1919), had already revealed how British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had made secret commitments to the French and Russian military and political leaders without informing his colleagues in the English cabinet, or letting the English Parliament have the least idea of what was going on. Of course, in England, unlike the United States, the government could go to war without consulting the legislature. However, not to consult the executive cabinet was considered a serious constitutional breach by most British experts. Loreburn pointed out that talk about going to war for Belgium was fraudulent. At a time when England was unfriendly to

France, in 1887, British Ambassador Lord Vivian told the Belgian government that England would not lift a finger if the Germans occupied Belgium temporarily as a means of defeating France. Yet the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality had been signed by England in 1839. By what mystical law was English honor involved in 1914 when it was not involved in 1887? Loreburn showed that the commitments made by Grey were such that England had no choice other than to attack Germany with or without the Belgian issue. Fay refused to accept the full scope of Lord Loreburn's revelation, but at least he agreed that Grey's hands were not free even before the Belgian question was raised. Scores of American historians rubbed their eyes after reading Fay and took a new look at the emotional binge of 1914-1919.

Although Fay had the facts preponderantly on his side, it would have been astonishing indeed if his revisionism had passed unchallenged by anyone. A first cautious counter-attack was launched by Bernadotte Schmitt of the University of Chicago in "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914," in *American Historical Review,* April, 1924. It was Schmitt's thesis at this time that not the individual powers but the two rival alliance systems carried the blame for the war because "neither could yield on the Serbian issue without seeing the balance pass definitely to the other side." Apart from the lack of proof, there was something unhealthy about this fatalistic mode of reasoning. Schmitt was saying, in effect, that ten million men were killed in the First World War and another thirty-five million wounded because this was their unalterable destiny—an unavoidable fate. The balance of power was not more dependent upon Serbia in 1914 than it had been upon Macedonia at the time of the second Balkan War in 1913. The influence of Russia was preponderant in Serbia and the influence of Austria-Hungary was preponderant in Bulgaria. Admittedly, it would have been far more logical had it been the other way around, since Bulgaria was closer to Russia and Serbia was closer to Austria-Hungary. It would have been even more reasonable had England not blocked her Russian ally's efforts to establish an outlet at the Turkish Straits during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. But,

making allowance for all this, there is still not any tangible proof that the balance of power was dependent upon events in Serbia. On the contrary, Fay made it thoroughly clear that the Kaiser had immediately advised Austria-Hungary to retreat in Serbia as soon as they began to suspect that Russia, France and England were planning to attack Austria-Hungary and Germany because of the Serbian policy. Had it not been for the binding German offer of July 5, 1914, to support Austria, the Habsburg ministers would have backed down. If the Kaiser did not think the balance between the alliances was dependent on Serbia, by what process of reasoning can Schmitt arrive at the conclusion that the Germans were operating on the opposite premise? Schmitt is willing to concede that "it is now fairly certain that no responsible statesman in any country, as distinct from military cliques, actually desired war." But his further thesis that Sir Edward Grey was seeking to restore the traditional concert of powers in Europe must be relegated to the realm of poetic fantasy. The Concert of Europe meant a preponderant alliance of the major powers of Europe. The British government soon released eleven fat volumes of documents covering their policy from 1898-1914. No one has ever succeeded in finding a sentence in those documents which suggests that Grey was trying to restore the Concert of Europe. This does not mean that he was working single-mindedly toward war in the style of his cousin, Lord Halifax, in 1939, but it does mean that the entente combination with France and Russia, which he inherited from Lord Balfour upon coming into office, was an advantage which he had no intention of surrendering. The existing alliance would have to be abolished if the Concert of Europe were to be restored. Although Germany, and not England, had started this latest alliance system, Grey could not bear the prospect of surrendering the advantage which England had acquired over Germany by means of her ententes with France and Russia.

The culmination of Schmitt's attempt to block the tide of revisionism about 1914 was his monumental work, *The Coming of the War* (2 vols., Scribner's, N. Y., 1930). This was the final and most voluminous effort by any American

historian to pin primary responsibility for the war on Germany. His book was devastatingly refuted the following year by M. H. Cochran, *Germany Not Guilty in 1914* (Stratford Press, N.Y., 1931). In the meantime, Fay's hypotheses and conclusions were supported by a galaxy of distinguished American historians. For instance, William L. Langer, "The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-1881" (*American Historical Review*, Oct., 1925 & Jan., 1926), demonstrated Bismarck's efforts to win the friendship of France by supporting a number of highly controversial French policies. Princeton's Raymond J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906" (*American Historical Review*, January, 1928) demonstrated that in 1904 British foreign policy had placed Germany in a desperate situation. Sontag made the following comment about the plight of the German leaders:

> They saw the evil machinations of Edward VII gradually, almost inexorably, arraying the whole continent against Germany.

Sontag emphasized that the Kaiser's friendly attitude toward the Tsar was sincere because he believed that "Russia was the defender of Western Civilization and Christianity."

William E. Lingelbach, "Belgian Neutrality: Its Origin and Interpretation," in *American Historical Review*, of October, 1933, demonstrated that English policy toward Belgium from 1839 to 1914 was based primarily upon expediency rather than principle. For instance, Lingelbach recalled that "until 1870 English defense of Belgian neutrality was directed against her traditional enemy, France."

The period from 1870 to 1904 was one of transition. It was evident only during the last decade before the war that English policy toward Belgium had become exclusively anti-German. But as late as 1909, government leaders explained in the House of Commons that the traditional British pledge to Belgium applied only to her ultimate territorial integrity. The British foreign secretary reserved the right to interpret this pledge in the context of the momentary situation. Lingelbach denied that the German leaders should have known in 1914 that a request for military passage on Belgian territory meant war with England, particularly since the Germans promised to respect the territorial integrity of that country.

It was only later that Anglo-French military plans for operations in Belgium came to light. These plans were developed during the eight years prior to 1914.

Contributions on the origins of war in 1914 were accompanied by findings about America's tragic and unnecessary involvement in the First World War. Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania" (*American Historical Review,* October, 1935), began his account with the following terse first sentence:

> On November 3rd, 1914, some three months after the outbreak of the World War, Great Britain proclaimed her intention of mining the North Sea and transforming it into a military area.

It would have been unthinkable twenty or thirty years earlier for any American historian describing the Lusitania tragedy to begin his account with this unprecedented English violation of the law of nations. American historians were impressed by a lengthy report published by the *American Historical Review* in October, 1937. On German initiative, a congress of French and German historians had convened at Paris in November, 1935. This was the beginning of a sensational and highly successful attempt to coordinate the presentation of modern European history from 1648 to the present in the textbooks of the French and German schools. The lengthy report dealt with the many tragic divisions which had separated France and Germany during earlier generations. There was Richelieu's policy which had culminated in the unprecedented destruction of Germany in the Thirty Years War. There was the rapacious policy of aggrandisement conducted by Louis XIV which robbed Germany of one fair western province after another. There was the conquest of the entire German nation by France during the period of Napoleon I. There was the patriotic German uprising against Napoleon in 1813. There was the attempt of Napoleon III to destroy Bismarck's Prussia by bringing Austria and Russia into the field against her. There was the tragic misunderstanding between the two nations which followed the restoration of German unity in 1871. There were the events of the final crisis which produced another suicidal Franco-German conflict in 1914. About all of these highly controversial events there

was virtual unanimity with several relatively minor exceptions between French and German historians. In view of this, and many other similar great achievements, it is not surprising that Lord Halifax had to work very hard to persuade France to undertake another suicidal and unnecessary war against Germany in 1939.

Revisionism, along the lines laid down by Sidney B. Fay, was clearly preponderant in American historical circles by this time. The counter-offensive at the historical level had failed. The political offensive inaugurated by President Roosevelt in his Chicago bridge speech on October 5, 1937, was still in its infancy. Roosevelt had suggested that the world was divided into two parts: 90% of good nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Empire, and Nationalist China; 10% of bad nations including Germany, Italy and Japan.

The initial public reaction to the President's pronouncement was overwhelmingly negative. Furthermore, President Roosevelt failed to win the majority of Americans to his new mythology during the subsequent four years prior to Pearl Harbor. The impact of revisionism concerning world affairs had gone too deeply to permit an easy inversion of things.

Only a physical blow such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was capable of reversing the prevailing trend. The last of the major anti-revisionist American accounts about 1917 was Preston William Slossen, *The Great Crusade and After, 1914-1928* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1930). Slossen offered the antiquated thesis that "the war came to the United States from without, from causes for which the United States had little responsibility." A strong pull in the opposite direction came shortly afterward with George Sylvester Viereck, *The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (Liveright, N. Y., 1932). This was the first detailed account of the role of House as the grey eminence of the Wilson administration. House had written a novel which was published anonymously in 1912: *Philip Dru, Administrator.* The hero, who closely resembled Woodrow Wilson, led a great crusade which culminated in the formation of a League of Nations. In the meantime, Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow*

Wilson: Life and Letters (7 vols., Doubleday, Doran, N. Y., 1931-1939), had begun to appear. This honest and forthright reporting in depth revealed how shockingly little President Wilson had understood about controversial world issues. His strongest field was American domestic politics. Probably no president in American history was less qualified to deal with complicated foreign issues. The public imagined that Wilson must have been well-equipped because he was a university professor. The public forgot that a university professor is lost when he steps out beyond the boundaries of his field of specialization.

Walter Millis had made a great reputation with a book on the Spanish-American War, in 1931. He followed this with *Road to War: America, 1914 to 1917* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1935, 466 pp.). Unlike Barnes, Millis did not intend to deal simultaneously with the 1914 and 1917 questions. He announced at the outset that:

> The primary concern of this book is solely with the United States. The merits of the European struggle are beyond its scope, and it is no part of my purpose either to defend the German cause or to attack that of the Allies.

Having successfully limited the scope of his query, Millis proceeded with a robust revisionist treatment of his theme. He began with a curious quotation from Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States in 1917:

> The juxtaposition in the American people's character of Pacifism and an impulsive lust of war should have been known to us, if more sedulous attention had been paid in Germany to American conditions and characteristics.

This bitter comment from the crabbed old German diplomat does not really relate to any peculiar American characteristics. You can find this same "juxtaposition" in the German people. But it is important to note Bernstorff's criticism of the element of ignorance in German policy toward America. Millis follows the same tack in citing the blunders of American policy, although he does not lose sight of the German blunders. The English profited from this German-American comedy of errors.

Tansill's definitive treatment in 1938 has already been cited as an abiding achievement of American historical scholarship. Subsequent research about 1917 has been primarily concerned with explaining some of the important related issues. Probably no historical writer has been more successful in this field than Forrest McDonald, who had initially established his reputation as a historian by successfully refuting the formidable 1913 Beard thesis about the American Constitution. Forrest McDonald, *Insull,* has all the elements of a classic Greek tragedy. Insull's moral turpitude during the period of American neutrality in the First World War virtually staggers the human imagination. Yet he was not punished for his misdeeds on that occasion. The same Insull was savagely persecuted by the American New Deal authorities twenty years later. Yet, as McDonald shows, on this occasion Insull was entirely innocent of the transgressions with which he was charged. Surely there is in this instance a supreme example of the irony of human fate in a world of moral relativism.

Samuel Insull immigrated to the United States from Liverpool, England in 1881. He had been accepted before arrival as private secretary of America's greatest genius in the field of electrical invention, Thomas Edison. Insull embarked upon a career which made him one of the most powerful businessmen in the United States by 1914. Edison gave him stock worth $15,000 at the end of his first year of service in America. J. P. Morgan was behind Edison, and Insull was able to exploit the situation. Henry Villard had succeeded in attracting additional German financial support to the Edison enterprises in 1884. As Insull witnessed the rise of an American empire of electricity, he decided to make Chicago instead of New York the capital of that empire. By 1914 he was thought of as the leading private utility magnate in America.

Insull became an American citizen in 1896, but he remained loyal to his English heritage. Through his international contacts in England and elsewhere, he was aware of the approaching war in 1914 long before the common people had any notion that such a struggle might take place. He knew that Chicago's Mayor William Hale Thomson had referred to Chicago as the sixth largest German city in the world.

Thomson was not trying to suggest that Chicago was actually German, but he was expressing his pleasure at the size of the German element. Insull saw the challenge in converting Chicago, the isolationist capital of the midwest, to a crusade against Germany on behalf of democracy.

One of America's top financiers, Roger Bacon, told a Frenchman in 1914 that there were not more than fifty thousand Americans in the entire United States who favored joining England and France in the war against Germany. Creel was the leader of propaganda in America after March, 1917, but Insull was the leader of that propaganda during the first two and one-half years of the First World War. He directed both English and American propaganda lieutenants. Sir Gilbert Parker, the chief of the English propaganda mission to America in 1914, possessed no real skill in approaching the Americans. He thought it would be quite sufficient to discuss English aspirations with the so-called American upper classes. Insull explained to him that the American press had to be bought. If England could not afford to buy it, American financiers would help, but England would have to grant special favors to help win the sympathies of American journalists. Sir Edward Grey was horrified at the prospect of being personally interviewed by American newspapermen, when it was first suggested to him in January, 1915. But Insull succeeded in persuading the English that it was necessary to make concessions of this kind in order to win the Americans. McDonald shows that there were frequent meetings between Insull and George Creel. The former was the teacher, and the latter was his very able pupil. Insull managed to pass a sufficient amount of official and confidential information to England during the period of American neutrality to warrant his being imprisoned for espionage as one of the leading English agents in America. However, thanks partly to the effort of Insull himself, the Anglophile position became trump, and Insull received only tributes and acclaim for his war work.

Insull was the hero of the business world in the 1920's. Although he managed industrial assets worth billions of dollars, his personal fortune was probably not more than five million as late as 1926. The economic depression struck the

United States in 1929 and Insull fought a hard battle for several years to maintain the solvency of the many utility companies which he directed. He did not sell short and make his own profit as did many of the Wall Street men. He thought of saving the companies for which he was responsible. It is remarkable that he was able to carry on for two years in view of the prevailing trend of treachery and deception among his associates. By Christmas, 1931, it was obvious that he had lost the fight. He resigned the last of his many directorates in June, 1932 and departed for Paris. It was at this point that he became the scapegoat for guilty men. He was suddenly accused in absentia of causing the collapse of numerous business firms through dishonest practice. In the meantime, Insull had left for Italy. President Hoover submitted to pressure and asked the Duce to seize Insull on October 9, 1932, but by that time Insull was already a fugitive in Greece.

Hoover's successor, Franklin Roosevelt, vowed to punish Insull. The Greek government at first refused to surrender him to the United States, because his case was not covered by the terms of the Greek-American Extradition Treaty. But McDonald shows that American pressure was brought to bear on the Greek government, and he calls it "blackmail." Insull fled from Greece but he was seized by the Turkish authorities at the request of the United States. He was brought home, handcuffed and placed on trial October 28, 1934. The guilt of Insull had been assumed in advance and the outburst of hatred against him in the American press resembled the outbursts of hatred against the Kaiser during the First World War.

Insull, like the Kaiser, was innocent of the rabid accusations directed against him. He stood several trials and he was acquitted every time. Far from being exceptionally crooked, Insull was in reality a paragon of virtue so far as the business ethics in his field of enterprise were concerned. The torture and travesty finally ended, and Insull was allowed to leave America. He died of a heart attack in a Paris subway on July 16, 1938. The master of the lie during the First World War had been morally assassinated by the lie. There was no logical

connection whatever between these occurrences on the stormy sea of current events.

In the meantime, American revisionism on the historical events leading to the European war in 1914 and American entry into the war in 1917 had scored a signal triumph. But the triumph was destined to be of short duration. The fruits of revisionism were swiftly swept away after Pearl Harbor. The United States was signatory to a treaty in Paris in 1949 which, among other things, declared that Germany was solely responsible for the outbreak of the European war in 1914. It was like a page from Orwell's *1984*. The trend of deceit has continued since that time in relation to these questions. Sydney B. Fay of Harvard was a very disapppointed man when he recently read Barbara Tuchman *The Guns of August,* (Macmillan, N.Y., 1962, 511 pp.) a popular account of the 1914 crisis by the granddaughter of Henry Morgenthau. Fay had disclosed the willful deceit of Henry Morgenthau in 1920. Forty years later he was confronted by a new edition of anti-revisionism presented by his own publisher. This experience brought home to the Harvard historian that the glorious American historical research in the 1920's and 1930's had been wilfully and deliberately forgotten. However, Fay has not given up hope. He knows that the repercussions of Pearl Harbor cannot dominate the scene of American historical research forever.

Chapter VII: The Second World War

As in the case of the First World War, there are two distinct problems involving American historians and their approach to World War II origins. 1939 may be compared to 1914 so far as the outbreak of war in Europe is concerned. 1941 may be compared to 1917 in terms of American participation. It was not evident at the outset of either conflict that direct American military intervention would take place. The pros and cons of such intervention were hotly debated in both instances. The origins of the conflict in 1914 played an important role in the debate which finally culminated in America's declaration of war against Germany. After 1939, on the other hand, there was relatively little discussion of responsibility for the European war. Almost everyone assumed that there was no problem involved. This attitude prevailed throughout the war years and into the cold war period which followed the war. It was expressed by Louis Gottschalk in the *Journal of Modern History,* March, 1948:

> American historians seem to be generally agreed upon the *Kriegsschuldfrage* (war guilt question) of the second World War . . . even though some politicians and writers have tried to raise a controversy regarding the origins of its Japanese-American phase.

Gottschalk is conceding less than three years after the close of the Second World War that there is some controversy about 1941. On the other hand, he is asserting that there is general agreement about 1939. His assertion is correct, since the first significant book introducing a new interpretation on 1939 was not published until 1961: A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1961). If one agrees that the American historians, as well as the American public generally, are still seeking to assimilate their experiences from the Second World War period, the origins of conflict in Europe in 1939 must possess relevance to their understanding of these experiences

along with the events concerning 1941. If Gottschalk's assertion in 1948 was made at a time when there was no published research in depth on 1939, it necessarily reflects a mere assumption rather than a historical judgment. There has been considerable controversy since the appearance of Taylor's book between those who feel that he has raised an important issue and others who charge that he has merely been mischievous.

The war in 1939 began as a conflict between Germany and Poland. Taylor has little difficulty in demonstrating that German foreign policy during the years before the beginning of the German-Polish diplomatic crisis in March, 1939, was aiming at cooperation with Poland. He also demonstrates that the Germans hoped to reach a lasting accommodation with Great Britain and France. Here then is the paradox. Hitler is assumed to have been exclusively responsible for the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Poland on September 1, 1939, and for the British and French declarations of war against Germany on September 3, 1939. In other words, he is assigned the sole guilt for a conflict against three nations with which he was hoping to establish friendly relations. Taylor does not really attempt to determine the final responsibilities for 1939. He is content with presenting enough data and analysis to show that easy assumptions about the 1939 situation are unwarranted. There are many indications that American historians will soon become engaged in some important discussions about the origins of the conflict in 1939 which may prove to be comparable in importance to the earlier discussions about 1914. There is no advantage in the present context to explore the implications of the 1939 situation in detail. The generalization of Gottschalk in 1948 has continued to apply down to 1963.

It has sometimes been argued that Charles C. Tansill, *The Back Door to War* (Regnery, Chicago, 1951), introduced the problems connected with 1939 in the process of describing the problems in 1941. The same thing has been contended about W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The World Crisis in American Foreign Policy, 1937-1941* (2 vols., Harper, N. Y., 1953). There is no doubt that both of these studies have

introduced important factual material concerning European events in 1939 and they contain some trenchant observations about European conditions. For instance, Tansill shows that President Roosevelt was interested in creating a breach between Germany and England after the Munich Agreement in 1938, and Langer and Gleason demonstrate that Germany was unprepared for a major European war in 1939, having failed to plan for such a dire eventuality. Such contributions in both instances are subordinate to the main theme of tracing American foreign policy, and they do not relate to a comprehensive presentation of the European situation. For that matter, Taylor's book is actually a suggestive essay on European diplomatic events between the First and Second World Wars rather than a study in depth. The latter can only be feasible if based upon an intensive study of Polish, French, German and Italian primary sources, along with such Soviet materials as are available. Taylor's study is mainly restricted to the use of German and Italian archives and those by Tansill and by Langer and Gleason to the American archives. Probably one of the most surprising gaps in modern historical writing, particularly in the light of the 1914 contrast, has been the paucity of research on 1939 during the first generation after the event. Be that as it may, there is a very considerable amount of literature by American historians concerning 1941.

The first major American work on the Pearl Harbor disaster was written by a non-professional historian and editor of the Chicago *Tribune,* George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor* (Devin-Adair, N. Y., 1947). Morgenstern had worked intensively in the records of the several congressional Pearl Harbor investigations and had met many of the personages connected with the formulation of American military and diplomatic policy. The following year, after Morgenstern's achievement, witnessed the appearance of Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.). Beard had been extremely popular with the American left wing since the appearance of his books on the American Constitution and Jeffersonian Democracy more than thirty years earlier. He

was the only American scholar who had presided over both the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association. His academic prestige was very great. His description of the events leading to Pearl Harbor was much more thorough and detailed than had been true of Morgenstern's account. Yet both narratives ended with the same conclusion, namely, that Pearl Harbor would probably never have taken place had it not been for the unnecessary provocations and vagaries of President Roosevelt's policy in the Far East at a time when the Japanese, both civilian and military leaders, would have preferred a peaceful accommodation with the United States rather than war. Beard, in particular, showed that Pearl Harbor paved the way for a vast expansion of communism throughout the world. As might be expected, the assertions of Morgenstern and Beard provoked a counter-attack from those historians, and they were many, who were inclined to defend every important phase of Roosevelt's foreign policy. It should not be forgotten that Franklin D. Roosevelt was probably the most popular President in American history.

Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor; A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy* (Creative Age Press, N. Y., 1950), was the first major counter-attack directed against Morgenstern and Beard. It was quickly followed by Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1950). Although Feis was inclined to be somewhat more conciliatory toward the Japanese nation than was Rauch, the two pro-Roosevelt historians agreed very closely in their main argument. Their thesis in turn followed the direction of President Roosevelt's Chicago Bridge speech of October 5, 1937. Their case was based upon the assumption that there was a more or less permanent alliance among Germany, Japan and Italy directed against virtually all of the other nations. Since these books appeared several years after the opening of the cold war in 1947, their authors were cautious in their statements about communism, but they were in full agreement that communism was nothing like the threat to American security from the three nations mentioned above.

The balance between revisionist and anti-revisionist books on Pearl Harbor has been virtually maintained since 1950. Feis went on to publish four additional major studies about American foreign policy during the Second World War.[1] On the revisionist side, Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design for War* (Devin-Adair, N. Y., 1951), concentrated on the contrast between Roosevelt's public policy pronouncements and secret diplomacy. Tansill's *Back Door to War,* previously cited, was based on unpublished State Department documents which revealed that President Roosevelt encouraged the British to go to war in 1939 and then considered the best means of obtaining America's full involvement after Great Britain encountered serious military difficulties in 1940. Very interesting in this connection is a seldom cited book by Sydney Rogerson, *Propaganda in the Next War* (Geoffrey Bles, London, 1938). Rogerson was a British intelligence officer, and he began his study for a series edited by Captain B. Liddell-Hart with a review of British propaganda techniques during the First World War. The thesis of this remarkable book was that these same tactics would not work again in the event of a second conflict. Rogerson then proceeded to detail a manner in which the United States could be brought into a war against Germany through the backdoor by successfully promoting a Japanese-American conflict. This is what happened less than four years later, and it explains the title of Tansill's book.

Both Tansill and Sanborn contributed to a revisionist anthology on 1941, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes: *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caxton, Caldwell, Idaho, 1953, 679 pp.). The slogan for this publication was borrowed from John Quincy Adams and it included the following passage:

> America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.

Barnes explains in the preface that this project was deliberately conceived as an answer to Basil Rauch, and his first major attempt to cope with the revisionist challenge on 1941. The book by Rauch contained so many errors that it offered an inviting target which was certain to attract the

eager participation of leading revisionists. In addition to Barnes, Tansill and Sanborn, the formidable team included William Henry Chamberlin, George A. Lundberg, William L. Neumann, Percy Greaves, and George Morgenstern. Morgenstern's contribution, "The Actual Road To Pearl Harbor," offers a considerable extension of the thesis in his 1947 book. Morgenstern was able to cite convincing evidence that the freezing of Japanese commercial assets and the *de facto* blockade of Japan by President Roosevelt on July 25, 1941, was certain to produce war unless some new *modus vivendi* was achieved. For instance, Morgenstern notes that "Grew (American Ambassador to Japan) was under no illusions after the imposition of the embargo concerning what the effect would be: 'The obvious conclusion is eventual war.' "[2]

There is an astonishing parallel between American policy toward Japan in 1941 and Polish policy toward Germany in 1939. In the latter case, the Poles maintained the fiction of seriously seeking an agreement with the Germans until confronting them with a mobilization and a threat of war. Some observers have suggested that events in Bohemia explained this Polish attitude, but the records show that the Poles were actually eager to produce the collapse of the rival Czech state. After initiating a crisis, the Poles refused to negotiate for a solution. Much the same happened in 1941. There had been friction in Japanese-American relations since the *Panay* incident in 1937, but the impression prevailed that the United States was eager to reach a lasting agreement with Japan in order to concentrate American attention on Germany. It has sometimes been suggested that the Japanese alliance with the Germans and Italians convinced Roosevelt that these three nations constituted a monolithic bloc. However, later records show that Roosevelt was fully informed of serious friction between the Japanese and their European allies. As a matter of fact, the Japanese were far more considerate toward English and American property interests in China than toward the Germans and the Italians. The administration recognized prior to July, 1941, that Japan could be separated from her European allies. This fact was emphasized by Ambassador Grew both before and after the sudden blockade of Japan.

The evidence collected on this point by Morgerstern and others is surveyed by Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949* (Regnery, Chicago, 1963) :

> Had a *modus vivendi* with Japan been reached—and it could have been reached with far fewer concessions at the expense of China than were later to be made to Soviet Russia at Yalta—almost certainly the war with Japan would thereby have been averted, particularly in view of the German reverses in Russia in the winter of 1941-1942.[3]

Morgenstern and the other revisionists showed that Hull, the American Secretary of State, was sorely tempted to negotiate an agreement with the Japanese plenipotentiaries Nomura and Kurusu as late as November 25, 1941. There was constant interference from Harry Dexter White, principal assistant of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. It was later proved that White was a communist agent. Hull was finally persuaded to present his ultimatum of November 26, 1941. The ten points of this note which, included the abandonment of the Japanese position in Manchuria in the face of the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese, rendered impossible a negotiated settlement. It was very much like the Polish refusal to discuss the Danzig crisis with the Germans during the entire period from March to September, 1939. First, the acute crisis was created, and then a position precluding any sort of negotiated compromise was adopted. Grew was undoubtedly right in predicting that only war could result from such a situation. The fact that the United States was successfully intercepting all of the secret diplomatic instructions from Tokyo to the Japanese envoys in Washington, D. C. has been cited by the revisionists again and again to prove that the American authorities knew that the Japanese efforts to reach an agreement even at considerable Japanese sacrifice were sincere. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a desperate expedient to be embarked upon only if it became obvious that every effort to compromise had failed. Of course, no revisionist has ever gone so far as to claim that the Japanese were wise to attack Pearl Harbor. This would be a nonsensical position for anyone to take in view of the disasters which have overwhelmed Japan

after 1941. What the revisionists do claim is that the Japanese were very reluctant to be goaded into war.

It can truthfully be said that the revisionists have thus far failed to persuade the majority of professional historians to adopt their views. For instance, none of the leading American college textbooks on world politics have accepted the revisionist position and some do not even cite a single one of the revisionist books in their bibliographies. The anti-revisionist interpretation of the events leading to Pearl Harbor is presented no less indefatigably today than it was fifteen years ago. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, 1962) admits that Roosevelt and Marshall should have warned Kimmel and Short in Hawaii to prepare for an inevitable Japanese attack several days before the assault actually took place. However, she regards their failure to do this as a typical example of human frailty, human ignorance, and human inability to do the right thing at the right time. She accuses the revisionists of merely parading wisdom after the event. Hers is a sort of make-believe world. Stanford's Ralph Lutz frequently tells the story of his conversation with a naval intelligence officer telephoning from Washington, D. C., the Sunday before Pearl Harbor Sunday. Lutz, like many other experts, knew that the American note of November 26, 1941 had virtually precluded further talks. He also knew that the American Navy was concentrated at Pearl Harbor and that Naval maneuvers since 1931 had demonstrated the feasibility of an attack against that place. Therefore, he made the routine remark in his telephone conversation of November 30, 1941 that he supposed everything possible was being done to alert the Honolulu commanders. He received the equally routine response that naturally everything was being done. And yet the record shows that Kimmel and Short were being informed as late as December 7, 1941, that there was no serious crisis in American-Japanese relations. Had Hawaii been alerted, the Japanese task force would never have struck. This was known at Washington through the deciphered messages from the Japanese military leaders to the task force headed for Hawaii.

The full details of the extent of official American knowledge about secret Japanese plans have been revealed.

Admiral Theobald, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (Devin-Adair, N. Y., 1954) appeared eight years before the Wohlstetter book. It was followed by *Admiral Kimmel's Story* (Regnery, Chicago, 1955). These books presented full proof that the authorities in Washington deliberately withheld from the military authorities at Pearl Harbor the information which would have prevented the Japanese attack. But Roberta Wohlstetter, knowing that she has the backing of no less a naval authority than Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, dismisses all this as understandable human frailty which appears sinister only to these who are guilty of over-refined speculation.

Morison of Harvard won out over Brodie and Sprout, naval historians of Princeton, in receiving the commission from President Roosevelt to write the official American naval history of the Second World War. This account, based on a large number of specialized studies, was published in fifteen volumes by Little, Brown in Boston during the period from 1947 to 1962. In Volume III, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April, 1942,* the basic arguments used by Roberta Wohlstetter in her study were first presented. Revisionist pressure did not produce any indication of an intention to retreat on the part of the anti-revisionists. Although the research possibilities in connection with Pearl Harbor are by no means exhausted (there are several plans for new multi-volume studies), there has been little revelation of essential new details since the books of Theobald and Kimmel appeared in 1954 and 1955. For instance, Walter Lord, *The Day of Infamy* (Holt, N. Y., 1957) presents some new aspects on the operations of the Japanese task force without adding any new details on American policy. The author does not always draw the most logical conclusions from his own data, which more often than not conform to the revisionist approach rather than that of the anti-revisionist conclusion. Especially interesting in this connection, however, is the fact that Holt, the largest American commercial publisher, was willing to bring out a book containing very little new information.

The passage of time has helped to reveal that the Pearl Harbor tragedy is only one facet of a much larger situation. Stanford's Thomas Bailey (*The Man in the Street,* 1949) has taken the position that President Roosevelt had no choice other than to deceive the American people about his aims and intentions because of the allegedly deplorable ignorance of the American people about world affairs. Whether or not such a thesis can be sustained, quite apart from the fact that the doctrine is incompatible with the traditional American conception that the American president is just another representative of the American people, will depend very much on how the larger issues of this period are treated. The dominant interpretation today insists that an alliance among the United States, English imperialism, and Soviet communism was absolutely indispensable in order to save the world from the bad example of German authoritarianism. As long as this hypothesis remains dominant, the revisionists on 1941 will be accused of concentrating too much emphasis on relatively secondary issues. The 1941 revisionists can only hope to come into their own, so far as public opinion is concerned, when many other questions and problems have been dealt with. The issues between the revisionists and anti-revisionists on Pearl Harbor were publicly debated at the American Historical Association meeting at Chicago, Illinois in December, 1950. Even at that time, with the facts preponderantly on their side, the revisionists had no difficulty in winning the verbal engagement.

During the last thirteen years, although the number of titles remains approximately in balance, the factual margin on the side of the revisionists has continued to increase. It seems fairly safe to predict that the debate will be resolved eventually in their favor if the day comes when they receive an impartial hearing. This day will not come so long as the overwhelming majority of professional American historians continue to believe that an alliance between the United States and Soviet communism was indispensable in 1941 in order to save the world.

Chapter VIII: The Korean War

A lasting transformation of the American position in relation to the diplomacy of the modern world took place during the two later Roosevelt terms (3rd term, and 4th Roosevelt term completed by Truman, 1941-1949). There had been a comparatively brief period of attempting to impose American ideals by force in the Eastern Hemisphere under Woodrow Wilson, 1917-1920. The final rejection of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles was followed by a return to normalcy under Harding's leadership. No such return to America's traditional position took place following the Rooseveltian great adventure, 1941-1945. Under Truman's leadership the United States moved into the front position on the anti-Communist side in the Cold War which the President himself inaugurated by proclamation to Congress on March 12, 1947. In the real sense of the word, however, this result was achieved by British diplomacy.

There have been many studies on isolated aspects of the pre-World War II European situation such as the Munich Conference or the Spanish Civil War, and there have also been a number of studies on the Cold War, but American historians have been slow to grasp the central British role in bringing about either the Second World War or the Cold War. This is because studies in depth on these crucial subjects have hitherto been conspicuously lacking. For instance, the authoritarian regimes, despite their many faults, had little to do with the decisive immediate events leading to the general European War, 1939. The decisions of Lord Halifax in London, and the British diplomatic pressure at Warsaw, Paris and Rome led to the war. No doubt Litvinov was seeking to promote a Franco-German war during the 1930's, but France was pushed into war in 1939 by England rather than Moscow. No doubt President Roosevelt hoped that England would go to war against Germany in 1939. But the American Chief

Executive was in no position to exert decisive pressure, and the English leaders were able to arrive at their own decisions without his help. No doubt Hitler was quite willing to fight against any and all comers if cornered. But the German leaders would have preferred peace to war so far as Britain, France and Poland were concerned. No doubt it was easy to claim that Stalin lit the fuse to a new war when he signed his non-aggression pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939. But the British policy of forcing a unilateral blank-check guarantee on Poland on March 31, 1939, before attempting to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union, precluded Polish-Russian cooperation in the event of war. With the British Empire behind them, the Poles had no intention of voluntarily allowing a single Red Army soldier to appear on their territory. The preservation of peace in 1939 would have been comparatively easy had Halifax and his small group of collaborators in London favored it. But they were willing to go to war—not for British military security which they already possessed—but for British prestige and the preservation of their leadership in Western Europe.

The Second World War closed with the United States in the role of moderator between the crumbling British Empire and the advancing Soviet Union. British calculations had failed. The Soviet Union did not become a second-rate power due to blows received during the German preventive war against Moscow. The U.S.S.R. was a much greater power than the British leaders had supposed. Underestimation of the Soviet Union was no doubt the most serious miscalculation of the British leadership. Halifax did not wage war in 1939 in order to deliver mastery of the Eastern Hemisphere to the Communists. Under the circumstances existing in 1945, it is not surprising that the United States did not return to their traditional position after the war. On the contrary, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. were soon formulating world-wide decisions and busily interfering in the affairs of belligerent and neutral nations alike. Germany, Japan, Italy and many other lesser nations were vanquished. France was weakened by her 1940 defeat, and even more by her so-called liberation, in which twenty times as many Frenchmen were slaughtered

by the resistance within one year than had previously been killed throughout the entire German occupation. (See *France: The Tragic Years* by Sisley Huddleston.) Poland was a Soviet sattellite, the victim of the power to the East which Poles traditionally hated and feared first and foremost. Probably most galling to the British leaders was the fact that the United States occupied the central position on the diplomatic teeter-totter between the U.S.S.R. and the British Empire. This situation continued until the British Foreign Office came forward with its bluff of withdrawing from the British sphere of interest in Greece and Turkey. The result was the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947. Hence the United States did replace the British in leading the so-called containment of Communism.

The British gladly exchanged roles with us and resumed their traditional position as the moderator par excellence in world politics. Today they are busily trading with Red Cuba and Red China while we vainly seek to boycott those Communist countries. Great Britain, unlike Israel, is not technically neutral in the Cold War. But the Anglo-American alliance usually appears to be a very one-sided affair. The British are consistently the nation most favored by official America. Recently the United States attempted to pressure the Western Continental European nations into admitting Great Britain to the Common Market on terms of special advantage for the British. The attempt failed, but it offered fresh confirmation to the Continentals that America is usually inclined to take the English side in any dispute.

The background of the Korean War is intelligible only within the context of the Cold War. This fact is fully understood by Denna Frank Fleming, professor of international relations at Vanderbilt University, and to date the leading American historian of the Cold War. It has often been asked how an American professor with sympathies as pronouncedly leftist as those of Fleming can continue to write articles and to publish research with such equanimity on a subject as delicate as the Cold War itself. Fleming undoubtedly has the courage of his convictions, and for years he has enjoyed the special protection and support of Harvie Branscomb, a former

Rhodes scholar, who, until recently, was Chancellor of Vanderbilt University.

Fleming was born in Illinois in 1893. In his 1928 Ph.D. thesis at the University of Illinois, *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate* (published by Putnam, N. Y., 1930), he deplored the failure of the United States to ratify the nefarious Versailles Treaty, which did so much to create the conditions later successfully exploited by Lord Halifax to bring on the Second World War. After an early period of teaching in Washington, Iowa and Illinois, Fleming received an appointment at Vanderbilt University in 1938. He was heaped with honors following the Second World War. He received several Fulbright teaching fellowships in Europe and Asia, and he was appointed Director of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation (1950). He also joined the Executive Council of the American Association of University Professors.

The key to Fleming's popularity was to be found in his support of the Litvinov brand of collective security prior to the Second World War and of any and all Rooseveltian policies in connection with the war itself. A typical example of Fleming's work during this period is *While America Slept: A Contemporary Analysis of World Events from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Nashville, 1944, 269 pp.). Like President Kennedy, *Why England Slept* (second edition with preface by Henry Luce, 1962), Fleming seems to suggest that one nation or another is asleep when it does not follow policies which he advocates. One thing is certain: Franklin Roosevelt and Denna Fleming were asleep so far as any real recognition of the threat from world Communism to our country is concerned.

D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960,* Vol. 1, *1917-1950* (Doubleday, N. Y., 1961), is far and away the most impressive presentation of Cold War events leading up to the Korean War. The author has conducted research in depth on a wide range of important problems. Since his narrative is pro-Soviet from beginning to end, he naturally takes special pains in seeking to establish a rapport with his American reader at the outset. He begins with an appeal to his traditional Midwest background:

> As a University student in 1914 I was aware that a big war was likely to break out in Europe at any time, but I was as isolationist as my Mid-Western countrymen until the deepening of the struggle convinced me that our neutrality in World War I could not be maintained.[1]

Fleming went on to describe his devotion to the League of Nations after 1918 and his refusal to reconcile himself to the fact that the United States was not a member. However, by the time the League was formally dissolved in 1943, the new United Nations organization was coming into being. Fleming makes a plea for peaceful American competition with Communism:

> I have never doubted that we can compete successfully with communism, if we place our main reliance on non-military methods. The lesson of World War II was that the losing side must not plunge the world into another world war in order to restore and improve its position. We had just permitted Germany to do that, with calamitous consequences. Nevertheless, after 1945 we ourselves at once assumed the position of a loser.[2]

Fleming warns his reader that recent wars, including the ones Fleming himself has advocated, have been "the source of the vast expansion of communism in the world." The reader is expected to realize that situations leading to war can only be a profit to Communism, never to the United States. Another argument by Fleming is the contention that the United States has fallen consistently behind the Soviet Union in nuclear research since 1945.[3]

Fleming explains to his readers that he has attempted to improve the quality of his work by reporting how situations look from the other side. He expresses special thanks to Robert Oppenheimer and Harvie Branscomb for support of his project. Fleming offers the following generalization about the present world situation:

> Our lives are made uneasy now by the Russian Revolution of 1917 resulting in the creation of a rival system to our own.[4]

One wonders if perhaps it is not just a little more than that. The United States in the past has thrived on peaceful competition with rival systems. However, the satanic Communist tyranny that began its campaign for world mastery after

seizing power in Russia in 1917, is a little different from the earlier rivals of the United States.

The fifth chapter of Fleming's first volume, which is still part of his introductory material, refers to the "crucifixion of Czechoslovakia at Munich." His twenty-first chapter, which deals with the origins and course of the Korean War, refers to the "crucifixion of Korea." One receives the impression in the latter case that the Americans were very much more to blame for the sufferings of the Koreans than were the Soviet Russians.

Fleming accepts the Nuremberg trial verdict on sole German guilt for the preventive war which Germany launched against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 (Chapter VI, ff.). There is no mention of the Soviet violation of the non-aggression pact with Germany in the seizure of Bukowina and part of Moldavia in June, 1940. (These territories were beyond the demarcation line for Soviet claims accepted by the Germans at Moscow.) There is no mention of the Communist role in overthrowing the legal Yugoslav government in March, 1941, thus wrecking the neutrality policy of Yugoslavia. There is no mention of the terrorist campaign carried on by the Communists in Germany and the German-occupied territories during the year before the outbreak of the German-Soviet War. There is no mention of the massing of Soviet troops on the German border in 1940 at a time when there were practically no German troops in the East. There is no mention of renewed Soviet threats to Finland after the Soviet victory over Finland in March, 1940, and of Soviet proposals to establish their control throughout the Balkans and in Turkey. In short, Fleming has suppressed all of the provocative Soviet policies which contributed to the outbreak of war. There is no mention in either volume of his study that the Communists are striving for world mastery. On the other hand, Fleming contends, without any proof, that Hitler's program was based on the concept of world mastery for Germany. Since all of the historians agree that it was one of Hitler's major objectives to subordinate German policy to British policy in world affairs, the riddle of how Hitler could possibly have been working for

world domination in the style of the Communists remains unexplained.

It is Fleming's fundamental position that the "German Fascists," and not the Communists, were the real threat to the United States during the 1930's. He never bothers to introduce any evidence to support this view, but he heaps contempt on those who did not share it. For instance, he cites the *New York Times,* July 24, 1941, for Truman's statement that the United States ought to help Germany against the Soviet Union if it appeared that the Soviet Union was winning the European War. Of course, Truman was promptly called to account by Roosevelt for this realistic pronouncement. Fleming, in 1961, uses this statement by Truman as an argument against Roosevelt's successor. This leaves no doubt, in view of the present world situation, that Fleming's sympathy for the Soviet Union and Communist policies is not only robust but indestructible.[5]

Fleming even goes so far as to deny that President Roosevelt made any mistakes in policy at the Yalta Conference which delivered North China to the Communists and confirmed the decision that only the Red Army would be allowed to capture Berlin, Prague and Vienna. Fleming refers to the critical accounts of Yalta diplomacy as the so-called "Yalta myth."[6]

In his treatment of the Korean background, Fleming relies heavily on George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Harvard University Press, 1950), which was written before the outbreak of the Korean War. Fleming emphasizes the fact that Red Army forces arrived in Korea before the Americans:

> Korea was divided first as a matter of military convenience and courtesy. Russian troops entered Korea on August 10, 1945. American troops did not land in South Korea until September 8.[7]

Fleming also emphasizes that the proposal to divide Korea along the 38th Parallel originated in the United States. He seeks to present Kim Il Sung as a progressive leader in the style of Owen Lattimore's earlier interpretation of Mao Tse-tung. He praises the North Korean dictator for the March, 1946 land reform, and emphasizes that "there was much loyalty to the North Korean regime from the start."

The land reform in South Korea on March 22, 1948, consisted primarily in the disposition of former Japanese holdings while the large Korean estates were spared. Fleming considers that the more conservative policy in the South eliminated any chance for enthusiastic popular support for the South Korean regime. He constantly stresses the idea that the Communist regime in the North had the support of the people and that the regime in the South pleased only a small reactionary clique. Fleming believes that "although nearly three-fourths of the twenty-four million Koreans were in South Korea, the character of its government made its ultimate survival doubtful." The implication that it might have been well to permit North Korea to conquer South Korea is inescapable.

Fleming is on solid ground when he cites two speeches by Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson (National Press Club, Washington, D. C., Jan. 12, 1950; San Francisco, March 15, 1950). Acheson definitely did create the impression in these speeches that the United States, following the withdrawal of American troops in 1948, would never intervene militarily in Korea, regardless of what happened in that country. It is equally true that Acheson was perfectly well aware at the time he delivered these speeches that there had been serious military incidents on the demarcation line since the autumn of 1949, and that his words might well be construed as an invitation to the North Koreans for a military offensive against South Korea. These are indisputable facts, and Fleming cannot be criticized for citing them. However, it is more difficult to excuse what he does to some of the related details.

Fleming reveals that the pro-communist officials in the United States State Department were able to obtain Acheson's approval on December 23, 1949 for a private circular to American diplomatic missions abroad explaining the alleged need for the Communist acquisition of Formosa. However, news of this nefarious betrayal of America's ally, Chiang Kai-shek, leaked out on January 3, 1950. The circular was withdrawn, but President Truman, at his news conference on January 5, 1950, refused to indicate that the United States would do anything to prevent the Communist seizure of Formosa. It was

obvious to everyone, in view of the demoralized condition of the Chinese Nationalist forces at that time, that the Red Chinese could conquer Formosa with ease unless they were blocked by the American fleet. It appeared fairly obvious by January 13, 1950, that both Formosa and South Korea would soon be taken over by the Communists. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, who represented the administration on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, told *U. S. News & World Report* (May 2, 1950) that he was "afraid that South Korea would have to be abandoned." Connally went on to make a specific prediction that the Communists would soon capture both Formosa and Korea.

In the meantime, Acheson was busily engaged in putting pressure on Syngman Rhee. He threatened Rhee in a note on April 7, 1950 that the United States would terminate every kind of aid to South Korea if unscheduled new elections were not held in the near future. Rhee had no choice other than to hold the elections at an adverse moment on May 30, 1950. His Government Party won only 47 of the 210 seats in the Assembly.

Bi-partisan foreign policy was the vogue in the United States at this time. Grenville Clark, the chief Democrat Party theoretician, and John Foster Dulles, the principal Republican theoretician, were in agreement on all of the fundamental issues. Dulles was visiting the 38th Parallel on June 20, 1950, less than five days before the outbreak of war. This prompted the Communists later to contend that he was on a mission to complete the preparations for the unleashing of the war. Surprisingly enough, Fleming follows the Communist approach to this question: "Was it possible that the North Koreans were the ones who were surprised?"[8] He cites John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (Harper, N.Y., 1951, p. 165) to support his contention. Gunther claimed to have heard one of MacArthur's aides in Japan exclaim on June 25, 1950: "The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!"

Fleming quickly admits that North Korea was far better prepared militarily than South Korea. For instance, the North Koreans had a large force of heavy tanks; the South Koreans did not have any tanks. However, he refuses to

admit that this is relevant to responsibility for the conflict. His thesis is based on the assumption that the South Koreans could have responded to directives from MacArthur in order to provoke a conflict in the certainly that they would speedily receive American aid despite the recent public declarations about American policy. Although a polemicist such as Fleming would scarcely take a final stand on the basis of information supplied by an irresponsible journalist such as John Gunther, Fleming is very emphatic in arguing that, regardless of the responsibility in Korea, Stalin was not to blame. In probably one of the most remarkable of his many inaccurate characterizations, Fleming refers to "the cautious Stalin."[9] Was Stalin cautious in the days when he was robbing banks in Tiflis, and consorting with habitual criminals by choice? Was Stalin cautious when he pushed the collectivization of agriculture simultaneously with the heavy industry five-year plan? Was Stalin cautious when he double-crossed Hitler again and again after the defeat of France in 1940? Was Stalin cautious when he pushed ahead the Communist plan to conquer all of China before the Soviet Union had exploded her first atomic bomb? But it ought to be evident at this point that Fleming's Stalin, like the Socrates of Aristophanes, is a figment of his own imagination.

Especially typical of Fleming's approach is the abuse heaped upon the South Korean leader. The following is a typical example:

> Since June, 1950, we have learned a great deal about the Koreans. We have certainly learned, for example, that Syngman Rhee was abundantly capable of starting the Korean War.[10]

Fleming creates the impression that President Truman made up his own mind on the spot at Independence, Missouri, to intervene in Korea. This assertion strikes one as somewhat incongruous in view of Truman's prolonged mental agony on the question of what to do with the atomic bomb in 1945. In any case, Truman's order for the commitment of the American air and sea forces was not issued until June 27, 1950, after he had returned to Washington, D. C. On that same day, Truman decided to defend Formosa against possible Red Chinese attack. Three days later, he ordered the commitment

of the American ground forces in South Korea. In the meantime, the United Nations General Assembly had passed a resolution, in the absence of the Soviet delegation, commissioning the United States to support the South Korean cause against North Korea. It seemed to some critics as though the power of deciding between peace and war had been transferred from the American Congress to the United Nations General Assembly. This is the thesis of Chesly Manly, *U. N. Record, Ten Fateful Years for America* (Regnery, Chicago, 1955) and A. Widener, *Behind the U. N. Front* (The Book Mailer, N. Y., 1955).

Fleming created the impression that American policy in South Korea had been wrong-headed and reactionary from the start. For instance, the Americans had refused to recognize Lyuh Wooh-Hyung as President of the Provisional Government in South Korea in September, 1945. The reader might receive the impression that the People's Republic convention which elected Wooh-Hyung was fairly representative of the South Korean people. Such myths are effectively dispelled in Kenneth Ingram's *History of the Cold War* (Finlayson, London, 1955). Ingram points out that there were no less than 133 other political parties registered with the American authorities in South Korea at the time Wooh-Hyung was elected by his party.[11]

One of the most conspicuous features of American military intervention in Korea in 1950 was the relationship between the American government and the United Nations organization. Fleming plays down the U. N. issue in his account and emphasizes instead the contrast between American and Soviet Cold War policy.

By contrast, V. Orval Watts, *The United Nations: Planned Tyranny; Comments on the Dream and the Reality* (Devin-Adair, N. Y., 1955), stresses American and Soviet commitments to the U. N. He states the following about Truman's intervention in Korea:

> President Truman, for example, helped to transfer power from Congress to the President and from the President to the United Nations when he established a precedent in the vitally important matter of declaring war. This transfer of power came from his decision to put American forces into the Korean War without

> consulting Congress, on the ground that the United Nations ordered American troops to be used in an international 'police action.'[12]

Watts does not hesitate in agreeing with Soviet complaints about the United Nations General Assembly resolution taken in the absence of the Soviet delegation. It is somewhat ironical to find Watts, who is staunchly anti-Communist, taking this stand; whereas, Fleming, who is much more tolerant toward Communism, neglects the opportunity to introduce this point against the American case on Korea. The reason is not far to seek. Fleming's position is based upon the assumption that support of the United Nations is the best approach in seeking a lasting accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Watts recalls that:

> The Soviet representatives returned, vehemently protesting that the Security Council had acted illegally, as indeed it had (i.e., in recommending General Assembly action while the Soviet delegates were absent). The Charter provided no such method of by-passing the Military Staff Committee and thus depriving the Soviet Chief of Staff of his share of authority over the U.N. forces defending South Korea. What kind of a Government is it in which this sort of thing can go on?[13]

The same approach, culminating in the same question, is also found in Sisley Huddleston, *Popular Diplomacy and War* (Rindge, N. H., 1955, pp. 138 ff.). The expected answer is that such a government is a farce. The basic philosophy behind the United Nations was not world government but a preponderant league of states to maintain the peace However, there was a strong intellectual trend in America from the outset to convert the United Nations into a world government. The argument was twofold: (1) American unity had proceeded from a delegation of sovereignty by sovereign states; (This is the approach of Carl Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal,* 1947) (2) that preponderant leagues of states to maintain peace had failed. (This is the approach of Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* 1948.) As a matter of fact, preponderant leagues of states to maintain the peace have never been tried for more than a few years. The last real effort along these lines ended with Lord Castlereagh's suicide in 1822. The Leagues of Nations never constituted such an effort in any

meaningful sense of the word. Germany and Russia were not allowed to join the original League, and Japanese affiliation was only nominal. The United States refused to join it. The principal League of Nations powers from 1920 onward were Great Britain and France. Yet the British, far from concluding an alliance with France, were perpetually engaged in undermining the French security system in Europe and in limiting French aspirations abroad. The British contended that they had no obligation to form an alliance with France after the United States refused to do so. Under these circumstances, any talk of a preponderant league of states to maintain the peace at Geneva was fatuous nonsense.

When Stanhope proposed a preponderant league in Europe after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, he sought to attain an adequate basis for it. It was evident that the Quadruple Alliance which he achieved was a good start. It included Great Britain, France, Austria and Prussia. Unfortunately, the entire edifice was wrecked in the wake of the 1720 depression which swept Europe. Benito Mussolini's four-power pact proposal of March 1933 was in the Stanhope tradition. Had Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy been able to form a sort of concert of the principal powers in 1933, a good start would have been made toward engineering a league of preponderant states. It seemed for a brief moment at the time of the Munich Conference in 1938 that this goal might be achieved. On the other hand, there was no prospect whatever of success in this direction at the time of the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Friction and suspicion between the Soviet Union and the British Empire were much in evidence by that time. Unless a genuine accommodation could be achieved among the United States, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union, there was no prospect whatever of making a good start toward organizing an effective league of preponderant states. After the proclamation of the Cold War by President Truman in March, 1947, any talk of the United Nations functioning in this capacity also appeared to be errant nonsense.

People had to make a choice. Either they could argue, as in Aesop's "The Fox and the Sour Grapes," that a league of

preponderant states such as the U. N. envisaged was not a good idea in the first place; or they could contend that the U.N. ought to be scrapped because it embodied merely an illusion. Those who took the former position were inclined to press onward toward world gvernment. The latter, and not the league, was the answer to them. This raised the question of how states, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, who could not even maintain a conventional alliance, were supposed to be able to amalgamate their respective sovereignties into a world government. There appeared to be no way of squaring the circle so far as the contrasts in the American and Soviet ways of life were concerned. Was the world government to be based upon the Soviet or the American model? It could not be based upon both.

Although the professional historians have been understandably reluctant to deal with this theme in depth, it can be safely stated that the preponderant inclination among the American historians today is most definitely toward world government and the abandonment of the American independence proclaimed in 1776. It will be the task of the next section to explain why this is so. Opinions in such matters are based on prejudices because the necessary data and objective criteria are lacking. The attitude toward the Korean War in the final analysis will be determined by the attitude toward the United Nations.

American intervention in Korea was a great victory for those who advocate the transformation of the United Nations into a world government. The strategic issues in Korea were minor, particularly since General MacArthur was denied his request to extend the scope of operations beyond the Korean area. The military balance in the world is not likely to be affected to any measurable extent whether Korea is united under Communists or divided as it is today. Korea is primarily a devastated nation that requires economic assistance and as such is automatically dependent on some neighboring system. The United Nations issue, rather than the Cold War balance, was at stake in Korea. American

soldiers bravely died for the first time in a major war which was not a war waged by their country, but a conflict resolved upon by a sort of mythical world government. The Korean War demonstrated that the Cold War depends very largely on the decisions made in relation to the United Nations. Those who advocate scrapping the United Nations oppose the appeasement of world Communism. Those who favor the transformation of the United Nations into a world government favor the appeasement of world Communism. So far there have been no recorded exceptions to this rule on the part of prominent writers.

The Cold War since 1947 has been a phony Cold War. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that in America, the leader of the anti-Communist bloc, there is a much greater and more articulate desire to appease world Communism than to oppose world Communism. This follows with relentless logic from the conclusion that the failure to establish a preponderant league of independent states must be followed by an experiment in world government.

Bernadotte Schmitt, in his presidential address to the meeting of the American Historical Association at New York City on December 29, 1960, made the following statement:

> In 1960, both the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly proclaimed their abhorrence of war and insist that they are working for peace.

Schmitt exhorted American historians to assist the two rival nations at this work. He did not advocate an alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. This had proved impossible following the close of the Second World War. Instead of that, he favored the more ambitious goal of the subordination of both American and Soviet policies to the United Nations. The same approach was recommended by Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager in their televised discussion of current issues at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, on July 31, 1963. Both men castigate American hatred of Communism as the greatest obstacle to the realization of this dream. They could not very well do

otherwise and maintain a position consistent with the premises of their argument. An effort to proceed to world government in the world today must of necessity be predicated upon a campaign to suppress the denunciation of world Communism in the United States.

PART II: THE THEORIES

Chapter IX: The New Skepticism

Theodore Lyman, *The Diplomacy of the United States* (Wells & Lilly, Boston, 1826), made the following comment about America's position in the world during the Presidency of John Quincy Adams:

> America is not a member of the holy alliance (1815 alliance of Protestant, Catholic, and Greek Orthodox nations); she is not connected with any nation by the form of her government, or by situation, or by firm compacts. But she is one of the great confederation of Christian states. One of those powers who, by religion, arts and sciences, compose what is called the civilized part of the world.[1]

It was stated in the previous chapter that a league of preponderant states has never been given a fair trial. The inference was clear that an effort in this direction would deserve serious consideration. For instance, one need only imagine the effect on the Eastern Hemisphere of a diplomatic alliance among England, France, Germany and a non-Bolshevik Russia. But a development in this direction might well be applauded without implying the necessity of American participation in such a combination. President Polk's 1845 corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is virtually ignored today. The corollary stated that the Monroe Doctrine was predicated upon the supposition that the decadent balance-of-power system had nothing to seek in the Western Hemisphere. Lyman stated in 1826 that the leadership of the United States in this hemisphere was a very natural thing. The United States was the first colonial nation to shake off the bonds of imperial despotism. The scope of her resources and the skills of her people completed the picture of her natural law leadership. The idea of a world divided between Western and Eastern Hemispheres need not be relegated to the age of John Quincy Adams. It is

still a fact that the Eastern Hemisphere faces problems in terms of the large number of contending states which are special to that area. Hence, the need for a league of preponderant states in the Eastern Hemisphere. So long as the Pan-American system works, there is scarcely any need for American participation in such a system in the Eastern Hemisphere. Particularly relevant in this connection is the statement of Lyman that the United States is not connected with other nations by their form of government.

Lyman was advocating the continuation of American independence, and not some policy of Chinese isolation behind any great wall of one sort or another. Lyman was not opposed to international commerce, international conferences, the presence of foreign scholars, or any international measures of a general practical nature. He was opposed to such alien ideas as entangling alliances, military intervention abroad, and world government. He could afford to oppose these things with relentless logic in 1826 when the United States, in comparison with the present day, were relatively poor and weak. It is manifestly much easier to advocate these American values today. But it is not being done by most scholars because, for one reason or another, they favor the surrender of America's independence and the creation with Communist participation, of one monolithic world state.

Consider the role of America's most popular contemporary theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Relativism, 1919-1941* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1961), explains that Niebuhr enjoys his popularity because he has attacked typical American traditions such as aloof independence and neutrality, and because he has advocated American global crusading on a vast scale. Meyer makes the following comment in relation to one of Niebuhr's major works, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (2 vols., Scribner's N. Y., 1941-1943) :

> Niebuhr directed his unhappiness in 1941 upon a moral attitude. He feared America's sense of detachment and distance from the war. He feared American complacency, an emotional attitude—complacency in a world of agony. He feared that victory would amount to a harvest reaped by America from the sacrifices of America's allies.[2]

It is interesting to contemplate the luxury of being concerned because one's country is *not* in danger of becoming involved in war. Then there is the additional luxury of fearing that one's compatriots are too calm and too happy in a world of agony. As a consequence, Niebuhr advocated a program of American global intervention, which of course enormously increased the agony of the rest of the world. For instance, it helped to turn Eastern and Central Europe into a permanent chaos of bullets and murder. Niebuhr also feared that the Soviet Union might bear a heavier burden in warfare than the United States. Imagine the luxury of being concerned that perhaps the losses of Communism are too heavy and that the losses of the United States are too light! And yet Meyer's summary of the attitude characteristic of Niebuhr is a fair and accurate one.

The antithesis between the values of Lyman in the age of John Quincy Adams and the values of Niebuhr in the age of Franklin Roosevelt, is almost complete. Meaningful communication between individuals so widely separated intellectually would be difficult if not impossible. Niebuhr seems to know that President Roosevelt was God's special instrument in the twentieth century. He might have had a difficult time convincing someone like Lyman that Roosevelt was not the anti-Christ.

Stalin, Hitler and Churchill, with all their faults, were at least responding to genuinely critical situations. President Roosevelt deliberately led his nation, although not measurably threatened by the war in the Eastern Hemisphere, into a program of global intervention which greatly accelerated the spread of Communism. There has been a vast change in American intellectual values since the days of John Quincy Adams and the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. The problems are analyzed in a general way in Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (Knopf, N. Y., 1963). Hofstadter recalls that "the American mind was shaped in the mold of early modern Protestantism." There was a general belief in the importance of education, and no stress at all on the need for an intellectual elite. As Hofstadter puts it:

> Perhaps the most decisive testimony of the changed situation of twentieth-century intellectuals is that after 1890 it became possible for the first time to speak of intellectuals as a class.

Hofstadter then proceeds to explain that this class was in rebellion against the American way of life:

> After about 1890 . . . American writers and other intellectuals became a more cohesive class than they had been, became restless with the constraints of gentility and conservatism, and took up arms against American society.
>
> Before this, intellect in America had been mostly associated with the maintenance of old values.[4]

Hofstadter notes that:

> The intellectual class emerged after 1890 as a force standing somewhat to the left, and during the great depression much of it moved to the far left.

Hofstadter adds that:

> They were trying far more than ever to espouse political causes that supposedly represented the case of the people against special interests—it does not matter for this purpose whether these causes were conceived in the Populist, Progressive, or Marxist traditions.

Hofstadter is careful to avoid a direct commitment on the role of Marx in the development of American intellectual radicalism. He feels himself on safer grounds in discussing the roles of Darwin and Freud, and he insists that their influence was enormous. Hofstadter himself does not conceal his own admiration of Darwin and Freud. In fact, he complains that "to this day, the language of most secondary-school biology texts is guarded, and evolution is taught in many places only by indirection."

He notes with evident disgust that in a recent public opinion poll the number of young people who affirmed that "man was evolved from lower forms of animals" was slightly less, 35%, than those who denied this hypothesis (40%, with 24% don't knows). Hofstadter's indignation would be more intelligible if the Darwinian evolutionary hypothesis of the descent of man had in any way been proved. Darwin asserted the hypothesis, and simultaneously denied the Christian doctrine of man's creation by God. However, the proof for

Darwin is still lacking. By the same token, Hofstadter presents a ringing defense of Sigmund Freud and his impact on American educational institutions in general and on the American intellectual in particular. He even goes so far as to assert that whatever "bad consequences" have been found in Freudian doctrine were "misconceived" by poorly informed Freudian disciples.[5]

Hofstadter is thus evasive about discussing Marx and openly enthusiastic about Darwin and Freud. Perhaps it would be no exaggeration to state that Darwin, Marx, and Freud created the gulf between earlier and later American thought in general. Darwin destroyed the faith of American intellectuals in Christianity. Marx destroyed the faith of American intellectuals in America's institutions. Freud demolished the personal ethics based on the Christian tradition in favor of his own personal system of values.[6]

It was still possible for William M. Sloane to contrast European democratic radicalism with American conservatism in 1895:

> The thought of his (Heinrich Heine) time, as of the present day among the scholars of the continent, displays an intense weariness of the past, a yearning to be rid of the old failures and to try new experiments. Quite the contrary is characteristic of America, which, though neither optimistic nor pessimistic, is essentially conservative and melioristic. The democracy of Europe is young, radical, and fierce, that of English America, though determined, has the modesty of long experience. The two are antipodal, and the evidence of this is conclusive wherever they are brought into juxtaposition, as they are so constantly on our own shores. Radical democracy in any degree will of course level down and not up, and so destroy all greatness both in the making and in the writing of history.[7]

The new radical Marxian, Darwinian and Freudian doctrines were busily at work in America when Sloane recorded his own views. They had not yet had time to transform the American scene. Another American historian, Albert Bushnell Hart, was able to say in 1898 that: "The Americans are one of the most conservative of all peoples, and their whole political system rests on a respect for precedent."[8]

By 1906, the American scene was rapidly changing. As J. Franklin Jameson, the editor of the *American Historical Review,* put it:

> It may well be that the historical writers of the next generation will lay all their emphasis on social and economic history.
>
> But even after the tide has set in the direction of economic and social history strongly, even violently, as is the manner of American currents, even in that socialistic millenium toward which we are no doubt advancing, it is at present hoped that students, however fascinated with the narrative and the theory of social movement, however penetrated with the conviction that economic forces have controlled our human destinies, will yet remember that for the last 400 years the actual form in which human life has mainly run its course has been that of the nation.[9]

In the meantime, while American intellectuals were losing their faith at home, they were being asked to devote their attention to foreign affairs. The following statement is from a lengthy article by an anonymous high-ranking British General Staff officer which appeared in the *American Historical Review,* July, 1911:

> For the first time since Mahomet II converted the Church of St. Sophia into a Mahomedan mosque, the armies of the East have repulsed decisively the armies of the West, and Christians have fallen back before the unbaptised (Russo-Japanese War—1904-1905).
>
> But for the two great Anglo-Saxon communities, east and west of the Atlantic, so proud and confident in their population, in their wealth, and in their mighty possessions, the Manchurian Campaign sounds also another and even graver note of warning, the warning that the richest and seemingly the most powerful states may meet with sudden and deep humiliation, if national preparation for defence is neglected, and the spirit of self-sacrifice for the national good is subordinated to the desire for individual comfort, individual ease, and so-called individual freedom. The evil effect of pure individualism is, we may gladly admit, more and more fully recognized by Anglo-Saxon democracies as regards the internal life of a nation (i.e., the new transition towards socialism) but it is still obstinately ignored as regards the duty of that personal military service, upon the performance of which the continuance of the existence of the nation may depend.

A further example of preparation for possible tests of valor abroad may be seen in the typical quoting of foreign

predictions that the United States was about to depart from their traditional foreign policy in favor of new alliances. Roland G. Usher, cites the following from his review of a book by the leading German historian, Hermann Oncken (*American Historical Review,* January, 1915) :

> In conclusion, he says, 'In the first rank of conquering world powers is the Union (America) now to be found. But the further it progresses along this row, the more it will be drawn into the net of world antagonisms, the more it will be compelled to take sides with the great coalitions, and the more it will lose the early peculiarity of continental isolation with all its advantages in an age in which the Great Powers and their dependencies stretch around the globe.'

Increasing skepticism toward religion, toward American politics and constitutional practice, toward the traditional American economic system, was accompanied by a skeptical attitude toward traditional American foreign policy. It was an age of revolt against the values of the past, accompanied by a naive willingness to embrace whatever new doctrines arrived from abroad. One encounters this in C. J. H. Hayes, "The History of German Socialism Reconsidered" (*A.H.R.* Oct. 1917). It must be emphasized that Hayes is discussing German organized Marxism. He comments as follows:

> Too much has been said about its international policies and its merely tactical manoeuvers in German politics, and too little about its greatest and best contributions to the Germany of the present and of the future.

This naive praise of a supposedly beneficent Marxism was considered perfectly normal by the 1917 editors of the principal American historical journal. This was the era in which Marxism triumphed in Russia. William Roscoe Thayer describes some of the changes very bluntly in his article "Vagaries of Historians" (*A.H.R.,* January, 1919) :

> In the nineteenth century, however, came the revelation, now generally accepted among intelligent peoples, that the earth is not the centre of the universe, and consequently man's cosmic position has completely changed.
>
> The modern key word for solving the enigma is evolution, development, growth, not special creation according to theological assertions and guesses.

Thayer then proceeded to apologize for his own comparatively old fashioned way of looking at the matter:

> But in general I feel that the less an historian has to do with science, the less he deliberately admits and assumes scientific aims and conclusions, the better.

In other words, although Thayer did not feel comfortable about the newly dominant scientific (actually pseudo-scientific) trend, he dared pit only his feelings, not his intellect, against it. Above all, in academic circles one was expected to apologize for one's Christian affiliation.

The trend away from American nationalism in favor of world government was clearly reflected in Frederic A. Ogg and Charles A. Beard, *National Governments and the World War* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1919, 603 pp.). These authors insisted upon deducing from the World War experience that modern nationalism was obsolete. Ogg subsequently established a reputation at the University of Wisconsin as the leading American authority on comparative constitutional government. Beard later renounced the prevailing internationalist vogue. Probably no leading American scholar was ever denounced more fiercely by the majority of his colleagues than Dr. Beard at the time his final volume on Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy appeared in 1948 (see especially S. E. Morison, "History through, a Beard," *Atlantic,* August 1948). His internationalist colleagues regarded him as a sort of apostate.

In his review of the Ogg and Beard volume for the *A.H.R.*, July, 1919, J. M. Callahan noted that:

> For international government Dr. Ogg favors a league of nations with power to enforce peace by appropriate machinery and by acceptance of certain restrictions on the sovereignty of states.

The accent was on the drift toward world government rather than on alliance of independent states to maintain the peace.

The complacency of the dominant internationalist school among American historians was rudely shaken by the American economic depression of 1929 and the drift toward authoritarianism abroad. For a short time it appeared that the tendency to express skepticism about traditional American

ideas and values would be replaced by a return to American nationalism. This mood was reflected in Theodore Clarke Smith, "The Writing of American History in America from 1884 to 1934 (*A.H.R.*, April, 1935) :

> It may be that another fifty years will see the end of an era in historiography, the final extinction of a noble dream and history, save as an instrument of entertainment, or of social control, will not be permitted to exist. In that case, it will be time for the American Historical Association to disband, for the intellectual assumptions on which it is founded will have been taken away from beneath it. My hope is, none the less, that those of us who did form what may then seem an age of quaint beliefs and forgotten loyalties, may go down with our flags flying.

It would be interesting to speculate on what the chances might have been for a new trend in American historical thought had the Rooseveltian adventure in world intervention not been rewarded with superficial success. At the time of the Atlantic Conference in August, 1941, both Roosevelt and Churchill were inclined to assume that the Soviet Union would go down to final military defeat before the end of 1941. Had that happened, a successful Anglo-American invasion of the European continent would have been a dubious prospect at best. Failure to conquer Europe might well have strengthened a trend toward traditional American values at home. But that was not to be, and the internationalist trend continued with greater vigor than ever before after V. E. Day and V. J. Day.

The existing state of affairs was reflected in the presidential address to the American Historical Association of Bernadotte E. Schmitt in New York City on December 29, 1960. Schmitt had experienced some difficulties during the 1930's because of the drift away from internationalist views at that time.

Twenty years later, the picture had changed completely. Schmitt was considered to have been vindicated by the policies of Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower. His election to the presidency of the American Historical Association was regarded as symbolic justice. His presidential address was largely autobiographical and most of the audience received it as a sort of oracle.

Schmitt recalled that he began his professional historical studies at Oxford University in October, 1905. His 1910 Ph.D. thesis on "British Foreign Policy and the Enforcement of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878-1887, was published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1917. Schmitt had written a strong defense of British balance-of-power politics, and his first great period of popularity came with our entry into the First World War.

Schmitt's talk in 1960 was entitled "With How Little Wisdom . . . ." This was derived from what Swedish Chancellor Oxenstierna was supposed to have said to his queen at the close of the Thirty Years War: "with how little wisdom the world is governed." Schmitt's use of the expression was meant to apply to the alleged excesses of traditional nationalism. It seemed noteworthy to Schmitt that the American Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 27, 1914 that there was "reason to believe matters will be arranged without a general European war"; it was only on July 31st that Gerard reported that "Russia's mobilization makes war inevitable." But these two testimonials are in no way a proof that the American diplomat was naive. There was, in fact, every reason to believe that a general war could be averted until the Russian general mobilization took place. There was also good reason to believe, as late as September 2, 1939, that a second general European war could be averted. It has been one of the weaknesses in his historical writing that he tends to take a fatalistic attitude toward events: that which finally happened had to happen. Whatever he has written in his post-1914 work is permeated with his own awareness of the supposedly inevitable catastrophe. In reality, there was nothing inevitable about the 1914 and 1939 disasters. To regard them with such fatalism merely encourages the possibility of future disasters on a comparable scale.

In his 1960 lecture, Schmitt deprecated the *Grosse Politik* (48 vols. of documents on events leading to 1914; generally regarded as the best published collection of its kind). He expressed admiration for the title selected by the new Cambridge Modern History for the 1898-1945 period: *The Age of Violence.* Schmitt contended that German diplomacy before

1914 was "singularly maladroit." This is an accurate characterization, but it is noteworthy that he did not apply some comparable appellation to the deceptive British foreign policy of 1914, or to our own American policy of the same year. President Wilson sent Colonel House on a mission to Europe in 1914 in the hope of arranging a coalition among the United States, Great Britain and Germany along the lines earlier advocated by Joseph Chamberlain. It would be difficult to imagine a more unrealistic diplomatic strategy on the eve of the First World War, when Great Britain and Germany were heading two rival alliance sytems. There are many further examples of Schmitt's habitual one-sidedness. For instance, he claimed that the Brest-Litovsk separate peace between Germany and Russia in March, 1918, proved that the Germans were every bit as "avaricious" as the allied propagandists claimed. Schmitt was not bothered by the fact that this myth had been exploded many times. In the Peace Conference in 1918, General Hoffmann asked Joffe, one of the Soviet delegates, why the Reds were asking for the return of Congress Poland (former grand duchy of Warsaw transferred to Russian rule at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) when the overwhelming majority of the Polish people were resolutely opposed to Bolshevism. This was an age of self-determination, and Hoffmann insisted to Joffe that the Polish people would never vote for Bolshevism. Joffe replied that they certainly would do so if the Red Army was permitted to occupy Poland for a certain period of time. Not one square inch of former Russian territory was annexed by the German Empire at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. What Germany did do, however, was to protect a number of newly independent nations, such as Poland and Finland, from Bolshevik conquest and terror. It was typical for Schmitt to seek to disguise these obvious facts and to suggest an interpretation diametrically opposed to them.

Equally interesting was Schmitt's vigorous defense of Wilson's deliberate attempt to foment a Marxist revolution in Germany in October, 1918. This has been widely considered as one of the greatest crimes of modern diplomacy, which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. The German parlia-

mentary system in October, 1918, had evolved to a point where it was indistinguishable from the British system (apart from the fact that Germany remained a federal state along American lines, rather than a unitary state along English lines). As in England, the German cabinet ministers were responsible to the German parliament (Reichstag and Reichsrat). As a matter of fact, Germany's universal manhood suffrage, in existence since 1867, was broader than England's limited suffrage (until 1928). Nevertheless, and quite apart from military victory, President Wilson did everything he could to encourge the German subversives to overthrow this system in order to introduce Marxist chaos and confusion. He told the Germans several times in public notes that they would not even receive decent peace terms unless they overthrew the existing domestic political system within Germany. No greater inducement to the bloody riots and revolts of the period November 1918—November 1923 could be imagined. Many an apologist for Wilson has expressed doubt about this particular policy. It was typical of Schmitt that he vociferously defended it before his American professional colleagues in 1960.

Equally typical is Schmitt's refusal to admit the obvious fact that the 1919 peace treaties were totally at variance with Wilson's Fourteen Points which, except for Point 2 on freedom of the seas, constituted a solemn contractual armistice agreement between Germany and the Allies. By the same token, Schmitt denounced the Hoare-Laval Pact of 1935 as "shocking." It has long since been obvious that it was French failure to consolidate her alliance with Italy in 1935 which enabled Hitler to challenge the French status quo and alliance system in Western and Central Europe. Had the Hoare-Laval Pact succeeded, Ethiopian independence would not have been destroyed, France and Italy would not have been separated diplomatically, and Hitler would not have been granted his exceptional opportunities. However, it is also a well known fact that the Hoare-Laval Pact failed because English Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin lacked the moral courage to stand behind Sir Samuel Hoare, his foreign secretary. This is particularly noteworthy when one recalls that Baldwin had

fully approved Hoare's Paris diplomacy in advance. Of course, the Hoare-Laval Pact was denounced by the Soviet Union as well as Baldwin. This was because Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov was deliberately seeking to promote a Franco-German war and to frustrate French attempts to pacify Europe short of war. It would have been surprising indeed had Schmitt not denounced the Hoare-Laval Pact in the strongest terms in his address at New York City in 1960.

It is not surprising that Schmitt warmly defended the British foreign policy of August, 1939. After all, this policy led to the general European war which Schmitt had personally been advocating ever since the Munich Conference. It is amusing to study Schmitt's elaborate efforts to defend the Soviet Union for concluding her non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. This is indeed a paradoxical situation. Schmitt simultaneously praises Halifax for promoting war and Stalin for pursuing a neutrality policy. Equally noteworthy is the bland contention that the eventual German preventive war against the Soviet Union had been inevitable ever since September 1, 1939. In reality, complex developments preceded that war and the numerous efforts by Hitler to arrive at a lasting accommodation with Stalin have been thoroughly documented by Phillipe Fabry and a large number of other historians. It is typical of Schmitt to gloss over the complex events and simply to contend that one catastrophic development or the other was inevitable from the beginning.

It should also occasion no surprise that Schmitt warmly approved of the English unconditional surrender policy toward Germany, as formulated at London in 1939 and adopted by President Roosevelt at Casablanca in 1943. The following is typical of Schmitt's process of reasoning

> The agreement to insist on Germany's 'unconditional surrender' has also been criticized on the ground that it prolonged unnecessarily the resistance of Germany. I am not convinced of this. It must be remembered that in 1918 Germany surrendered on condition that peace would be based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Germans later complained that the Fourteen Points had been ignored in the Treaty of Versailles. 'Unconditional surrender' guaranteed that the Allies would not have to meet that reproach a second time.

In other words, break a treaty with your adversary on the first occasion, and in the next, wipe him out completely to avoid the charge of bad faith. This is undoubtedly an interesting approach, but certainly no one would contend that it remotely resembles an approach based upon traditional American ethics.

Hofstadter and others have pointed out that the early generations of independent Americans tended to be men of faith, confident about their views of the world, and about their independent republic and its future. The intellectuals after 1890, who became a separate class, were men of skepticism: skeptical toward Christianity and toward America's future as an independent nation. Their approach was primarily negative. They talked about internationalism, it is true, but Porter Sargent, Sr., one of America's leading educators, sagely observed that men often speak of things more frequently when they are slipping away. Sargent spent the decade before 1914 travelling around this planet of ours without ever having to use a passport. There was less talk about internationalism then than there is now. But there was also more genuine internationalism, in the constructive sense of free travel and communication than there is today. By the same token, the suppression of the independent national states of this world might well annihilate nationalism without creating an internationalism in any way equivalent to what men enjoyed within the old pre-1914 system of national states. Many of the later historians are skeptical toward what men once possessed while being simultaneously naively hopeful about the Brave New World which has been promised to them by the radical humanists. Skepticism, like any other frame of mind, has its place. But it is tragic when men seem to be skeptical and negative toward their most precious assets, and naively hopeful about human forces which, in the long run, are likely to do them only harm. Coping with problems of this kind is undoubtedly part of the challenge facing American education and American historical scholarship today.

Chapter X: The New History

George Bancroft wrote history in the spirit of American nationalism and, despite his unorthodoxy, of Christian faith. The subsequent denial or deprecation of nationalism and Christianity by a multitude of American historians meant that a vacuum remained to be filled. The major attempt to meet this challenge has come to be known as the New History. In discussing his experiences at Columbia University around the turn of the century, James T. Shotwell makes the following comment:

> Beard (i.e., Charles Beard) and I later differed very much in outlook. He became an isolationist and I went into the field of international relations. Both Beard and I looked to Robinson (i.e., James Harvey Robinson) as the pioneer in what he termed "The New History."[1]

The New History was actually born at Columbia University, the institution of higher education which also provided the leadership for the twentieth century trends in American public education.

Although the question has never been adequately examined, it would seem that a more exotic birthplace for this school of historical writing than New York City was required. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the disciples of Robinson have placed so much emphasis on their supposed debt to the German historian, Karl Lamprecht. The actual connection between Robinson and Lamprecht was artificially established. Their ideas on history are about as far apart as were the thoughts of Hegel and Marx on philosophy and political economy. However, it can at least be argued that Marx derived his system, both thought and method, by reversing Hegel, by placing his sole emphasis on materialism in the same way that Hegel had insisted on emphasizing idealism. In the case of Robinson and Lamprecht there does not seem to be such a parallel. The most that can be said is that Lamprecht

was already a celebrity when Robinson was just beginning to establish his own reputation. As a matter of fact, Robinson never did become the author of any truly major works. He published some articles, essays, and secondary school textbooks. There was talk about a forthcoming history of the western world, but it was never completed. Robinson's reputation was established in the classroom, and some of his former students became extraordinarily influential on the American intellectual scene. The unsuspecting Lamprecht was lured into visiting America in 1904 to give some lectures at Columbia. The myth about the transplantation of Lamprecht's ideas to America followed. It ought not to be forgotten that German historical scholarship enjoyed extraordinary prestige in America in 1904. During the preceding period, there had been as many as four thousand American graduate students at German universities in a single year. By the same token, the prestige of German scholars in America today has fallen very low due to the military defeats of Germany in both world wars. It therefore takes a very deliberate, conscious effort to recall the earlier situation.

Harry Elmer Barnes, *A History of Historical Writing,* (2nd ed., Dover, N. Y., 1962) deals with Lamprecht in the intellectual context of the nineteenth century Romantic revolt against the Enlightenment:

> It was left for Lamprecht nearly a century later to take over what was really valuable in the Romanticist doctrines and to work them over into his famous theory of historic development as a process of transformations and mutations within the collective psychology of both a nation and community.[2]

As in the case of other profound German historians willing to philosophize about history, it is true that Lamprecht was constantly in danger of being misunderstood. For instance, he made use of "collective-psychological dominance." Lamprecht was dealing with German history on a broad scale from the end of the Carolingian Dynasty in the tenth century down to the industrialization of modern Germany. He hoped to be able to characterize meaningfully certain epochs of German history (high middle ages, late middle ages, reformation, early modern, etc.). These collective psychological

dominants in no sense imply a desire on the part of Lamprecht to promote collectivism or socialism. Although Lamprecht was primarily interested is social and economic history, and no less conversant with the works of Marx than with the works of Hegel, he was first and foremost an idealist who merely wished to give the material factors of history their just deserts. For instance, unlike Robinson, there is no trace in Lamprecht's 15-volume history (published between 1891 and 1911) of any attempt to undermine, discredit, or disavow either Christianity or nationalism. Robinson was forever attacking both Christianity and nationalism.

In the opinion of many distinguished critics, Lamprecht wrote the most stimulating and useful general history of Germany ever produced. Needless to say, the competition in this field from the days of Niebuhr down to the present day of Wahl and Schnabel has been formidable indeed. Robinson wrote pointed and provocative essays and textbooks lacking original research. Lamprecht opened up entire new vistas on the basis of original research (i.e., the reasons why Suabia, unlike Switzerland and Holland, did not separate from the rest of Germany and become an independent state). Robinson was more interested in illuminative reasoning and the exploitation of the primary research done by others. Lamprecht hoped to increase the factual knowledge of his compatriots about German history. Robinson was primarily interested in debunking such facts as were already known. The approach of Lamprecht was overwhelmingly affirmative and positive toward his subject. Although Robinson professed to believe in the perfectibility of man and the creation of Utopia here on earth, his approach toward the past achievements of man, whether in America or elsewhere, was primarily negative. Both men attracted gifted and ardent followers because of the brilliance of their minds, but their contributions were entirely different.

Lamprecht was seven years older than Robinson. The latter was firmly established at Columbia and the former at Leipzig when Earl Wilbur Dow, "Features of the New History: Apropos of Lamprecht's *Deutsche Geschichte*," appeared in the April, 1898 *American Historical Review*. Dow

agreed enthusiastically with Lamprecht that "we are gradually coming into another period of generalization." The reasons for Dow's hopeful enthusiasm are not far to seek. Fifty years earlier, George Gervinus, one of the greatest German historians, had exclaimed in despair that Leopold von Ranke was turning up so much primary source material in the European archives that only specialized monographs, but no works of synthesis, would be possible in the decades ahead.

It is the nature of all human knowledge to seek eventually to simplify the universe even if this means to falsify it. Darwin's idea of the descent of man from protozoan slime seems amazingly simple compared to the complex and subtle doctrines of Christian theology so that many scholars tended to accept Darwin's theory without really questioning whether or not it was actually true. Lamprecht claimed to be in a position to generalize meaningfully about the complex trends of history. He believed in the use of the related disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, and economics, as well as geography and political science. This seemed to conform with the developing American pattern. It is small wonder that there was a boom in Lamprecht among American historians, particularly when we recall that in those days, unlike today, most of them could read German fluently.

James Harvey Robinson, *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (Macmillan, N. Y., 1912), remarks that "in its amplest meaning History includes every trace and vestige of everything that man has done or thought since he first appeared on the earth."[3] Robinson liked Lamprecht's general approach because "it is clear that in treating history for the general reader the question of selection and proportion is momentous." He believed that conventional historical writing placed too much emphasis on great men, political events at the top level, and military history. He was on strong ground in regarding the end effect as disproportionate, and in praising Lamprecht's sense of proportion. Besides, Robinson was intensely anti-Christian. Although Lamprecht did not attack Christianity, he had very little to say about strictly theological questions in comparison

to someone like Ranke, who had very nearly entered the ministry instead of becoming a historian.

Robinson admired the eighteenth century because of the "regenerative workings of the new spirit of Enlightenment." This was the era in which Diederot said that mankind will not be free until the last king is strangled in the entrails of the last priest. In other words, the Enlightenment constituted an attack on the traditional values of Western civilization, even though individual figures, such as Voltaire, were conservative in their practical politics. Robinson complained that the "disproportionate fondness for political and military affairs" had discouraged historians from understanding "ourselves and our fellows and the problems and prospects of mankind." He contended that "the present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has now come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance." In other words, Robinson believed that overthrowing all of the traditional values would facilitate human progress. This is why he opposed the Christian emphasis in history and denounced Hegel for exhorting the Germans "to be the bearers of the Christian principle."[4]

Robinson expressed his enthusiasm for Karl Marx, who "denounced those who discover the birthplace of history in the shifting clouds of heaven instead of in the hard, daily work on earth." Robinson was careful not to identify himself 100% with Marx, but he claimed that the Marxian dialectic "serves to explain far more of the phenomena of the past than any other single explanation ever offered." Robinson was inclined to consider the works of Marx as offering the most light for mankind, and the Christian Bible as the manifestation of darkness. Above all, Robinson insisted that the humanist doctrine of man's ultimate perfection on earth was the only valid approach to history. He exulted that "not until the 18th century did the possibility of indefinite human progress become the exhilarating doctrine of reformers, a class which had previously attacked existing absolutes in the name of the 'good old times' (i.e., Thomas More's *Utopia*)."[5]

Robinson conceived history as the domain of science from which the Christian religion should be totally excluded:

> Now—and this cannot be too strongly emphasized—the continuity of history is a scientific truth, the attempt to trace the slow process of change is a scientific problem, and one of the most fascinating in its nature. It is the discovery and application of this law which has served to differentiate history from literature and morals, and which has raised it, in one sense, to the dignity of a science.

Like other materialists, Robinson embraced Darwinism as final truth rather than as a mere hypothesis:

> Even today I find that members of the guild are some of them inclined to deny that man's descent from the lower animals is, strictly speaking, an historical fact, although they would concede that Henry II's descent from William the Conqueror is such.

Robinson believed that "the discovery of organic evolution was the culmination, not the beginning, of a philosophical revolution." Robinson saw in evolution the fulfilment of the Enlightenment dream of a world of pure reason. He opposed the idea of different human races and advocated a melting pot for all mankind. The subversive movements which transformed a French political reform movement into a destructive revolution find his unqualified approval; he is inclined to ridicule those who disagree:

> Yet not a few have dared to look back with regret, even with yearning, upon that ancient regime whose ruins the Assembly so plentifully sowed with the salt of its contempt.

Carthage has been destroyed! In other words, Robinson considers that the ravings of a few Jacobin deputies have deprived the French people of their earlier tradition extending over many centuries. Robinson is willing to cite a contemporary French conservative authority such as Charles d'Hericault, but only after first labelling him "a hopelessly reactionary royalist." Robinson reserves special venom for what he considers the vestigial remnants of the spirit of conservatism. He denounces conservatives because of their Christian reluctance to accept Condorcet's dubious theory about "the indefinite perfectibility of man." Robinson contends that "the conservative is a perfectly explicable and inevitable product of that long, long period before man woke up to the possibility of conscious betterment." The following is Robinson's own version of man's glorious past:

> It is a long, long time since human history began, when a species of apes, probably closely allied to the gorilla and chimpanzee of the African forests, found itself able to go on its hind legs without the assistance of its fore limbs, leaving these free to become even more dexterous arms and hands.

This is the spirit of Robinson, who claimed to be the scientific historian, although he has no shred of proof to offer in support of Darwin's assumption about a possible evolutionary connection between animals and man. Needless to say, the type of tirade which so often characterizes the polemical writings of Robinson is nowhere to be found in Lamprecht, the supposed prototype of the much glamorized New Historian.

Harry Elmer Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (Century, N.Y., 1925, pp. 204-205), quite rightly observes that Robinson as a historian was less rigid in his application of theory and method than was Lamprecht. This was possible because Lamprecht's respect for tradition was a force for restraint which Robinson lacked. The latter considered that the free man must have no respect for tradition whatever. Needless to say, this represents the modern pagan view as opposed to the Christian view. Robinson had many brilliant individual insights, but he was naive in his acceptance of materialist theories and in his disregard of the human wisdom from the past. If Robinson be accepted as one of the first intelligent men upon earth, what sort of opinion can the critic who accepts this viewpoint have toward mankind?

Barnes admits that:

> Lamprecht has exerted a deep influence upon many of the European historians, as well as upon progressive historians in America, where, in 1904, he delivered in the form of a series of lectures his most extensive explosition and defense of his historical method and point of view.[6]

But Barnes suggests that in the narrow sense one might as well attribute Robinson's approach to Francis Bacon as to Karl Lamprecht.

Karl Lamprecht, *Americana: Reiseeindruecke, Betrachtungen, Geschichtliche Gesamtansicht* (Heyfelder, Freiburg im

Breisgau, 1906 Americana: Travel Impressions, Observations, General Historical Impressions), is a description of the travel experiences of the Leipzig historian from July to November, 1904, which culminated in his Columbia University lectures for the New Historians. This account is memorable for several reasons. In the first place, it reveals the vast gulf between Lamprecht's thought and Robinson's. Secondly, it is remarkable for its insights concerning the increasing difficulties in the relations among the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.

Lamprecht did not live to witness the outbreak of the First World War. But the Anglo-French *entente cordiale* had been concluded in April, 1904, and Lamprecht knew that the British leaders were in the process of associating their country with the continental alliance combination hostile to Germany. Lamprecht was thinking ahead about the possible role of the United States in the event of a European conflict. He was inclined to be deeply pessimistic after his trip. He personally favored a diplomatic alignment among the United States, Great Britain and Germany in the style which Cecil Rhodes had advocated. However, there now seemed to be a serious breach between Great Britain and Germany and Lamprecht predicted that the United States would adopt a policy favorable toward Great Britain and her allies and hostile toward Germany in the event of a general European conflict.

Above all, Lamprecht was not impressed with what he saw of the German-American community in the different sections of the United States. Of course, there were many brilliant exceptions, but the German-American community did not have much prestige in comparison with several of the other American ethnic groups. Lamprecht believed that this disappointing reputation was deserved. He was convinced that Americans of British stock, and possibly even Americans of Slavic stock, were surpassing the Americans of German ethnic background in the American environment. Lamprecht imagined that Germany' dismal political record from 1648 to the reunification in 1871 might have something to do with making the Germans less effective than other groups in a new environment with new loyalties.

Unlike Robinson, the German historian was a nationalist. He noted with some sadness that the Teutons of world history have tended to teach that the hate of one's own cousins is the best hate. This had been his observation in his studies of German and English history. He was not entirely fatalistic about the inevitability of the disaster which actually took place in 1914. He recognized that Germany was not a world power in the style of the British Empire or the United States, and hence not a real competitor. Her dimensions were much more modest. Her rank was something like that of Prussia among the European powers of the eighteenth century. But Lamprecht knew that the new Germany had an impressive defensive military capacity, and he hoped that other nations would recognize that fact: "if you attack her, you will have another seven years' war."[7]

Due to Lamprecht's earlier extensive studies in the field of Americana, it is not surprising that his account showed considerable insight into American institutions and trends. For instance, despite all the muckraking and the strenuous activities of the Progressives, Lamprecht had no difficulty in identifying the United States of 1904 as a predominantly conservative country. New trends, such as the New History, had not yet had time or opportunity to dominate the American scene.

The followers of Robinson distinguished themselves in the eyes of their leader by their strenuous bombardments against the American Christian tradition. Not every American professional historian considered himself to be a disciple of Robinson by 1929 or 1930, but it is nonetheless true that attempts to condemn Robinson's basic premises were usually looked at askance by the guild.

James H. Breasted, "The New Crusade," in *American Historical Review*, January, 1929, presented some aspects of his recent research into the history of Egypt as though the achievements in this field were somehow relevant in discrediting Christianity. This is noteworthy when one recalls that Breasted was elected President of the American Historical Association in 1928.

Breasted contended that the "appearance of civilization for the *first time* (italics his) is the most remarkable event in the history of the universe, insofar as it is known to us." At that time he was still contending that the first major human civilization originated in Egypt. He referred condescendingly to the process known as pseudomorphosis. For instance, Breasted noted that American civilization was imported from Europe, much as one might import perfume or champagne. The civilization in Japan was imported from China. Breasted contended that every human civilization except that of Egypt constituted an example of pseudomorphosis because it was imported from somewhere. Breasted suggested that "there was no hewn stone architecture anywhere on earth when the pyramids of Giza arose."

Breasted hoped that his audience was agreeing with his logic, and probably most of them were. If evolving the first human civilization was in fact the most important human achievement, and if this achievement took place before the Christian era, it must follow from Breasted's reasoning that the achievement of pagan Egypt was more momentous than the revelation of Jesus Christ or any other events which have transpired since that time.

Breasted praised John D. Rockefeller, Jr. for supporting his research efforts over many decades, and he called his research activities a "modern quest for the Holy Grail" and a "new crusade" which was intensified by "feeling a deep reverence for the life of man on the earth." The new dispensation was to be based upon the rejection of Christianity and the glorification of man instead of God. This was one of the most important central assumptions of the New History. It was precisely such an attack upon Christianity which had been lacking in Lamprecht, supposedly the foreign patron saint of the New History.

James Harvey Robinson succeeded Breasted as President of the American Historical Association in 1929. Robinson recalled in his presidential address, "The Newer Ways of Historians," that when he spoke to the guild nineteen years earlier his theories were received "somewhat blankly, with a touch perhaps of hostility." However, during the past two

decades the situation had greatly changed. As Robinson put it:

> Tonight I only fear that what I have to say will appear to you all too commonplace since the temper of thought has undergone a mighty change in the last twenty years. Many a novelty has in that interval flattened into a platitude.

In the category of former novelties one might class the denunciation of Christianity or conservative nationalism. Such approaches were no longer novelties but part of the dominant view. Robinson put the matter very concisely in relation to nationalism:

> National history seems to us more provincial than formerly it did. Fichte could, after the battle of Jena, assure the Germans that they were an original people with an original language—such was the state of ignorance in his time.

In all fairness to Robinson, it ought to be conceded that he never was an expert on early nineteenth century German history. It is still somewhat dubious for Robinson to have misunderstood Fichte so completely. Modern language researchers thoroughly support Fichte's statement that the German language, like the Russian language, is in fact a so-called *Ursprache* (language with a continuous development from the stone age). This would not be true of the so-called modern hybrid languages such as English, French and Italian. So far as the ignorance in the time of Fichte is concerned, this was in fact the greatest period in German letters, and this opinion remains generally accepted today. The following is illustrative of the Robinson position which had become so commonly accepted by 1930:

> 'Civilization' is taking on a new meaning from what it had for older writers. It is what Graham Wallas (admiring biographer of the English Jacobin, Jeremy Bentham) calls our 'social heritage,' as distinguished from our animal heritage.

In other words, apart from the hypothesis about the evolutionary descent of man, the emphasis is on civilization as the record of man in his gregarious activities. There is no place for the older spiritual values in this theory.

Robinson expressed his enthusiasm for Russia's Pavlov and observed that:

> The discoveries in animal psychology are by no means irrelevant to man's conduct in all times. They may well influence one's reflections whether he read the New Testament or the *Morning Times*.

Robinson comes out strongly in favor of a trend toward world government via League of Nations, World Court and the World Bank. He notes that "it may be that the last mentioned, the World Bank, may ere long be speaking more convincingly than either League or Court." Robinson contended that the First World War revealed the bankruptcy of the historians who served old values such as Christianity or nationalism. He asks and answers the following:

> Did such knowledge as historians had arduously accumulated of the past serve to make them wiser than their fellows? Hardly. In all countries they were unable to overcome their native susceptibility to the prejudices of their particular tribe. They gulped down propaganda which in a later mood they realized was nauseous. They were, in short, easily sold out, and their studies had not prepared them to assess a sudden emotional crisis much better than the man in the street. I am not thinking especially of ourselves. But in retrospect our motes appear about as sizable as the beams of British, French and German historians.

There is much wisdom in what Robinson says about the illusions of wartime historians, but this does not mean that fundamental values such as Christianity and patriotism need be assessed as fair-weather values to be served when the results are auspicious and to be discarded the first moment things work out badly in human affairs. Robinson ended his paper on the following excessively dogmatic humanistic note: "The growing recognition that we are super-animals, not degraded angels, is making clear what was once dark."

In *The Human Comedy, as Devised and Directed by Mankind Itself* (3rd edition, Harper, N.Y., 1937), Robinson went the full length in advocating the use of history by professional historians as an instrument of Messianic crusading to achieve the perfectibility of man. Of course, this meant substituting propaganda for real history. Robinson, however, insisted that such a use of history would be the fulfillment of the most perfect and effective application of modern science:

> Modern scientific research, in spite of its professed aloofness and disregard of human feelings and motives, has succeeded in unfolding at our gates so new a world in its origins, development, workings, and possibilities of *control in the interest of human welfare* (italics mine) that practically all of the older poetic and religious ideas have to be fundamentally revised or re-interpreted.[8]

Robinson believed that "history might be the great illuminator. As yet it is highly imperfect; but some day it may well become the most potent instrument for human regeneration."[9]

Robinson successfully unleashed a storm of criticism against Christianity and traditional American nationalism by American historians. It was not the first storm of this kind, but it was the most severe and it continues unabated after Robinson's death.

Verne Paul Kaub, *Collectivism Challenges Christianity,* (American Council of Christian Laymen, Madison, Wisc., 1961, 249 pp.) bitingly dedicated his study:

> To all those valiant pastors, of every faith and creed, who, braving the scorn of the liberal intelligentsia, continue to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and Him crucified.

Robinson, unlike Lamprecht, believed that modern historical research ought to attack the highest human values in a dogmatic fashion in order to create a brave new world. Robinson insisted on describing his approach as scientific and objective. In reality, he proved to be a victim of the same illusion which plagued the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment, namely, the perfection of men through the use of human reason. One of the greatest tasks confronting the historical guild in America today is the liberation of American historical science from such illusions. In the meantime, there is no doubt that the outlook of the New History is still the dominant outlook among the American professional historians today.

CONCLUSION

There seem to be two principal schools of thought among professional historians in the United States about the eight crises presented in this study. One group of historical scholars takes what might be called a positive view of the American record in relation to 1775, 1812, and 1846. They regard the American Civil War as a sudden aberration in the American pattern resulting from the pursuit of mistaken policies during the years from 1860 to the end of the Reconstruction era in 1877. They regard 1898 as a second major aberration, this time in the conduct of American foreign policy. The same group considers 1917 to be still a third aberration, but they also emphasize that there was no fatal or inevitable link between 1898 (temporary American overseas imperialism) and 1917 (American intervention in the First World War). This former group tends to praise the return to normalcy in the policies of the Harding administration. They look to the years from 1941 to 1949 under Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman for the genesis of the Cold War situation, which now seemingly holds our people captive, with the pursuit of a world-wide policy divorced from the traditional American position. This group deplores the Cold War as an adventure at the behest of the United Nations, an organization which they regard more as a threat to American sovereignty than as a contribution to genuine international conciliation.

The group described above is known as Revisionist. Its members are numerous, but its influence is small. This group of historians, in turn, like the existentialists in the field of philosophy, is divided between professing Christians and some earnest and sincere non-Christian humanists.

The prevalent opinion among the American professional historians of the present day is almost exactly the reverse of the one described above. The dominant group tends to be very harsh in judging the policies of the American Revolution-

ists of 1775. It ridicules American policies in relation to the War of 1812 as hypocritical camouflage for aggrandizement. The conflict with Mexico in 1846 is condemned as a manifestation of chauvinism. On the origins of the American Civil War, the group tends to magnify Lincoln's role while deprecating the efforts of Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln's principal rival from Illinois, to avert the conflict. The group tends to apologize for American policies resulting in armed intervention in Europe in 1917 and 1941, while accepting policies in relation to the Korean War as a series of blunders which nevertheless produced the good result of strengthening the United Nations.

The Revisionist group often tends to consider the major group as either lethargic or perverse in holding what the Revisionists consider to be untenable and obsolete opinions in 1964. However, such thinking usually constitutes an effort to dismiss the real problem much too easily. A typical example is furnished by one of the conclusions reached in the televised discussion between Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager at the Huntington Library on July 31, 1963. These two leading anti-Revisionist historians had been discussing successful historical biographies. They agreed that an element of tragedy in a biography tended to increase its popularity with the reading public. They then proceeded to reach the remarkable conclusion that the public career of England's Winston Churchill was entirely successful, and lacked every element of tragedy. At first glance, an assertion of this kind appears to be sheer stupidity. The statement of Churchill that he did not become His Majesty's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire has been cited over and again. The decisive events in the permanent political decline of the British Empire took place while Winston Churchill, formerly the ardently conservative nationalist leader, was prime minister. Even Churchill himself uses the word tragedy in the title of the final volume of his memoirs. The point to remember, however, is that anti-Revisionist historians, such as Nevins and Commager, consider everything exclusively in terms of their own personal subjective viewpoints. Churchill's career may have been a

tragedy for Winston Churchill, but it was entirely satisfactory from the standpoint of Nevins and Commager.

Great Britain, in the Second World War, was like the man seeking to thumb a ride from San Francisco to Oakland who ended up in Tucson, Arizona. This is a symbol of what happened when the British leaders relied upon Franklin Roosevelt to help them solve their problems. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Winston Churchill unintentionally contributed in his career to the destruction of modern nationalism and to the creation of a trend toward the monolithic world state which anti-Revisionist historians proclaim over and over again as the desirable goal of mankind. It would be untenable for anyone to argue that truly brilliant men, such as Nevins and Commager, whose record of historical research and writing is available to everyone, are so unintelligent as to misinterpret the basic meaning of Winston Churchill's career. It is entirely a question of perspective. They simply interpret it from their own standpoint rather than from Churchill's.

These historians declared on the same occasion that American policy toward Germany since the Second World War had been generous to an unprecedented degree. Of course, this statement might appear ludicrous to any intelligent West German, even a member of the Bonn intellectual establishment. He would know that the United States has taken more money out of West Germany in military occupation costs than she has loaned to that country under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. He would know that the Morgenthau plan of starvation (J.C.S. 1067) governed American policy in West Germany during the years before the Cold War prompted some concessions in the interest of political expediency. He would know of the tens of thousands of German prisoners of war exposed to the elements without shelter or adequate food during the months after the armistice in the camps at Remagen and Bad Kreuznach. He would know that American policy in West Germany in 1964 is still dedicated to the eradication of traditional German nationalism.

If he is a mature man, this hypothetical West German citizen will not be bitter, but he will realize that the United

States, like Germany, has made some important blunders in foreign policy. But he would never describe American policy toward Germany since 1945 as unprecedented in its generosity. On the contrary, he might even be inclined to regard present American policy as one of the most formidable obstacles to the recovery of unity in Germany. Once again, it is patently obvious that Nevins and Commager are not stupid. They merely look at the American impact on Germany from their own standpoint and from their own interests, rather than from the standpoint or interests of the German.

Many Revisionists imagine that the anti-Revisionist historians will be prompted to change their opinions by the uninterrupted parade of Communist victories throughout the world. It must be recalled, however, that this assumption is predicated on the premise that all, or most, American intellectuals today abhor Communism. But will this necessarily be the case for those who are enthusiastic about Marx, Darwin, and Freud, or who recognize in Communism a logical extension of radical humanism and the doctrine of the perfectibility of man? It would seem possible that intellectuals of this category would choose life in the Soviet Union today over life in the America of one hundred years ago. Is there really any valid reason to assume that such intellectuals are necessarily genuinely and sincerely horrified by the spread of World Communism? Do the criteria which apply to the judgment of the conservative nationalist apply to the radical humanist advocate of world government? It is always easy to accuse the person with whom one disagrees of stupidity. It is usually unjust to do so. It is often merely a case of different values, different attachments, and different allegiances. This study is tentative and suggestive rather than exhaustive. It has attempted to throw some light on problems of values and meanings. In the present complex age, stipulative definitions are necessary more often than ever before if successful communication is to be established. A recognition of the basic premises on the part of one's colleagues and associates is desirable for successful communication about the vital issues.

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